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Abstract 
 
This thesis traces the evolution of the concept of African philosophy through three 
phases: the cultural essentialism of Léopold Senghor, founder of Négritude, the 
universalist critical reaction of Paulin Hountondji and the professional 
philosophers, and the sophisticated particularism of Valentin Mudimbé. The three 
stages are contextualized with discussion of the socio-political positioning of each 
writer, his motives, and his particular understanding of what is at stake in the 
definition of African philosophy. 
The initial need to bring about a revalorization of African culture and a 
recognition of African philosophical capabilities is met by a flamboyant and 
highly vocal cultural movement, Négritude, which is, however, intrinsically 
limited in scope and lifespan, and sets up a number of persistent, dogmatic 
suppositions about the ‘essentially African reason’. A demonstration of the 
Western origins of this essentialism debunks but does not dispel its influence, 
since it is firmly anchored to the themes of authenticity, colonial influence, and 
postcolonial independence. This leads to a dilemma where any move to separate 
African philosophy from the notion of a distinctly African reason is perceived as a 
Eurocentric attempt at acculturation, or a capitulation to the false universalism of 
‘Enlightenment philosophy’, and on the other hand, the view that African thought 
is essentially different from European thought is also criticized as deriving from 
the Western colonial discourse. 
There is no definitive answer to this problem, and even the search for such an 
answer is itself part of the problem, a further twist in the ruse that Mudimbé 
believes is inherent to the colonial discourse. The practical solution Mudimbé 
proposes is to introduce an écart between African scientific practice and the West, 
to create a new space within which Africans might investigate the field of their 
experience in an Afrocentric way which will preserve their cultural specificity. 
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THEL’S MOTTO 
 
Does the Eagle know what is in the pit? 
Or wilt thou go ask the Mole? 
Can Wisdom be put in a silver rod? 
Or Love in a golden bowl?1 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The Problems of African Philosophy 
One of the first questions that one is apt to pose with respect to any academic 
subject is, of course, why should we study this area? Apart from personal interest 
and topical peculiarities (such as the fact that the area is usually neglected by 
Western philosophy), possible responses may be found by considering the 
specific problems that come up within the context of African philosophy, how 
they may be solved, or at least approached, and what relevance all this may bear 
to other subjects of interest and to philosophy in general. 
As we remarked above, African philosophy is an area generally neglected by the 
Western academy, which tends to engage with it on two fronts: first, insofar as 
African philosophers deal with subjects of direct relevance to Western 
philosophy, especially the texts of Western philosophers or the themes which 
dominate the Western philosophical environment; and secondly, as an object of 
study, through disciplines like anthropology and ethnology, which assume an 
essential difference between African societies and the West.2 
But the common interests of African and Western philosophy may be more 
numerous than is realized. In the next few paragraphs we shall outline some of 
these interests, which will be further developed in the body of the thesis. 
1.1.1 Philosophy, Africa and Reason 
Post-colonial African philosophical texts typically depart from some sort of 
rumination about the nature of philosophy itself. 3 This is unsurprising, for the 
continent has a singular relationship with this particular discipline, initially 
 9 
because Africa was theorized as the ‘dark’ continent, lost to the light of reason, a 
land imagined to be dominated by savagery and (with the advent of ethnology) by 
the ‘pre-logical mentality’.4 In Western scientific and cultural traditions, Africa 
has by turns been glorified, as the home of primordial (i.e. ‘natural’) freedom, 
untouched by the decadence of culture and civilization;5 vilified, as a mire of 
intellectual and moral perversion or retardation;6 and nullified, as a chaos utterly 
devoid of artistic and scientific talent.7 Throughout European history, and despite 
the immediate evidence of real African philosophers within the very heart of 
European countries and traditions,8 Africans were repeatedly represented as 
creatures incapable of any considerable degree of reflection, and a fortiori 
incapable of philosophy.9 If Africans are at all mentioned in the works of the great 
philosophers, it is rarely with a sentiment other than complete indifference or the 
most scathing contempt. Thus, in his momentous work on the unfolding of 
history, Hegel reserved no place for Africa in the universal realization of the 
World Spirit and denied it even the modest achievement of having a history.10 
The denial of African reason and creativity is closely linked to the dual nature of 
colonial exploitation itself — the symbiotic fusion of cynical opportunism and 
idealized, delusory paternalism inspired complicity in the most surprising 
quarters. Liberal and progressive philosophers, though deploring the violence and 
destruction of colonization and slavery, admitted that Africa was a land suffering 
from gross underdevelopment and requiring the sting of the colonial goad in order 
to attempt to construct an authentic civilization, or to be elevated to the level of 
autonomous rule.11 Even Marx, the arch-critic of social oppression, saw 
colonialism as little more than a necessary stage of development along a linear 
route.12 
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Consequently, African writers have to a great extent been preoccupied with, 
among others, the following issues: (i) the revalorizing of individual 
subjectivities; (ii) the question of the existence or possibility of an African 
philosophy; and, (iii) African independence. 
The first two issues are very closely connected, for one of the ways in which 
writers have tried to revalorize African identities has been to show that Africans, 
too, are rational and engage in philosophical reasoning, either in their traditional 
or modern cultures, or both.  
But it is not merely a case of persuading the European colonizer that Africans 
are civilized and sophisticated beings. As we have just noted, portrayals of 
Africans within Western societies was quite often highly unfavourable, and not 
only because ‘le Noir paraît naturellement comme l’autre lointain, curieux, 
marqué face à l’un qu’est l’Européen, norme et modèle’.13 Europe’s destiny being 
linked to Africa through the design, implementation and long-lasting effects of 
colonialism, the revaluation of African identities has not only been a matter of 
correcting misrepresentation, but also of dealing with alienation as it is 
experienced by colonized individuals. Colonization, as the occupation of another 
people’s physical space, includes material dispossession, displacement, and 
coercion. But the greater part of the system’s power, like an iceberg, lies hidden 
below the surface. In Studies In a Dying Colonialism, Frantz Fanon comments on 
the French occupation of Algeria that  
it is not the soil that is occupied. It is not the ports or the aerodromes. French 
colonialism has settled itself in the very centre of the Algerian individual 
and has undertaken a sustained work of clean-up, of expulsion of self, of 
rationally pursued mutilation.14 
Fanon is known for his analytical accounts, often highly subjective, of the 
neuroses that are developed and internalized by the colonized individual and the 
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colonized society as a whole, and the corresponding pathologies that develop 
within the colonizer and the colonial society.15 Indeed, both he and Memmi 
emphasize that colonialism is equally debilitating and degrading for colonizer and 
colonized alike (though the former clearly has material advantages over the 
latter). In his Discours sur le colonialisme, Césaire also argues that a true 
emancipation from colonialism is imperative for the colonizing society, and that 
without such a liberation the future of the whole globe is in peril.16  
Many believe that for such an emancipation to be authentic there must be a 
serious and in-depth assessment of the second issue mentioned above, the 
question of the existence or possibility of an African philosophy. This question is 
deemed to be so important that in this area it is virtually omnipresent, and is often 
posed quite forcefully; Towa, for example, states that: 
On peut admettre aisément que l’Afrique moderne n’atteindra pas vraiment 
sa maturité culturelle aussi longtemps qu’elle ne s’élèvera pas résolument à 
la pensée profonde de ses problèmes essentiels, c’est-à-dire, à la réflexion 
philosophique.17 
Amidst concerns about the authenticity of participating in what, at first glance, 
looks like a paradigmatically European mode of reflection, a substantial part of 
the issue of philosophy in Africa lies within the compass of a general concern 
about universals and particulars. In other words, whether philosophy is single or 
multiple, and hence whether African philosophy is unique in content or merely a 
particular instance of universal philosophy. The former view may be termed 
particularism (and is often linked to a form of cultural essentialism), while the 
latter is a type of universalism. 
Associated with this, and almost impossible to detach from the debate, is the 
anxiety that the techniques of philosophy have not been elaborated universally, 
but within a specific culture and so are inevitably infused with the particularities 
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of that culture. This explains why many observers, when looking into African 
culture for signs of ‘philosophical thought’, have been prepared to accept as 
philosophy, texts which bear very little resemblance to those of the Western 
academy. At the very least, one is tempted to agree with Kwame Anthony Appiah 
that 
if […] African philosophy shares neither the problems nor the methods of 
Western philosophy, one is bound to wonder what the point is of calling the 
activity ‘philosophy’ at all.18 
On the other hand, attempts to restrict accounts of ‘sage philosophy’, world-
views, traditional cosmologies and theosophies to the domain of ethnology have 
provoked outrage in certain circles, on the grounds that such attempts betray the 
intention to confine Africans within the role that was previously allotted to them, 
that of non-rational ‘savages’. 
The conventional counter-argument is that to believe that the only philosophy 
African culture is capable of producing is something that bears not the slightest 
resemblance to what we refer to when we say ‘Anglo-Saxon philosophy’, or 
‘nineteenth century philosophy’, is to perpetuate the racist myth that Africans are 
essentially non-thinking beings, that their existence is defined through a depraved 
sensuality and not through reason. As we shall see, it is particularly difficult to 
bring such arguments to conclusion, as the interests at stake do not disappear, and 
philosophers’ attitudes are slow to change.19 
We have already touched on the third element in the list above: African 
independence. Amongst the texts we shall examine there are several which were 
written before the era of physical colonization had come to an end in many 
African countries.20 As such it is natural that they should be concerned with 
immediate physical decolonization. Nevertheless, many of these texts also posit as 
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an immediate necessity what Valentin Mudimbé has called ‘la réadaptation de 
notre psychisme après les violences subies’ (L’Odeur du Père, p. 13). This is a 
matter of investigating colonial pathologies, as described by Fanon above, and 
tracing their roots in order to eradicate them once and for all. 
The way in which one imagines the future of African philosophy is, of course, 
to a large extent a product of what exactly one believes it to be and how one 
envisions the road to African independence. It is remarkable that amongst the 
writers on African philosophy that we consider, not one believes that the future of 
the discipline is already guaranteed by the end of direct colonization: all of them 
posit some further stage, whether the recovery of some authentic African essence, 
or the restructuring of African epistemology. Some believe that in order to 
guarantee African independence, even after decolonization, Africans must effect a 
kind of rupture with, or distancing from, canonical Western thought.21 
1.2 Synoptical Orientation of the Thesis 
1.2.1 Context 
Each author will be considered in his historical and critical contexts, and 
emphasis will be given to understanding exactly why the ideas in play develop as 
they do and what purpose they serve, as well as the overall cogency and viability 
of the author’s thought. In this way it will also be shown how there is a general 
theoretical and historical development from one writer to the next. 
The principal authors whose work provides the basis for this thesis are: Léopold 
Sédar Senghor, of Senegal, Paulin Hountondji, of Benin, and Valentin Yves 
Mudimbé, of the Democratic Republic of Congo (specific discussions of whom 
may be found in chapters 2, 3, and 5 & 6, respectively). 
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The decision to begin with Senghor may well need no comment. His importance 
stems from the founding role he played in the Négritude movement and his 
position as the first president of independent post-colonial Senegal. In a thesis 
which tries to understand the development of ideas within historical context, 
Senghor’s various incarnations as African poet, philosopher, and man of state are 
clearly of a key interest. His collaboration with the leading French philosopher, 
writer, and political activist of the day, Jean-Paul Sartre, is just one of the ways in 
which he tried to create links between French and African cultures, societies, and 
thinkers.22 Senghor is also remarkable for being the first (and to date, the only) 
black member of the Académie Française, which is perhaps a mark of the 
significant extent to which he was able to effect the cultural assimilation which he 
proclaimed would carry the future of African civilization.23 Finally, by virtue of 
the dynamism and dramatic exultation of a prose which strains to express the full 
measure of his convictions, Léopold Senghor, perhaps more than any other figure 
in this history, has by turns incited great esteem and great disdain. Whether his 
texts are invoked to be repudiated and disclaimed, or to be exculpated and 
reclaimed, his presence and the importance of his contribution are unmistakable.24 
Senghor’s Négritude sets itself the considerable task of revalorizing African 
identities, a matter of demonstrating to the world the greatness of African culture, 
and showing ‘the colonizer’ that the African is not the ‘prelogical’ creature of 
ethnological textbooks. Africans were previously scorned and reviled on account 
of their ‘alienness’ and their difference from European culture, which sets itself 
up as the ‘norm’ of humanity. Senghor tries to prove that it is because of this 
difference that African culture is valuable, and a necessary counterweight to the 
overly abstract, mechanized Western reason. Leaning on the works of ethnologists 
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such as Leo Frobenius, who had initiated a revision of the predominant theories of 
Africans as irrational, uncivilized savages, Senghor intends to reveal to his 
audience the richness of African culture and the ‘genius’ of African civilization.25 
The first analytical chapter begins with an exegesis and then a philosophical 
analysis of Senghor’s key texts, examining the foundations, premises, and major 
arguments that comprised the critical element of the Négritude movement. 
Through a combination of critical reading and juxtaposition of other texts, 
exterior and anterior to Négritude, it may be seen that originally the movement 
sprang from a Western context and deployed supremely Western ideas. Given that 
Senghor claimed to reveal the essence of black thought and culture, and that he 
was writing in order to emancipate all aspects of blackness from positions of 
inferiority, isn’t this provenance problematic? 
This leads us to question the authenticity of Négritude as either a subjective or 
an objective expression of blackness, i.e. it did not objectively describe blackness 
because it was not scientifically well-founded, nor was it a subjectively valid 
account because it was not in fact grounded in black experience. Thus, the major 
problem raised by this chapter is that the discourse set up to reveal authentic 
African thought appears to do nothing of the sort. So what exactly (if anything) is 
African philosophy? 
The work of Paulin Hountondji also attempts to answer this question, and his 
text is pertinent at once for the strident attack which he launches against the 
tradition of Africanist discourse, and for the impassioned manner in which he 
clamours for urgent reparation of the weaknesses of African cultures and 
scientific practices. His first major text, Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, is strongly 
polemical and, though he later excused the force of his attacks by claiming they 
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were to a degree rhetorical, to correct the excesses of ethnophilosophy, his 
position has in fact suffered little subsequent modification.26 
On the positive side, his writing is clear and methodical: in this first book he 
moves from the initial debunking of ‘ethnophilosophy’, which he describes as 
‘l’ethnologie à prétention philosophique’ (p. 14), on to a tentative redescription of 
philosophy, basing his analysis on the actual history of ideas, hence it is explicitly 
descriptive and avoids the a priorism of Senghor’s account. (This is followed by a 
discussion of Guillaume Amo, and a commentary on the philosophy of Ghana’s 
Nkrumah: two subjects lying outside the present area of study.) Hountondji 
continues with a discussion of the difference between ‘true’ and ‘false’ pluralism, 
in relation to culture, politics and the academy, before coming to his own 
prescriptive conclusions about the future of African philosophy. 
One of Hountondji’s main concerns is to encourage the participation in what has 
come to be called ‘professional philosophy’ in order to focus on the writing of 
philosophy in the ‘strict’ sense of the word.27 By contrast with Africanists, 
ethnologists and ethnophilosophers, Hountondji writes in the tradition of what he 
considers to be a culturally neutral philosophy, devoid of any essentially African 
characteristics. According to the empirically based definition that we are given, 
African philosophy is simply regular philosophy produced by Africans. On a 
similar note, he attacks the very notion of an African essence, or any other 
cultural essence, and argues against the unity and uniformity of any culture, 
including ‘the’ Western culture. (Culture is here seen as an inherently 
heterogeneous mass of minor and major conflicts and opposing tendencies.) On 
the other hand, he dismisses the possibility of philosophy existing in pre-colonial 
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Africa since the African peoples were not literate, and writing, he argues, is an 
indispensable pre-condition for philosophy. 
Hountondji’s critics claim that, by limiting the possible evolutions of a genuine 
African philosophy to a mere instantiation of an archetype which only appears to 
be neutral, Hountondji capitulates to a purely Western notion of what 
philosophical thought should be. In so doing, he is said to betray African 
traditions by representing them to be incapable of philosophical reflection, and in 
particular by stipulating literacy as a necessary condition for philosophy. 
It is also possible to make the converse criticism of Hountondji: by insisting that 
it keep to ‘traditional’ forms, Hountondji imposes limits on philosophy itself and 
thus refuses a new, and potentially valuable transformation of the discipline. Is 
this what Senghor meant when he talked of the Civilisation of the Universal, an 
amalgam of traditionally Western and traditionally African thought?28 
1.2.2 Violence 
A further criticism to be made, of both Senghor and Hountondji, is that neither 
writer truly comes to grips with the problem of colonial violence. It may be 
argued that Senghor, through a simplified and naïve exaltation of African qualities 
(which are themselves taken from Western portrayals of Africa), neglects the 
brute facts of racial inequality and traps himself in a discourse which becomes 
politically inert. On the other hand, Hountondji’s determination to see philosophy 
as nothing more or less than a ‘forme particulière de littérature scientifique’ (p. 
72) means that he does not pay attention to ‘the honorific way in which 
philosophy has come to be seen’.29 Simultaneously, his refusal to countenance the 
notion of a specifically African reason leads him to gloss over the fact that 
‘d’habiles contempteurs mettent [notre humanité ou intelligence] encore 
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savamment et régulièrement en miettes au nom d’une raison et d’une science 
parfaitement au service des projets politiques’ (L’Odeur du Père, p. 13). These 
two lacunae mean that there is no serious attempt to bring into question the 
predominance of Western discourse and the violence with which the latter 
represses other discourses. 
In order to cast a new light upon the problems we have raised, in chapter 4 we 
take a brief look at the ways in which certain minority discourse theorists try to 
criticize the structures of dominant social groups.30 Like Hountondji, these 
theorists take issue with the portrayal of ethnic minorities as the mere set of 
instantiations of some type or essence, arguing that this is quite simply a strategy 
for domination, or, as Nancy Hartsock says, ‘a way of dividing up the world that 
puts an omnipotent subject at the centre and constructs marginal Others as sets of 
negative qualities’.31 The roots of this quest for domination are traced right to the 
source of modern humanism and egalitarianism, the European Enlightenment, and 
it is argued that, far from being a betrayal of Enlightenment ideals, colonial 
violence is in fact perfectly consistent with them. 
But the problem with these minority discourse texts is that, in directing a 
critique against the violence perpetrated against minorities and marginalized 
groups, they implicitly rely on a strong notion of terms like ‘the West’. It follows 
that the critique is founded on precisely the same basis as the object of criticism, 
Western discourse, and that it leads to a reinstatement of implausible 
essentialisms and binary oppositions. 
So the next step is to consider whether it is possible to articulate a strong 
critique of colonial discourse without reconstructing the categories which uphold 
it. To this end we take a look at a slightly tangential, but quite pertinent topic: 
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racial violence. The essential premise is that the critique of racism seems to 
perpetuate the structures of understanding which facilitate it. But, if true, this 
would lead to a paradox: either we critique racism, and thereby continue to make 
it possible, or we stop attacking racism, and thereby founder in political 
impotence. In fact, the paradox does not have to persist — it is dispelled by 
creating a new sort of text, which can recognize both the objective irreality of race 
and the subjective reality of racism. Our discourse then comes to occupy a strange 
kind of space, intermediate and ephemeral. The application of these comments to 
the case in point is deferred until chapter 6. 
Chapter 5 introduces the texts of Valentin Mudimbé, who works through the 
ideas of neo-colonial influence, African emancipation, and the problem of the 
‘ruse’, i.e. the anxiety described above that, in criticizing the Western discourse, 
one finds that one has inadvertently replicated its deeper structures. These are all 
discursive traps which can prevent authenticity and autonomy. 
We approach an initial reading of Mudimbé’s work through the image of 
l’odeur du Père. Using this metaphor, much can be understood about enduring 
colonial influence, its consequences and the reactions it provokes among theorists. 
But we also consider that there is something in the idea of colonial presence in 
Africa which is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s ‘beetle in a box’. Wittgenstein’s 
own response provokes us to wonder whether there is anything that could finally 
constitute a revealing of colonial influence. There is a tendency to view Western 
influence as something intrinsically harmful, to be excised like a tumour. We 
argue that colonial influence is not only highly diffuse and vague, but also 
indeterminate, that is, there are many possible candidates for the position, some of 
which lead us back into the problems dealt with in chapter 4. 
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These are not just abstract problems, but constitute a culturally-positioned, 
thoroughly contextualized dilemma: how is it possible to come to terms with the 
potency and ubiquity of Western science, and simultaneously to address the need 
for African speakers to assume their own ‘parole’. This, according to Mudimbé, 
requires a step into ‘folie’, for it entails a rejection of what is Western, not 
because it is false, but because it is Western. At first sight, this viewpoint might 
seem to be another recurrence of the old essentialist prejudices, that Africa should 
concern itself with Africanness and not try to mimic the West. In fact it is a matter 
of rupturing the history which has given rise to the contemporary scientific 
practice that exists in Africa today. 
Chapter 6 takes the study of Mudimbé further, looking at his strategy ‘en folie’. 
We discuss the myths surrounding discourse itself, Africa, and the West in 
Western discourses. Scientific and quasi-scientific discourses in general, and 
philosophy in particular, are surrounded by many idealistic notions such as 
neutrality, universality, rationality, objective truth, and modernity. We consider 
whether it is necessary, or indeed even possible, to fulfil or incarnate these ideals, 
and try to suggest alternative perspectives. Following Mudimbé, it is argued that 
true and attainable universality and neutrality are not achieved through an 
emptying of all particular details (and it is the combination of the actual 
impossibility and yet the apparent realization of such an emptying that constitute 
the ethnocentrism of much philosophy), but rather through an all-inclusive 
universal: ‘un universel riche de tout le particulier, riche de tous les particuliers’.32 
In a world of politics, an apolitical discourse is neither possible nor desirable; in a 
world of difference and inequality, a blank empty neutrality inevitably becomes 
an elision of difference, a silencing of marginal voices. It is a privileged 
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perspective which suggests that privilege is immaterial. The idealized discourse 
that philosophy is often represented to be belongs and is appropriate only to an 
apolitical utopia (i.e. ‘no place’). 
The two most striking characteristics of Mudimbé’s texts are their inclusivity 
and their diversity. The two elements are inter-related, consisting in the fact that 
Mudimbé resists fragmenting his loyalties in order to accept easy conclusions 
about either side (‘side’, broadly speaking) of the debate in African philosophy. 
His discourse is inclusive yet critical, contextualized and contextualizing. It is no 
small measure of his worth that writers on both sides of the divide recognize the 
value of this open, synthetic, yet highly original approach.33 Mudimbé uses texts 
from within the Western canon in order to fuel his critique of colonial discourse, 
but ultimately he posits the need for a radical rupture with Western theoretical 
tradition, and he sees this as the only way for Africa to orient itself along an 
‘authentic’ axis. 
1.3 A Word on Method 
The title appears to make the subject of this thesis a matter of arriving at a 
definition. That appearance is misleading, for although the question seems to 
require some sort of substantive answer (e.g. African philosophy is the philosophy 
of traditional Africa, African philosophy is a variety of ‘folk’ philosophy or 
collective ‘world-view’, etc.), in fact it is more of a springboard, a point of 
departure for a more complex series of conceptual evolutions. Having said that, 
for the first two analytical chapters (on Senghor and Hountondji), this initial 
characterization fits fairly well. It is only when we find that using such a schema 
leads us up against some irresolvable and quite unhelpful problems, that it 
becomes obvious that we must adopt a different approach (which is what happens 
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in chapter 4). This will lead us to confront a series of difficult questions, about 
concepts like authenticity, autonomy, neutrality and objectivity, which may 
eventually shed light on the matter. 
I have not, for this thesis, adopted any specific critical framework or 
methodology, except, of course, the general background, dispositions and 
prejudices that I have indicated above. This pointed absence of method (or 
perhaps a multiplicity of methods) may well have a destabilizing, fragmenting 
effect on the text; on the other hand, I hope that what it has lost in elegance it may 
have gained in suppleness and manoeuvrability. Thus, we are able to juxtapose 
the most heterogeneous of texts, in terms of content as well as style and 
background, in order to bring into evidence tensions and correspondences which 
would otherwise remain unspoken. Another advantage is that it has occasionally 
been possible to appeal to the rich imagery of texts, rather than referring to step-
by-step argument (consider section 5.4, which takes Wittgenstein’s beetle-in-the-
box metaphor as a point of departure). Where it seemed appropriate, I have 
indicated correspondences between the ideas that are developed in this thesis and 
the texts that are proper to my own academic background, Western analytical 
philosophy. 
Wherever possible I have tried to dismantle barriers rather than erect them. So, 
for example, in discussing what might be termed the hermeneutic shortcomings of 
modern analytical philosophy, i.e. the tendency to keep the focus away from the 
origins of one’s ideas at all costs, my critique is not based on the assumption that 
this particular strain of the discipline is doomed to bad faith (by denying its 
historicity) and therefore is inferior to more political approaches. Rather, the point 
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is that analytical philosophy has much to gain by opening itself up to new avenues 
of thought, new ways of considering the world and one’s place within it. 
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Chapter 2: Senghor: ‘L’Esthétique Négro-africaine’ 
2.1. Introduction 
The first part of this chapter is intended briefly to introduce the reader to the 
historical, political and ideological circumstances surrounding, or giving rise to, 
the Négritude movement. Following this there will be a philosophical exegesis of 
some of the texts of one of the founders of the movement, Léopold Senghor. The 
object of this exegesis is to examine the (often implicit) philosophical bases for 
the claims made in the texts, and this will lead on to a critique of the various 
positions assumed by Senghor. Consideration will be given to the charge that 
even though Négritude was a movement for the emancipation of Africans, the 
roots of it were mainly European and it was principally addressed to Europeans. It 
will then be suggested that the movement was nevertheless a key ideological 
moment in the history of Africa, both in its construction of its own self-image(s) 
and in its relations with the West. 
The founders of the Négritude movement were Aimé Césaire, Léon Damas and 
Léopold Senghor, three poets with African roots (Césaire came from Martinique, 
Damas from Guyana, and Senghor from Senegal), all studying and writing in 
1930’s Paris, where they started to write poetry and prose which was intended at 
once to express and to exalt the values of Négritude. 
Senghor describes Négritude as ‘the whole complex of civilised values — 
cultural, economic, social and political — which characterise the black peoples, 
or, more precisely, the Negro-African world’, and also ‘l’ensemble des valeurs de 
civilisation du monde noir’.34 And, in Orphée noir, Jean-Paul Sartre explains the 
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content of the movement as ‘une certaine qualité commune aux pensées et aux 
conduites des Nègres et que l’on nomme la Négritude’.35 
2.2 Exegesis of Senghor’s Text 
‘L’Esthétique négro-africaine’ first appeared in Diogène in October 1956, and 
was later included in Senghor’s first collection of essays, Liberté 1: Négritude et 
Humanisme.36 Arriving almost a decade after Sartre’s (very nearly definitive) 
contribution to the discussion,37 this essay is one of the clearest statements of 
Senghor’s thoughts on Négritude, and is a particularly good instance of the 
metaphysical approach that he adopts. 
This, then, is the main text we shall be looking at. There are also others which 
help us to fill in the backdrop to the Négritude movement and to understand why 
Senghor and his fellows wrote as they did. In a 1961 paper delivered to an 
audience at St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, he said: ‘the French forced us to seek 
the essence of Négritude when they enforced their policy of assimilation and thus 
deepened our despair,’ and also ‘assimilation was a failure; we could assimilate 
mathematics or the French language, but we could never strip off our black skins 
or root out our black souls’ (The African Philosophy Reader, p. 439). 
So it was partly in response to French colonial policy that Négritude evolved, 
but there were other reasons as well. For centuries Europe had prided itself on 
being the paragon of civilization, and it was a common enough belief that the 
European civilization had reached such heights principally because of two things: 
its advanced technology and its unique grasp on reason. When Europeans came 
face-to-face with cultures radically different from their own they made the 
obvious inference that these cultures must not be so technologically advanced, nor 
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so perfectly rational. These supposed differences were then accounted to the 
subjects’ coming from inferior racial stock. David Hume put it thus:  
There never was civilised nation of any other complexion than white, nor 
even any individual eminent in action or speculation. No ingenious 
manufacturer amongst them, no arts, no sciences […] Such a uniform and 
constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if 
nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men.38 
So for the Négritude writers there was the added pressure to explain the 
perceived difference of blacks from the white ‘paradigm’, in order to enable 
African societies and cultures to be extolled instead of deplored. It is to this that 
Mudimbé refers when he describes the movement as ‘a young ideology devoting 
itself to the needs of a self-rediscovery’ (The Invention of Africa, p. 84). Sartre 
also argued that blacks, since their oppression was founded on their blackness, 
would have to fight for emancipation through their blackness; he said:  
Le noir est la victime [de l’oppresssion], en tant que noir, à titre d’indigène 
colonisé ou d’Africain déporté. Et puisqu’on l’opprime dans sa race et à 
cause d’elle, c’est d’abord de sa race qu’il lui faut prendre conscience. 
(Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre, p. xiii) 
A word on terminology: throughout this text, and indeed in all of his texts, 
Senghor repeatedly uses the term ‘Nègre’. That this term is regarded by Senghor 
to be equivalent to ‘africain’ will, I think, become clear. So for the sake of fluidity 
I shall generally avoid using the original French term, instead translating the term 
as ‘African’ in the majority of cases, or ‘black’ where the idea of race is 
particularly prevalent. Where terms such as ‘black’ do occur in what follows, let it 
be understood that I intend thereby to refer to those people who would identify 
themselves and would generally be identified by others as ‘black’. In other words, 
I am leaning on the actual use of the term, without presuming to provide a 
theoretical answer to the problems it raises. All that I am taking blackness to be, 
therefore, is a social phenomenon, and not an objective matter of racial type. The 
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latter idea, discussed towards the end of the critique of Senghor’s texts is, as we 
will see, neither scientifically nor philosophically sound. 
Senghor begins the essay with a rather controversial statement: ‘Le XXe siécle 
restera celui de la découverte de la Civilisation négro-africaine’ (p. 202). From the 
rest of this opening paragraph we learn that it is such practices as sculpture, story-
telling, poetry, music, painting, and philosophy that, for Senghor, constitute a 
civilization, which is defined as the ‘ensemble des oeuvres techniques et 
culturelles’ (ibid.). Yet it does not seem to occur to him that the ‘discovery’ of 
this African civilization was a discovery only for the Western ethnologists and 
anthropologists who were involved: obviously the African peoples in question 
already knew these facts about themselves. As will become clear, this oversight is 
evidence in support of the claim that Senghor, like his European ethnologist 
predecessors, is engaged in a Eurocentric discourse, perhaps not in terms of 
subject matter, but certainly in terms of the paradigms and conceptual structures 
he uses. 
He continues: ‘il s’agit maintenant, par-delà le premier choc, de définir l’esprit 
de la civilisation’ (p. 202), and he equates this ‘spirit of civilisation’ with what he 
calls ‘la Culture négro-africaine’ (also defined as the ‘ensemble de valeurs’ of 
Africans, i.e. Négritude: see the introduction to this chapter). One of the professed 
aims of the essay is to guide the attention of ‘certains intellectuels d’Europe’ in 
order to ensure that their admiration of black African art and literature will 
proceed without misunderstandings or misinterpretations. What follows will be 
‘[une] réflexion philosophique sur l’Art’, or, in other words, the ‘Esthétique’ of 
the title. 
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One of the most remarkable aspects of the essay is the way in which Senghor 
approaches an elaboration of this aesthetic using a method that is metaphysical, 
and not empirical. That is, although the scope of the notion ‘African art’ that he is 
using may well be informed by actual instances of African art (for example, later 
on he talks of drums and masks as elements of African art) it is not by way of an 
empirical analysis or some sort of generalization of such instances that we are led 
to define this artistic culture. Instead, we are given an account of the essence of 
African art. This in itself is not unusual: compare the motto ‘art for art’s sake’, 
which is also a statement of doctrine, derived conceptually and not through 
scientific survey. But criteria for arthood are usually considered defeasible, that is 
to say, open to refutation or revision in the light of something we know to be art, 
but which does not satisfy the (hypothetical) criteria. Whereas, in the case of 
Senghor’s definition, a piece which does not conform to the criteria will simply be 
excluded from the category (see Liberté 1, p. 217). This is because he is not 
primarily interested in art in its widest sense (of which there may be Western or 
African instances), but rather a specifically African art, because he is concerned 
with Africanness or blackness (Négritude) in general. In other words, it is a matter 
of an African, or ‘black’, essence, not an artistic essence. 
Now although Senghor may consider the content of African art empirically he 
considers the form metaphysically. So it is not the specific content of the category 
‘African art’ (perhaps masks, drums, strongly rhythmic poetry, and so on), nor the 
traditions and rationale behind it that he is interested in, but rather the pervasive, 
underlying metaphysic. This approach is anticipated in the schema that Senghor 
lays out towards the end of the first section: he announces that he will proceed 
first by sketching out what he calls ‘une psychophysiologie du Nègre’; then he 
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will discuss ‘l’Homme noir’ and the ‘culture originale’ that the latter produces; 
finally, he will ‘essayer de dégager les lois fondamentales de l’art négro-africain’. 
To take the first part, the word ‘psychophysiologie’ is derived from the Greek 
words ψυχη and ϕυσιολογια. Ψυχη is translated sometimes as ‘soul’ and 
sometimes as ‘mind’; in general, the term connotes both mental and emotional 
properties. Φυσιολογια denotes the science of how a thing, the body for instance, 
works (literally ‘the logic of its nature’). Although this rather dry etymology may 
seem far removed from a twentieth century essay on African art, a close reading 
of Senghor’s text clearly shows that he retains the scholastic effects of a classical 
(Western) education: his prose is littered with scraps of philological, or rather 
etymological, data.39 
So Senghor intends to show the workings of the mind/soul, not the mind/soul in 
general, but specifically that of the African. Senghor assumes that the African 
‘psychophysiology’ determines ‘the’ African culture, which in turn determines the 
fundamental laws of African art and life in general. Starting at the beginning of 
this list (psychophysiology) and working through the intermediate idea of culture, 
Senghor reaches the end of his discourse: art. 
For us, one of the benefits of this approach is that it lays bare the roots of some 
of the ideas that Senghor has about ‘Africanity’ and ‘blackness’: we are looking at 
an important moment in the ideological history of Senghor’s Négritude. 
In sketching out his conception of African ‘psychophysiologie’ Senghor makes 
several puzzling claims, among which: ‘le Nègre est l’homme de la nature. Il vit, 
traditionnellement, de la terre et avec la terre, dans et par le cosmos.’ At first it is 
hard to know quite what to make of this. Is Senghor simply reproducing the 
familiar stereotype of the African as the savage, the ‘man of nature’, as opposed 
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to the European paradigms of civilization? But the comparison is surely 
misleading, for are we not all originally ‘de la nature’? And is it not true of every 
people that traditionally, i.e. prior to industrialization, they are ‘de la terre et avec 
la terre’? Perhaps what he intends is a Rousseau-esque split between the realms of 
Nature and Civilization, where the ‘savage’ peoples are seen to be different from 
the ‘civilized’ because they are closer to, indeed part of, nature.40 But this need 
not be because they were black, it could simply be because they were ‘savage’. 
Even if this distinction between the ‘savage’ and the ‘civilized’ being were 
acceptable, it would still be far from obvious that the distinction mapped on to 
something integral to blackness as a particular racial type, rather than being a 
mark of any non-industrial society. We may also wonder whether Senghor is 
talking specifically about black peoples prior to industrialization; if he is not, then 
the assumption is that to be black is to be pre-industrial. 
However, it turns out that the distinction Senghor means to establish is once 
again a metaphysical one: ‘homme de la nature’ is supposed to refer not to the 
African’s biological origins, nor to her/his actual state of existence (i.e. civilized 
or savage), but to her/his ontological role in the cosmos. At first this may appear 
to be a rather innocuous statement, if it is understood along these lines: 
‘L’homme, nous apprend Marx […] est, au premier examen, un animal supérieur 
qui se fait dans et par la nature’ (Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, p. 24). Yet this is 
clearly not all that Senghor intends, as will become apparent. 
The phrase also serves to reinforce the ideas inherited by Senghor from the 
Belgian ethnologist missionary, Placide Tempels, whose book (by turns 
celebrated and reviled), La Philosophie bantoue, attempts to explain the African’s 
Weltanschauung or world-view.41 According to this interpretation of African 
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cultures (based, incidentally, on Tempels’ observations of a single African people, 
the Bantu), the domains of body and mind, flesh and spirit, nature and 
civilization, are united. So, for the African, being civilized is supposed to be 
something which consists in being at one with her/his natural surroundings, 
whereas the European civilization defines itself through antagonistic contrast with 
its environment, a striving against nature. 
Rather misleadingly, the qualification ‘traditionnellement’ suggests that 
Senghor is tracing the empirical, historical existence of Africans, their traditions 
rather than their essence, when in fact he believes that it is the African soul that 
determines the traditions of African society. ‘Traditionnellement’ functions in this 
instance, therefore, as a synonym for ‘authentique’. As a result, when Senghor 
focuses his attention on African traditions, he claims to see in them the cultural 
expression of the black soul: ‘c’est cette psychophysiologie du Nègre qui explique 
sa métaphysique, partant, sa vie sociale …’ (p. 203). Similarly, the claim that the 
African lives ‘dans et par le cosmos’ is not just a token statement of the truism 
that we all live in the universe. It is an assertion about a people’s beliefs about 
their role in the universe, again reinforcing the view that African peoples live, and 
believe themselves essentially to belong, in harmony with nature. 
It is when the focus moves onto the epistemological aspect of the black 
‘psychophysiologie’ that we start to understand the reasons behind Senghor’s 
claims so far. For the African is here characterized as ‘un sensuel, un être aux 
sens ouverts, sans intermédiaire entre le sujet et l’objet, sujet et objet à la fois’. 
The black’s sensuality (‘il est sons, odeurs, rythmes, formes et couleurs’) is 
contrasted with the rationality of the white European; elsewhere Senghor says: 
‘l’émotion est nègre, comme la raison hellène’ (p. 24), and informs us that ‘black’ 
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qualities include ‘mépris de la raison et des spéculations morales’ (Liberté 1, pp. 
53-4). Even the senses are segregated and ascribed a racial significance, and self-
consciousness is, in the case of the African, reconstrued sensually: ‘[l’Africain 
est] tact avant que d’être œil, comme le Blanc européen. Il sent plus qu’il ne voit: 
il se sent’ (p. 202).42 To critics who had accused him of reproducing the familiar 
stereotype of the African as a non-rational being, driven by his passions, Senghor 
replies: 
Le Nègre n’est pas dénué de raison, comme on a voulu me le faire dire. 
Mais sa raison n’est pas discursive; elle est synthétique. Elle n’est pas 
antagoniste: elle est sympathique. (p. 203) 
In fact, he does not give merely an affirmation, but a super-affirmation of ‘la 
raison Nègre’, claiming that it allows the perceiver to be aware of the world’s 
underlying reality, which he calls rather confusingly ‘la surréalité’, and not just 
its mere appearance.43 Incidentally, this seems to amount to an endorsement of 
one of Western philosophy’s most enduring dichotomies, that of apparent, or 
phenomenal, reality as opposed to the deeper, noumenal, reality. It may be argued 
that this dichotomy could be part of an African thought-system as well, and 
indeed this may be so. But, as a matter of principle, Senghor does not think so: ‘le 
Négro-Africain nous a, toujours et partout, présenté une conception du monde à 
l’opposé de la philosophie classique.’44 What Senghor takes to be the source of 
the African’s sort of knowledge (intuition, rather than ratiocination) leads him to 
call it ‘l’émotion mystique’, which is explained thus: 
la raison Nègre n’appauvrit pas les choses, elle ne les moule pas en des 
schèmes rigides, éliminant les sucs et les sèves; elle se coule dans les artères 
des choses, elle en éprouve tous les contours pour se loger au cœur vivant du 
réel. (p. 202) 
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Again, we are reminded of the supposed contrast between black and white, 
although the latter is here called ‘European’: ‘la raison européenne est analytique 
par utilisation, la raison Nègre, intuitive par participation’ (p. 203). There are 
several things to say about this binary opposition. First let us consider the 
dichotomy which gives it form: Senghor opposes ‘européen’ with ‘Nègre’, taking 
it for granted that one could not be black and European at once. This idea is based 
on certain racializing preconceptions about human beings, and in this case the 
tacit premise is that the authentic European, which is to say, the essential 
European, is white. Furthermore, the (white) European has one epistemic 
(knowledge-gaining) procedure, and the (black) African has another, quite 
different, procedure. 
So how are we to interpret the proposition that there are two ways of knowing 
the world, one ‘white’ and the other ‘black’? I shall outline two possible 
explanations. 
 
1. It has so happened that reason has developed into two, culture specific, 
forms. 
Let us take the word ‘Nègre’ to refer to an empirical concept which denotes the 
peoples who live, or who have traditionally lived, on the continent of Africa.45 
These peoples elaborate a particular kind of culture, in which one uses 
‘sympathetic’ or ‘intuitive’ reason rather than ‘analytical’ or ‘discursive’ reason. 
By association, then, this may be called ‘la raison Nègre’, such that the following 
proposition is likely to be true: if one is ‘Nègre’ then one uses ‘la raison Nègre’. 
2. There are, fundamentally, two forms of reason. 
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This interpretation can only consist in claims about the nature of reason itself; in 
the case of Senghor’s argument, it is the prior metaphysical essence which 
determines the type of reason one utilizes. Thus, either it is analytically true that 
the peoples of Africa are African with African souls, or the possession of an 
African soul is a necessary condition for being truly African. In the first case, it is 
logically impossible for the African, qua African, to use anything but African 
reason; in the second, if such individuals were to forsake their African reason, e.g. 
through over-assimilation, then they would no longer be authentically African, i.e. 
they would lose their essence. 
So if we take ‘Nègre’ to refer to an eternal and immutable ‘racial’ essence then 
it is because of this particular racial essence that ‘l’homme noir’ elaborates a 
particular ‘culture Nègre’, of which a central part is the use of ‘sympathetic’ or 
‘intuitive’ reason, such that the proposition: if one is ‘Nègre’ then one uses ‘la 
raison Nègre’, must be true. An African must use ‘la raison Nègre’, insofar as s/he 
is ‘Nègre’ (the argument proceeds analytically after the first step). 
If the first interpretation is correct, then one can be ‘Nègre’ (in the empirical 
sense, referring to African ethnic origin) and European (in the empirical sense, 
referring to one’s nationality), and more importantly one can participate in and 
belong to a European cultural environment. In which case it does not follow that 
if one is ‘Nègre’ then one necessarily uses ‘la raison Nègre’. (The additional 
premise that all ethnic Africans take part in a ‘culture Nègre’ is needed, and that 
is falsified by contingent circumstances.) 
If the second interpretation is correct, then if one is ‘Nègre’ (in the metaphysical 
sense of having a ‘black’ soul) then although one can also be European 
(empirically, i.e. by nationality), one is essentially black, such that one cannot be 
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culturally European because one ‘belongs’ to ‘la culture Nègre’. Therefore, one 
will use ‘la raison Nègre’, as distinguished from ‘la raison européenne’. 
On a closer reading of the text it can be seen that Senghor implies too strong a 
link between being ‘Nègre’ and using ‘la raison Nègre’ for the first reading to be 
correct. For he is not using an empirical but an essentialist concept of ‘race’: 
c’est cette psychophysiologie du Nègre qui explique sa métaphysique, 
partant sa vie sociale, dont la littérature et l’art ne sont qu’un aspect. (p. 203) 
He posits a single psychophysiology for all ‘blacks’, no matter what their 
upbringing or environment. This psychophysiology explains the black metaphysic 
because it is that which gives the metaphysic form, i.e. it is a causal explanation. 
Having examined some of the issues raised by a reading of the text, now let us 
move on to a critique of Senghor’s positions. 
2.3 Critique of Senghor’s Text 
The first thing to note is that Senghor’s texts are not, and were not intended to be, 
rigorous philosophical works. The language of the texts is poetic rather than 
precise, evocative rather than analytical, as if they sought not to demonstrate but 
to persuade. This in itself does not make the texts un-philosophical (we might 
compare the Bhagavad Gita, Confucius, Pamenides, Plato’s mythological 
accounts, or Nietzsche’s aphoristic style), but on the other hand it means that 
there is rarely any clearly stated argument for the positions occupied by 
Senghor.46 
Yet the texts do import a certain amount of recognizably philosophical concepts 
(e.g. aesthetics, metaphysics, essentialist concepts of soul, etc.) and my purpose in 
examining them is not at all to subject them to a rigorous philosophical critique 
and thereby refute their arguments. Indeed, given Senghor’s ambiguous standing 
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as a philosopher there would be little point in this. But what is useful in a 
philosophical treatment of his texts is that by using certain conventional methods 
of critical analysis we are able to investigate the way in which the concepts and 
arguments are constructed, and the philosophical premises they rely upon. This, in 
turn, allows us to trace the philosophical origins of these premises, to show how 
the ideas fitted in with other elements of contemporary thought, and how they 
may have influenced subsequent writers. As Mudimbé says, ‘while a literary 
language, Négritude’s content reveals an ideological system and even, according 
to Sartre, “a revolutionary project”’ (The Invention of Africa, p. 87). 
Let us start with the opening phrase of L’Esthétique: ‘le XXe siécle restera celui 
de la découverte de la Civilisation négro-africaine’. As has already been 
discussed, this statement is not qualified to the effect, ‘the discovery by 
Europeans’, and so it is implied that all discoveries are basically European 
discoveries, or that the only discoveries worth talking about are those made by 
Europeans; as if Africans had not always known that they existed as cultural 
beings, that they made sculpture, poetry and music, told stories, and painted.47 
Moreover, it is such ‘discoveries’, made by a few, which are taken to be objective 
and historical, rather than the comparatively small-scale revelations that in fact 
they are. To assume that European discoveries are the ones which matter, and that 
when Europe discovers something, that thing is ‘revealed’ to the world or ‘passes 
into’ ‘history’ is to be guilty of ‘eurocentrism’: mistaking Europe for the world 
and mistaking European history for world history.48 Senghor’s remark is 
true, but misleading because it is incomplete. In addition he should have noted, 
first, that the discovery of ‘la Civilisation négro-africaine’ was made by and was 
seen as a discovery by European field workers and academics; secondly, that 
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African cultures were in themselves complete and part of the objective history of 
the world (that is, they were already real happenings and did not need 
‘authentication’), irrespective of any ‘discovery’ or recording by Europe; and 
thirdly, that if the twentieth century will be known for having seen this 
‘discovery’ then it will be because the history of the twentieth century will be 
documented largely by Western academics, to the exclusion of many other points 
of view. Yet if an African perspective were more prominent we might read: ‘the 
twentieth century was the century in which Europeans, after a long period of 
ignorance of African civilizations and cultures, finally came to recognize their 
reality.’ 
So, these textual weaknesses originate in Senghor’s failure to carry through the 
oft-avowed project of criticizing Europe, both for its bloody history and for its 
arrogant self-promotion to the role of universal standard. At first he seems to be 
carrying out a radical critique of Eurocentric practices, by setting up Négritude as 
an equal and opposite pole for discourse, but on taking a closer look it can be seen 
that he is actually, perhaps unwittingly, replicating the traditionally European way 
of thinking about Africa and Africans. 
I have already mentioned the way in which Senghor sets up an opposition 
between the terms ‘négro-africain’ and ‘européen’ and their respective cognates, 
to the exclusion of any idea that it might be possible to be ‘négro-européen’ or 
‘blanc-africain’. This is not to say that Senghor would argue that an African 
cannot acquire citizenship in a European country, or vice versa, for that is 
obviously false. What it means is that it is impossible for Africans to become 
‘truly’, ‘fundamentally’, or authentically European; and vice versa. This is 
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because Senghor is not discussing nationality, which is contingent, but race, 
which he takes to be part of the essence of one’s being. 
We can see that this is the correct way to read the text if we take a closer look at 
the section occurring towards the end, where it is stated that the ‘spirit’ of Negro-
African civilization is at work in the finest black artists and writers of the day, 
whether or not they realize this, and ‘qu’il soient d’Afrique ou d’Amérique’ (p. 
217). It is significant that the emphasis is placed on the ‘race’ of these writers, 
while simultaneously downgrading their nationality, and their national culture, to 
nothing more than a fact of geographical location. These ‘artistes et écrivains 
Nègres’ are not known as Americans or Africans but are from America or Africa; 
they are all essentially black, and they all, whether they know it or not, produce 
black art. 
Here we return to one of the recurring concepts of L’Esthetique négro-africaine, 
outlined earlier in the second reading of the proposition: ‘la raison européenne est 
analytique par utilisation, la raison Nègre, intuitive par participation’ (p. 203). 
This is that each ‘race’ is supposed to have a ‘racial essence’, which secures for 
the individual a particular ontological role in the cosmos and endows her/him with 
particular attributes and capabilities. This role is eternal, not defined by historical 
context, but by the nature of the being in question. To be more specific, one’s 
essence determines the type of reason one employs (‘psychophysiologie’), the 
type of culture one produces (‘culture originale’), and the works of art that this 
culture brings into being. The nature of ‘l’art négro-africain’ will be determined 
by the nature of its producers: the African produces African art, and this is not to 
do with the particularities of the environment, of everyday life, or the problems 
faced by the community in which the artist is raised. So this is another of 
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Senghor’s assumptions, viz. the black soul produces black art: ‘c’est cette 
psychophysiologie du Nègre qui explique sa métaphysique, partant sa vie sociale, 
dont la littérature et l’art ne sont qu’un aspect’ (p. 203). Since there are strong 
causal links between all of these things, it is possible to trace the ‘fundamental 
laws’ of a culture by starting from a knowledge of its racial essence.  
But this reliance on the concept of race goes too far. For example, it is claimed 
by Senghor that all black-African languages have rich vocabularies, which may 
be a contingent truth, but certainly does not gain any force of necessity from the 
racial origins of the speakers. We also find this: 
tout langage qui n’est pas fabulation ennuie. Bien mieux, le Négro-africain 
ne comprend pas pareil langage. L’étonnement des premiers Blancs en 
découvrant que les indigènes ne comprenaient pas leurs tableaux, pas même 
la logique de leurs discours! (p. 210) 
Can this supposed inability to understand really be taken as proof of the 
existence of a fundamentally different sort of reason, rather than just a difference 
in linguistic, cultural and semiotic backgrounds? Senghor clearly thinks it can, but 
there is in the text no explanation of the link he supposes to exist between one’s 
race and one’s metaphysical beliefs. We are given no way of understanding why 
the link between race and reason should be so strong, why, if one is black, one has 
a black soul and so uses black reason. As for the contention that black reason 
works through intuition, how can a person understand, for instance, a 
philosophical argument by intuition? Are we to suppose that all Africans are 
incapable of reasoning discursively? Senghor himself is a real-life 
counterexample of this claim, for he, like all the founders of Négritude, was a 
man of African ethnic origins, who rose through the ranks of French academia, 
studying Western literature, philosophy, anthropology, ethnology, linguistics, and 
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more. Yet he is an African, and by his own avowal incapable of understanding 
Western logical discourse! 
There is no attempt to justify the claims made in the text; moreover, it is 
extremely difficult to see how the position could be defended, for the notion of 
race that Senghor is working with is inherently flawed. Speaking of the three 
principal ethnic groups (‘whites’, ‘negroes’ and ‘Indians’) in the mid-nineteenth-
century United states, Michael Banton notes the broad cultural differences and 
comments:  
they could […] be distinguished by their outward appearance, but the 
relation between culture and appearance was accidental. Though the white 
group was characterised by a higher level of literacy than the others, there 
was no necessary relationship between whiteness and literacy. Outward 
appearance was not a sign of an inward difference that explained why more 
whites were literate, as if the word ‘race’ explained why they were more 
advanced; therefore it was not a good name to use for the difference.49 
Racializing terms are misleading and inefficient, and they tend to reinforce 
spurious conceptual divisions.  
Misleading, because when we use terms such as ‘black’, ‘ white’, ‘Nègre’, or 
‘Blanc’, it sounds as if we are claiming that there is some single, objective 
principle which unites all the members of a putative race (i.e. that there is a racial 
essence: some thing that makes all blacks black, all whites white) when we know 
that this is scientifically and philosophically an unsound concept. Yet if there 
were no such essence, how could we group people together in that way? As 
Banton puts it: ‘to identify the groups as ‘races’ [is] to imply that the biological 
differences [are] the key ones’ (ibid.). Moreover there is always the temptation to 
put the perceived differences of other people down to their having a different 
physical make-up, different genes, for example. So the use of racializing terms 
encourages the use of concepts such as that of racial essences, when in fact all 
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human groups have diverse genetic origins, and differences in outward 
appearance may often more plausibly be ascribed to factors of the environment, 
particularly in the case of ethnic groups which are both geographically stable and, 
by accident or tradition, mostly endogamous. 
The inefficiency of racializing terms stems from the fact that the most useful 
feature of general terms is the way they allow us to condense description and 
information exchange by denoting a group of things or a type of thing, which may 
then be predicated uniformly. Racial terms do this to excess, for they encourage 
over-hasty and inaccurate judgements about groups of people who often have 
little in common but the fact of being categorized together. Racial groupings are 
little more than generalizations over certain characteristics seen as salient and 
important. But we may wonder what is to be gained from classing all Africans as 
‘black’, for what, objectively speaking, are their common features? Is there any 
conceptual profit in making such strong assertions about peoples who may 
traditionally live on different sides of the continent? If race is treated as an 
archetypal essence, it becomes possible once again to talk of perfect and 
imperfect examples of a race, and so of ‘authentic’ or ‘inauthentic’ Africans, 
forgetting that our idea of ‘race’ comes in the first place from an over-
generalization which is scientifically unfounded and susceptible to abuse. 
Such terms also remove the need to examine the historical circumstances in 
order to discover why a certain group of people consistently exhibit a particular 
form of behaviour. So, for example, we might attempt to explain the Afro-
American culture of protest in the 1960’s as being a natural expression of the 
black race’s urge to protest and complain: the implication is that black people did 
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what they did because they were black (had black souls) and their common 
blackness actually caused them to express themselves in unison in this way. 
But if black protesters had anything like a common, universalized set of 
demands then is it not obvious that this was not because they had something 
common and universal inside them, but because they suffered under a common 
mode of oppression? In fact the crux of this whole argument lies not in their being 
black (insofar as this suggests a substantial essence), but in their being perceived 
and treated as black. So terms of race are inefficient because they suggest that the 
people they denote share common characteristics as a direct consequence of their 
‘race’, when it is often because groups of people are treated as if they are a single 
race (e.g. through racial abuse, enforced or spontaneous segregation, racial 
propaganda, etc.) that they find themselves acting as a solidary group. To 
reinforce racial concepts is often to reify them, in political and economic policy 
and procedure, in socio-cultural divisions. 
Ironically enough, these arguments against racialization also form a telling 
criticism of the way that Senghor conceptualizes Europeans. For example, on one 
of the many occasions when he contrasts ‘black’ with ‘Europe’, he says of ‘le 
Nègre’ that he is ‘tact avant que d’être œil, comme le Blanc européen.’ What is 
interesting about this and other similar instances is that, not only does he assume 
that all Europeans are white, but he also seems to take it for granted that they 
compose a single, homogenous unit: uncoloured and pure, they are all supposed to 
have the same civilization, the same way of thinking (i.e. analytic thinking) and 
the same culture. Yet, on the contrary, Europe consists of many different ethnic 
groups, each of which has different cultures and traditions. Nor is it easy to see 
that there is anything which unites them all, so to call them all ‘white’ is to be 
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guilty of a gross misconception. On the other hand, Africa is not the indigenous 
homeland of a single race, with a single culture and a single way of thinking; to 
believe it is, is to be sucked into the vortex-like pull of Senghor’s misguided 
dialectic.50 Paulin Hountondji puts it this way: 
Ainsi parlons-nous couramment de la civilisation africaine ‘traditionnelle’ 
par opposition à la civilisation occidentale. Comme s’il pouvait exister 
“une” civilisation africaine au singulier, “une” civilisation occidentale au 
singulier, comme si ‘la’ civilisation n’était pas toujours, par essence, un choc 
permanent de décisions culturelles contradictoires. (Sur la ‘philosophie 
africaine’, p. 226) 
Furthermore, although Senghor assumes that to be European is to be a colonizer, 
not all European countries and peoples have been colonialist countries and 
peoples (far from it!), and not all people in colonialist countries have been 
involved in colonialism, though it may be argued that all were affected by 
colonialism. 
Further problems arise from the oversimplification involved in sustaining the 
black/white dichotomy that Senghor uses. The way the text is set up, it is easy to 
be led into thinking that in talking about Africa and Europe we are talking about 
the whole world. But on reflection it is obvious that the dichotomy does not by 
any means exhaust the world’s actual or possible population: on which side of the 
binary would a Chinese or a Mauri person figure, for example? On which side of 
the divide ‘analytique par utilisation/intuitive par participation’ would their reason 
belong? The terms in which Senghor couches his essay restrict the form of the 
discourse to an over-simplified schema of opposed concepts which are, however, 
not at all opposites. He thus misrepresents the underlying structure of our 
societies and effectively discourages the impulse to investigate this structure using 
terms other than his own, which are themselves derived from the long-lived and 
persistent idiom of colonialism.  
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This tendency to racialize his arguments often leads Senghor to submit 
historical events to quite implausible explanations. For example in ‘Éléments 
constitutifs d’une civilisation d’inspiration Négro-Africaine’ he argues that it is 
the ‘réflexes plus naturels, mieux adaptés’ of the Afro-American which explain 
the disproportionately high employment (‘utilisation’ in the French) of Afro-
Americans in industry and in ‘les services techniques de l’Armée’ (p. 259). Due 
to his over-emphasis on race and racial characteristics, it does not occur to him 
that this fact may have more to do with the cheapness of Afro-American labour, 
with respect to their white American counterparts. By trying to valorize the 
supposedly ‘black’ attributes of the workers, Senghor manages to cloud the key 
issues, which are surely the actual material conditions of Afro-American workers 
and the devaluing of their labour. Hountondji also sees this as a major flaw in the 
structure of Senghor’s theoretical stance against colonialism: 
l’exaltation des cultures noires fonctionne […] chez Senghor comme un alibi 
servant a éluder le problème de la libération nationale. (Sur la ‘philosophie 
africaine’, p. 225) 
In order to discuss this point more fully, let us return to the notion of African 
reason which was mentioned in the previous section. The first quotation given 
above (‘la raison Nègre n’appauvrit pas les choses …’) may be perceived as a 
protest against the evolution of a hyper-analytical philosophy, a protest against the 
scientific culture of classification and schematization (‘elle ne les moule pas en 
des schemes rigides’), which does not stop at the natural world but tries to sort 
and archive humans as well. Senghor’s emphasis on the vital role played by 
perception and imagination is not unheard of, it is an idea which also finds 
expression in the texts of European philosophers such as Henri Bergson.51 And it 
might not be going too far to suggest a rapport with the Marxian critique of 
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philosophy, which enjoins us to analyze the real relations which obtain in the 
world as it is, not to idealize existence and try to extract an abstract, rationalized 
essence.52 
Though clearly conscious of Marxist theory, Senghor was never an adherent 
(unlike his counterpart Kwame Nkrumah).53 The second quotation helps us to 
clarify Senghor’s position: 
c’est cette psychophysiologie du Nègre qui explique sa métaphysique, 
partant sa vie sociale, dont la littérature et l’art ne sont qu’un aspect. (p. 203) 
Whereas Marx would have it that the structures of the social environment in 
which we are all agents are the primary determiners of our psychology and 
culture, Senghor has it the other way around: not only is culture not structured 
through the modes of production (‘sa vie sociale’), but both of them, together with 
the specific evolution of philosophical thought (‘sa métaphysique’), are dependent 
on the prior essence which is genetically (racially) given. 
A further qualification is in order: it seems that the notion of psyche in use is far 
closer in spirit to the equivalent Platonic, and not Aristotelian, concept. That is, 
Senghor is using psyche to denote neither a principle of growth and change (the 
animating force), nor a collection of non-material personal attributes which exist 
and develop in close relation with empirical experience. On the contrary, the 
Senghorian psyche is an ideal, an essential racial archetype; psychic determination 
is pre-social and pre-rational (the line of causation is Psyche  Reason  Social 
Life (including art and literature)).  
As for the interpretation that posits perception and imagination as central to 
specifically African reason, we may ask why these aspects should be seen as 
elements internal to the rational, rather than as external appendages or culturally 
specific forms of expression. In other words, it seems gratuitous to posit a 
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particularly African reason in order to grant these characteristics a rational status. 
Why not instead bring into action a universal critique of the form and role of 
reason, arguing that the conventional understanding of reason leaves too much 
unsaid and impoverishes our philosophical capacities? The rational role of 
imagination could then be established without any need to diversify the idea of 
reason itself, on the contrary the latter would actually be enriched. On the other 
hand we might agree with the conventional, abstract type of reason, posit it as 
common to all cultures, and then suggest that the particularly African way of 
making philosophical enunciations involves imaginative symbols and other 
sensual/perceptual means. Therefore, it is possible to attempt a renovation of the 
entire concept of reason, or alternatively simply to limit the scope of our argument 
to a purely socio-cultural context. In either case there seems little or no 
justification for creating an entirely new category. 
The idea of a single reason may perhaps be perceived as analogous to the 
axioms of a constitution: a single foundation may be (severally) consistent with 
many different and incommensurable superstructures, according to our interests, 
tastes and customs. The analogy is that Western philosophy is a single structure 
which rests on the rational foundation; there could be other structures, but they 
always presuppose the same base. As Hountondji argues: ‘ces différences de 
contenu n’ont de sens qu’en tant que différences de contenu, renvoyant, comme 
telles, à l’unité principale d’une même discipline, d’un même style 
d’interrogation’ (Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, pp. 52-3). The question is 
therefore why Senghor chooses to posit ‘black thought’ as a totally different kind 
of reason, rather than a culture-specific manifestation of the original, universal, 
unique reason. For there is no adequate explanation of exactly how black reason 
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complements white reason, only some rather vague, poetic asides. Is there 
something missing from white reason, some things it cannot understand? If so, 
then surely this is an incomplete, imperfect reason (and hence not reason at all). 
Do the two reasons describe the same facts, or do they refer to separate realms of 
existence? Senghor says that black reason perceives the sur-reality (an essential, 
transcendent reality) of things. But this implies that white reason is concerned 
with the superficial, the phenomenal, and again this leads us to ask whether such a 
faculty, or method, or perspective is truly rational. If we are working with 
something like a Platonic dichotomy, here, then one form of reason must be 
privileged over the other, it must have privileged access to reality (the Forms).54 
And the logos which concerns itself solely with phenomena is not reason at all, 
but opinion.  
This is not at all the conclusion Senghor wishes to draw, he is committed to 
Western reason as a valid and truth-yielding faculty,55 and yet it is difficult to see 
what else can be said. Unless he adopts some sort of relativism, which Senghor 
gives no sign of doing, so long as he posits two distinct forms of reason he must 
go all the way and say exactly what they are, how they operate, how they are 
limited to specific races, and which provides a closer link with truth itself. 
Anything less leaves us with no clear idea of what is at stake. 
2.4 Ethnocentrism, Europe and Négritude: 
In this section it will be discussed how Négritude, as representative of the 
putatively African culture, is linked to European culture. Such links fall into three 
main categories: first, the European origins of the concepts used by Négritude 
writers; secondly, the European destination (i.e. audience) of Négritude; and 
thirdly, the European ideological framework in which the concepts of Négritude 
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were situated and developed. The last category will to a certain extent be a 
recapitulation of the points expressed under the first two categories. 
2.4.1 European Origins 
Among the many critics of Négritude, Wole Soyinka argues that the movement 
was too European in its conceptual origins to be authentically African: ‘its 
reference points took far too much colouring from European ideas even while its 
Messiahs pronounced themselves fanatically African’.56 There is much evidence 
in support of this view (particularly with respect to Senghor), both in the 
Négritude texts themselves and in similarities between these texts and certain 
others which preceded and clearly influenced them. Let us begin with this 
comparative glance. 
Valentin Mudimbé, speaking of the work of Lévy-Bruhl, the ‘armchair’ 
ethnologist, refers to the latter’s theory of two types of mentality, and describes it 
thus: 
one is rational, functioning according to principles of logic and inquiring 
into causal determinations and relations; the other, prelogical, seems 
completely dominated by collective representation and strictly depends upon 
the law of mystical participation. (The Invention of Africa, p.136)  
This sounds rather familiar. Although the dichotomy that Senghor repeatedly 
presents is not the traditional one of ‘white rationality versus black irrationality’ 
(it is rather ‘white rationality versus black rationality’), there is in his work a 
great emphasis laid on the ‘black way of knowing’, which comes very close to 
‘collective representation’ and ‘mystical participation’. In the paper given at St. 
Anthony’s College, he speaks of how the values of black culture, i.e. Négritude, 
are expressed emotionally by the intuitive reason using myths, the ‘archetypal 
images of the Collective Soul’: 
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… the sense of communion, the gift of myth-making, the gift of rhythm, 
such are the essential elements of Négritude, which you will find indelibly 
stamped on all the works and activities of the black man. (The African 
Philosophy Reader, p. 440) 
Could it be that intuitive reason is nothing more than what writers like Lévy-
Bruhl posited as the ‘prelogical mentality’: essentially the same concept but 
wearing different colours?57 
 There are further clues to the Western origins of Négritude, it will help to note 
a few in passing. The description of culture as the ‘spirit of civilization’, for 
instance, is a quite Hegelian expression of an extremely Hegelian idea.58 And 
Henri Bergson had already elaborated a notion of intuitive knowledge as a 
complement, or indeed an alternative, to the knowledge acquired by the 
intellect.59 Senghor acknowledges this parallel in ‘La Négritude est un 
Humanisme du XXe siécle’, and seems to offer it by way of evidence for his 
convictions (Liberté 3, p. 70). In fact, the vast majority of the sources cited by 
Senghor in support of his arguments are Western writers or Africanists, and three 
individuals in particular: the first is the Belgian ethnologist and missionary, 
Placide Tempels. 
Senghor relies quite explicitly on Tempels’ book La Philosophie bantoue in 
which the priest ‘reconstructs’ the implicit world-view, or philosophy (both he 
and Senghor treat the two terms as synonymous), of the Bantu people.60 Senghor 
accepts at least the broad lines of this treatise, despite the spurious philosophical 
credentials and dubious ‘civilizing’ aspirations of the author. This is what the 
latter says of his enterprise: 
Ce n’est qu’en partant de la vraie, de la bonne et solide coutume indigène, 
que nous pourrons conduire les nègres vers une véritable philosophie 
bantoue. (p. 25) 
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It was Tempels who argued for an end to the ‘superficial assimilation’ of 
African colonial subjects and for a concerted effort on the part of colonizers to 
return them to their truly African roots (La Philosophie bantoue, p. 123). Senghor 
takes on board these ideas and accepts that Africanness (Africanité), whatever it 
is, must be something quite different from Europeanness, such that Europeanized 
Africans can only be inauthentic Africans. He also accepts Tempels’ quite 
unwarranted assertion that the philosophy of the Bantu is quite probably ‘la 
philosophie de tous les primitifs’ (p. 25). However, Senghor denies that blacks 
require white reason to lead them to a truly African civilization and, as we have 
seen, believes that this civilization is actual and not merely possible. In sum, 
Senghor may justly be criticized for his failure to question the objectivity of 
Tempel’s ethnological enterprise or the veracity of his ethnophilosophy, but the 
most important difference between the two writers is that, unlike Tempels, the 
Négritudinist does attempt to show that blacks are responsible for themselves and 
can elaborate their own culture. 
The next major influence on Senghor’s thought that we shall consider is Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin, the Jesuit priest who, in posthumous works, laid down his 
ideas for a new humanist, historicist philosophy. The relevance to Négritude is 
clearly stated: ‘la Négritude, par son ontologie, sa morale et son esthétique, 
répond à l’humanisme contemporain …’ (Liberté 3, p, 72). In the same essay, 
Senghor makes explicit use of Teilhard de Chardin’s teleological metaphysics and 
the related theory of cultural syncretism to argue that black culture is necessary to 
the world because it will be an integral part of the ‘Civilization of the Universal’. 
Without black culture, objective History could not make the progress for which it 
is destined, therefore black culture is necessary and valuable. 
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Yet on comparing Senghor’s work with the original text of Teilhard de Chardin 
it becomes clear that there is no real conceptual development between the two. Of 
course, the emphasis in the former is placed squarely on the importance of the 
role of black consciousness, whereas the original is phrased in far more abstract 
terms, but as Augustine Shutte says in an otherwise enthusiastic essay on 
Senghor’s ‘Civilization of the Universal’, ‘Senghor is content to use Teilhard de 
Chardin’s concepts; he does not develop or shape them in his own way’ (The 
African Philosophy Reader, p. 437). 
As for the political formation of Négritude, this derived from a source very 
different from the Belgian missionary-cum-anthropologist or the Jesuit 
philosopher-priest. In this case the source was the atheist, existentialist, Marxist 
philosopher and author, Jean-Paul Sartre. In The Invention of Africa, Mudimbé 
writes that 
it is Sartre who in 1948 with his essay, Black Orpheus […] transformed 
Négritude into a major political event and a philosophical criticism of 
colonialism. (p.83) 
Sartre, too, accredits the African with ‘une compréhension par sympathie’ 
(Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre, p. xxxi). But this other way of 
understanding is not, for Sartre determined by anything so mysterious as a soul, 
rather it is ‘une certaine forme d’humanité concrète et determinée’ (p. xxvii). 
Although the term ‘Nègre’ is used, it does not here denote a racial essence: ‘le 
Nègre’ is historically, not metaphysically, determined to express black cultural 
values and to fight for black emancipation. This is representative of Sartre’s 
dialectical materialism, according to which blackness is part of an ideological 
progression, the antithesis to the thesis that is white domination. Eventually, both 
will be subsumed into a humanity ‘sans races’, but until then ‘le Nègre ne peut 
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nier qu’il soit Nègre ni réclamer pour lui cette abstraite humanité incolore: il est 
noir. Ainsi est-il acculé à l’authenticité … ’ (p. xiv). 
This position is symptomatic of one of the major problems with the Sartrean 
formulation (and, afterwards, the Senghorean exposition) of Négritude, which is 
that the role assigned to the African exists solely in opposition to Western 
oppression, which is why Sartre refers to colonization as: ‘le premier fait de 
l’histoire Nègre’ (p. xxxvii). What this means is that the first important moment in 
the history of Africans conceived of and treated as blacks (‘l’histoire Nègre’) is 
the process of colonization, for it is the beginning of white oppression of blacks 
as blacks. But what is also implied (and by a non-African, non-black philosopher) 
is that insofar as one feels oneself to be nègre one’s history only goes back as far 
as the advent of colonialism. The problem is that there is no recognition that there 
may be anything other than this second-hand existence: it is assumed that blacks 
borrow their identities from the eyes of their colonizers, and that the most 
meaningful and pressing aspect of black existence is for them to wrest their 
identity back from whites. So all meaning in black existence is seen to stem from, 
or consist in opposition to, white existence (‘c’est la Négritude qui se définit 
contre l’Europe et la colonisation’, p. xxvii). It is a pretty poor existence which is 
independent and meaningful only by virtue of continuing oppression. 
Senghor, too, defines Négritude by opposition to the norms of European culture; 
the maxim would seem to be ‘black is what white is not’. This general tendency to 
assimilate his thought with that of others is noted by Janet Vaillant, who writes: 
‘[in his home culture] harmony was the most important social goal […] When he 
became a student in Paris, he instinctively reached out to bring different groups of 
people together, and to find common ground among differing points of view 
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rather than to out-argue or oppose them’.61 The implications of this strategy will 
be discussed in section 4.3, below. 
2.4.2 European Audience 
From the very beginning of ‘L’Esthétique’ Senghor makes it clear that he is 
speaking to a European audience, producing a clarifying account of all things 
African to enable Europeans to come to a true and accurate appraisal of African 
art and culture. But this instruction-manual approach is not as innocuous as it may 
at first seem. It conceals the fact that here, as in many other of his essays and 
papers, Senghor continues to treat European reason and judgement as the 
standards of reason and judgement; even while proclaiming blacks ‘les fils ainés 
de la terre’ (p. 207), he reconstructs a Eurocentric mode of discourse because he 
chooses to make the proclamation to Europe. 
It is a fundamental contradiction of Négritude that it was produced both in spite 
of, or in opposition to, and for the attention of Europe. That is, it partly consists in 
an attempt to address the former colonizers in order to convince them of the 
validity of the movement; because, in the words of Sartre, ‘… il faut qu’il [le 
‘Nègre’] les oblige à le reconnaître pour un homme’ (Anthologie, p. xiv).62 
Consequently, among the generations of African thinkers who have followed in 
the wake of Négritude there have been many critics of the movement who see it 
solely as a product made for European consumption. And there is evidence in 
Senghor’s work to support this complaint, but Négritude was not merely a 
Eurocentric discourse, it was also a deliberate and ostentatious turning away from 
Europe; indeed it is this deliberation, this ostentation, which shows exactly which 
audience was intended to observe it.63 By turning away from European values and 
extolling African ones, in the face of Europe, Senghor is trying to demonstrate the 
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value of the black man to the Western world. There remains, however, the potent 
criticism that he does not once question whether this world should be the judge, 
nor does it occur to him that the West may not be uniformly white, that the two 
‘worlds’ of Africa and Europe are already interacting and intermingled.  
2.4.3 European Ideology 
It should by now be clear that both the origins and the destination of Négritude 
texts and theory was ultimately European. In this section it will be considered 
how this may have lessened the force or the credibility of the movement. 
And if Négritude was made within a European tradition, with a European 
audience in mind, what does this matter? An answer to this question should be 
bipartite, distinguishing, as far as is possible, two aspects of Négritude: content 
and context. That the concepts expressed by the movement were non-African in 
origin belies the stated authenticity of Négritude as African cultural values, for it 
can be seen that these values have actually been imposed or imported from 
outside. Yet this does not mean that the concepts are not or could not be of use for 
Africans, they just are not what they purport to be. By saying the content of 
Négritude is non-African, which may perhaps come as a disappointment, we have 
not yet said that it is false.64 
As for the context, however, the fact that so much conceptual background has 
been imported from European ethnology, anthropology, humanist philosophy, and 
so on, should make us suspicious about the ideological framework assumed by 
Négritudinists. For these are precisely the disciplines which have in the past 
helped to assert the superiority of ‘whites’ over ‘non-whites’, in order to justify 
the quite unjustifiable colonial enterprise. We should be suspicious of this 
inherited framework because, even if it is used against Western domination, it 
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may well replicate the modes of thought that once made the unthinkable seem 
reasonable. Mudimbé says this:  
pour l’Afrique, échapper réellement à l’Occident […] suppose de savoir, 
dans ce qui nous permet de penser contre l’Occident, ce qui est encore 
occidental; et de mesurer en quoi notre recours contre lui est encore peut-
être une ruse qu’il nous oppose et au terme de laquelle il nous attend. 
(L’Odeur du Père, p. 13) 
There are also more immediate problems. Soyinka argues that Négritude could 
make no significant advances from the colonialist era because it issued no 
challenge to the basic premises of European racist oppression, namely, that the 
white is a highly developed human because s/he employs analytical thinking. 
Instead the movement asserted the equality of Africans on different grounds: that 
they are also highly developed because they employ intuitive understanding 
(Myth, Literature and the African World, pp. 127 and 136). It may be queried 
whether this argument was in fact a strength or a weakness, since, by accepting 
the basis for colonialist arguments yet deriving a different conclusion, it disarmed 
from the inside the sting of the colonial presupposition that whites are superior to 
blacks and therefore should rule them. So Sartre understood the matter, when he 
wrote ‘à la ruse du colon ils répondent par une ruse inverse et semblable: puisque 
l’oppresseur est présent jusque dans la langue qu’ils parlent, ils parleront cette 
langue pour la détruire’ (Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre, p. xx). This is 
quite possibly true, but there is still an irreducible problem here, in that with the 
basis for the old arguments intact they are available to be remade and would still 
retain much persuasive force. As a safeguard against this possibility, Négritude, a 
young and underdeveloped movement, was not entirely adequate. 
Moreover, this attack on colonialism was too limited in that it tried to replace 
ideas of white superiority with ideas of black and white equality. It thereby 
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replaced one form of chauvinism with another, by not leaving room for the self-
assertion of other marginalized groups.65 Rather than reasserting the black/white 
divide, however well-balanced, what was needed was a demonstration of the 
contradictions and irrationality at the heart of the Eurocentric discourse, which 
would then give room to speak to all marginalized cultures, not only African ones. 
As it is, Sartre is plainly wrong in writing: ‘[le Nègre] affirme sa solidarité avec 
les opprimés de toute couleur’ (Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre, p. xl), as 
Négritude actually constructed a new chauvinism which was built to 
accommodate black Africans alone. 
Yet more distressing is the way in which Négritude allows a certain 
complacency with respect to Africa. Sartre felt confident enough to write: 
…le Nègre […] se crée un racisme antiraciste. Il ne souhaite nullement 
dominer le monde: il veut l’abolition des privilèges ethniques d’où qu’ils 
viennent; il affirme sa solidarité avec les opprimés de toute couleur. (p. xl) 
That was in 1948. The last few decades have shown it to be anything but true: 
Africans, like people the world over, have proved themselves capable of 
authoritarian and military rule, dictatorship, governmental corruption, torture, 
terrorism and genocide.66 Négritude encouraged us to think such things were 
impossible, but the only basis for this was ideological doctrine, and not historical 
or psychological analysis, which would have told us that Africans were capable of 
all the crimes of colonialism, authoritarianism and racism that have been 
attributed to the West. Indeed, a quick glance at the history of the slave-trade, 
when African leaders sold slaves to Western traders, would have told us that 
Africans were as capable of these things as any people. 
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2.5 Replies & Other Texts 
In this section I shall recall some of the problems faced by Senghor and, using 
some of his other writings, see whether he is able to overcome them. 
First, the text we have concentrated on so far, L’Esthétique Négro-Africaine, 
seems to suggest that the epistemic approach that is assigned to the African, 
intuitive understanding, is exclusive to the African, and that the African is limited 
to the use of intuitive reasoning alone. Does this mean that, according to Senghor, 
a non-African could not appropriate essentially African conceptual techniques, in 
the same way that Africans have been said to appropriate ‘non-African’ or 
‘Western’ forms of thought?67 Could intuitive reason not form a part of some 
other culture? 
There is plenty of evidence in favour of an affirmative reply to this question. 
Even Placide Tempels, the Belgian missionary whose book La philosophie 
bantoue was so influential on Senghor’s thought, wrote the following: 
I must say that my goal, in this study of the Bantu was to feel myself ‘Bantu’ 
at least once. I wanted to think, feel, live like him, have a Bantu soul […] 
My attitude perhaps included an element of sympathy towards this living 
individual…68 
Surely this is a case of understanding through sympathy? 
Senghor apparently sees this possibility, for he writes, in the last pages of 
‘L’Esthétique’: 
On me dira que l’esprit de la Civilisation et les lois de la Culture négro-
africaine, tels que je les ai exposés, ne sont pas du seul Négro-africain, et 
qu’ils lui sont communs avec d’autres peuples […] Je ne le nie pas.  
But he does not face the objection in full, for he continues: 
Chaque peuple réunit, en son visage, les divers traits de la condition 
humaine. Mais j’affirme que ces traits, on ne les trouve nulle part réunis 
dans cet équilibre, sous cet éclairage; nulle part, le rythme n’a régné aussi 
despotiquement. (p.216) 
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While agreeing that people other than Africans may have traits in common with 
Africans, he reasserts the view that possession of these traits depends on racial 
essence: people of different races have common features because their essences 
share those features. The idea that human characteristics depend, not on essences, 
but on historical circumstances and individual choices is not considered, and the 
problems engendered by the essentialist view find no true resolution in the text. 
It may be apparent from what has been said that Senghor is stating something 
like ‘one race, one culture’, indeed, from his claim that culture is determined by 
race it does seem to follow that distinct races produce distinct cultures. 
Nevertheless, he certainly is not claiming that cultures are eternally stable and 
distinct from one another. In fact, the teleological aspect of Négritude, which 
consists in the prediction of an eventual cultural syncretism, is one of its most 
important and salient features. This is the idea of the Civilization of the Universal, 
borrowed from Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and according to which all cultures 
will eventually be merged and submerge their differences in a ‘universal 
culture’.69 Presumably, on Senghor’s account, this merging of cultures must 
proceed from a merging of races. But if the mechanism linking race-to-
metaphysics-to-culture is obscure, there is little hope of our finding a Senghorian 
account of how mixed races would account for mixed metaphysics, and thereby 
for mixed culture. Indeed there is no clue in any of the texts as to how Senghor 
would resolve this particular issue. 
As for the objection that racial terms do not denote objective racial types at all, 
he acknowledges this in the Oxford paper: 
and then the anthropologists taught us that there is no such thing as a pure 
race: scientifically speaking, races do not exist. […] with a mere two 
hundred million people, we would in the end disappear as a ‘black race’ 
through miscegenation. (The African Philosophy Reader, p. 440)  
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And elsewhere he remarks that ‘la pureté raciale était un faux mythe’ (Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin, p. 21). But although he accepts this critique, he does not 
give up his ideas on the links between race, soul, and metaphysics, and he still 
insists on presenting the same racial stereotypes as before.70 How can traits 
deriving from racial essences be at once fixed and surpassable? Yet Senghor’s 
position includes the view that all particular cultures will be subsumed in the 
universal. Does this mean that the idea of ‘l’âme nègre’ is just another myth, an 
impermanent rhetorical device? Since it is in practice impossible to say with any 
great accuracy or finality whether a person’s behavioural tendencies results from 
pre-programmed, innate information, or from the way one has been educated and 
one’s cultural milieu, any attempt to philosophize about such matters tends to end 
up as a straightforward statement of doctrine, in the absence of testable 
hypotheses. 71 
It is something of a conundrum that, although Senghor believes that through 
biological miscegenation and cultural syncretism, distinct races and cultures will 
disappear, he still insists on the homogeneity of Africa and Europe as both racial 
and cultural units. It does not seem obvious to him that we may already be 
involved in this process: for a long time now, and certainly during the time 
Senghor was writing, black people and cultures have subsisted in countries 
traditionally regarded as ‘Western’. There have even been consecutive 
generations of people with African ethnic origins, but who have never known a 
home other than Europe or America. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Senghor does seem to recognize that many of the origins of Négritude lie in the 
philosophical traditions of Europe, but this does not worry him; indeed, often he 
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leans heavily on European texts in order to support his views. He is not concerned 
that his portrayal of the African might simply reproduce Western stereotypes, 
though it is not clear whether this confidence stems from an implicit belief in the 
veracity of his sources, or an unquestioned complacency about his own 
undertaking. 
The criterion he gives for Africanness, i.e. expressing the ‘black soul’, means 
that a work of art made by an African national, but in a European artistic tradition, 
would not be (essentially) African for Senghor. There is a good reason for this: 
Négritude is, or rather was, first and foremost an affirmation of African culture, 
an affirmation set in contra-distinction to European culture; and secondly a 
critique of European culture. As a political and ideological movement with the 
stated intention of empowering Africans, though the reality of this claim is denied 
by critics like Hountondji (Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, p. 225), it was 
important for Négritude that its characteristics were at once different from 
European models, and promoted because of those differences. If the movement 
had limited itself to the claim that Africans were just as able to take part in 
(European) culture and civilization as Europeans themselves, then there would 
have been no concerted attempt to question the values of those European cultures. 
To say to Europe ‘we of Africa can do what you do, just as well as you’ is a 
positive statement, and it does assert the sophistication and the capabilities of 
African peoples. But it leaves intact the assumption that the standard against 
which sophistication and capability are to be measured is the European one, 
which straightaway disarms any attempt to criticize Europeans for their colonial 
history (if they set the standard, then they must be right). 
 61 
But since it turns out that Négritude was itself largely inspired by and created 
for European tastes, we arrive at the paradoxical conclusion that Négritude was 
itself inauthentically African despite its vociferous and repeated assertions to the 
contrary. And so we are still left with the rather problematic question as to what is 
authentically African; perhaps this shows that the matter was never as 
straightforward as it may have seemed. 
 Soyinka diagnoses what went wrong with Négritude as follows: 
Négritude proceeded along the route of over-simplification. Its re-
entrenchment of black values was not preceded by any profound effort to 
enter into this African system of values. It extolled the apparent. (Myth, 
Literature and the African World, pp. 126-7) 
Yet Senghor was right to think that in order to be in a position to surpass the 
inferiority complex imposed on Africa by Europe, an active promotion of norms 
radically different from those of Europe was needed. Mudimbé writes that ‘the 
alienation of colonialism entails both the objective fact of total dependence […] 
and the subjective process of the self-victimization of the dominated […]. Black 
personality and Négritude appear as the only means of negating this thesis’ (The 
Invention of Africa, p.93). What is surprising, and not a little disappointing, is that 
it never occurred to Senghor that the Africa/Europe dichotomy deserved to be laid 
to rest for good. The portrayal of differences between Africans and Europeans as 
metaphysical, rather than simply cultural, reinforced the conceptual divide and 
left a weighty burden for African writers to come, which many would work hard 
to diminish. 
After considering all these issues, it is clear that the picture Hountondji gives us 
of the animating force behind Négritude is quite accurate, when he says that it is 
la quête passionnée d’une identité niée par le colonisateur, mais avec cette 
idée sous-jacente que l’un des éléments de l’identité culturelle est 
précisement la “philosophie”, l’idée que toute culture répose sur un substrat 
 62 
métaphysique particulier, permanent, inaltérable. (Sur la ‘philosophie 
africaine’, pp. 60-61) 
Which is not belied by Léopold Senghor: 
And so we set out on a fervent quest for the Holy Grail, which was our 
Collective Soul. (The African Philosophy Reader, p. 439) 
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Chapter 3: Hountondji and Professional Philosophy 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we examine the ideas of Paulin Hountondji, a writer who has for 
over twenty-five years been a key figure in francophone African philosophy. The 
text we look at, Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, like those of the previous chapter, 
was first published in Paris by a prestigious publishing house (in this case, 
Maspero). The authors, too, bear certain similarities: like Senghor, Hountondji is 
a francophone African intellectual who received his education in France at the 
Ecole normale supérieure; here, he took his agrégation in philosophy and 
completed a postgraduate thesis on the philosophy of Husserl. Since then he has 
held various teaching posts throughout Europe and Africa. 
Unlike Senghor, however, we find in Hountondji no lengthy paeans to the 
African spirit, no detailed examinations of the essence of African art, no extolling 
of the particular qualities of ‘the Negro-African’. Indeed, the book is a lot more 
measured, more explicit and more self-aware than the Négritude texts. Apart from 
the style, however, it is the content of his work which so distances Hountondji 
from his predecessors, for this is one of the first and most distinguished examples 
of what has come to be called African ‘professional philosophy’.72 As Henry 
Odera Oruka, a fellow African professional philosopher, explains, ‘it is 
“professional” precisely because it is technical philosophy having professionally 
trained philosophers as its managers’.73 This sort of philosophical discourse, 
generally characterized by a marked affinity with Western academic philosophy, 
has emerged as one of the major critical reactions to — and in this case, against 
— Négritude. 
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In trying to expand the concept of ‘professional African philosophy’, Oruka also 
comments: ‘current African professional philosophy is predominantly a 
metaphilosophy. Its central theme is the question “What is philosophy?” And a 
corollary of this question is “What is African philosophy?”’ (ibid.). 
Hountondji’s text attempts to take on these questions, as well as others which 
spring up in the course of the debate; for our purposes we may discern four 
central themes which dominate the text. First, Hountondji contends that 
philosophy in Africa has, to date (the text is from 1977), consisted in various 
forms of ethnology and ethnophilosophy which are, he argues, fundamentally 
flawed in their representation of African cultures and peoples.74 Secondly, he 
discusses how the term ‘philosophy’ and its cognates are currently understood, 
and how he thinks they should be understood, with respect to culture. Thirdly, 
there is an attempt to redefine culture in contrast to the view that Senghor 
(influenced by Teilhard de Chardin) puts forward, according to which individual 
cultures are homogeneous units which will eventually meet in a cultural 
syncretism (see the discussion of the ‘Civilisation de l’Universel’ in the preceding 
chapter). Fourthly, he discusses the future of African philosophy, and the 
conditions he believes are necessary for its growth and development. 
The order of our analysis of Hountondji’s text will be as follows: the critique of 
Négritudinists and culturalists, the discussion of the concept of culture, the 
critique of ethnophilosophy, Hountondji’s own conception of philosophy and his 
analysis of the conditions needed to create a truly African philosophy for the 
future. Once we have become familiar with Hountondji’s ideas we shall turn to 
the objections raised by his critics, and see whether he is able to reply 
convincingly. 
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3.2 Senghor, Négritude and the Concept of Culture 
Let us begin by looking at Hountondji’s reaction to Léopold Senghor and the 
Négritude movement. In Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’ it is possible to distinguish 
two major criticisms of the Senghorian approach to African philosophy: the first 
concerns the observation about the European origins of Négritude, and the second 
refers to the concept of culture. 
Hountondji sees Senghor’s account of African philosophy to be quite 
conspicuously developing themes taken from European sources, serving European 
interests, and ultimately playing to a European audience. As we have seen, there 
is ample evidence for the view that Négritude has its roots in European thought. 
Most, if not all, of Senghor’s most important ideas derive in one way or another 
from European sources such as Lévy-Bruhl, Placide Tempels, Teilhard de 
Chardin, Bergson, Hegel, Marx, Sartre, etc.75 
But it is not this alone which provokes Hountondji’s criticism; after all, he 
himself will go on to recommend that Africans assimilate and continue the 
‘héritage philosophique international’ bequeathed by European philosophers, 
among others.76 The objection Hountondji raises is that, without appearing to 
question their validity, Senghor adopts and promotes Eurocentric theses which 
assert the existence of radical, and principally racial, differences between 
European and African peoples, usually to the detriment of Africans. Thus, 
Senghor tells us that Western reason is analytic, objective, and eminently 
scientific, while African reason is synthetic, subjective, and largely poetic: views 
succinctly expressed in maxims like: ‘l’émotion est nègre, comme la raison 
hellène’.77 Such ideas were easy for European commentators to commend as they 
were merely transformations of pre-existing European ideas about Africa.78 Like 
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Soyinka, Hountondji believes that by accepting this ideology, rather than 
subjecting it and its producers to critical interrogation, Négritudinists rendered 
themselves politically impotent against the continuing influence of colonialist 
powers: 
L’exaltation des cultures noires […] fonctionne chez Senghor comme un 
alibi servant a éluder le problème de la libération nationale. (p. 225)79 
Hountondji also finds it highly ironic that these texts, which should have been 
the documents of African intellectual and political emancipation, were aimed 
primarily at a European public. He points out that, like the long list of European 
ethnological works in which African peoples were treated as the unthinking, non-
rational subjects of rational Western anthropology, Négritude was also a discourse 
about Africans but for Europeans. Goaded by this irony, Hountondji proclaims: ‘il 
nous faut aujourd’hui mettre fin à cette extraversion scandaleuse’ (p. 35); and it is 
indeed a startling characteristic of Négritude that it is almost completely 
extraverted: a defence of blackness delivered before a colonialist audience. 
The concept of culture and the particular use to which it is put in Senghor’s 
writings also testify to the exteriority of his discourse. As was explained in the 
preceding chapter, Senghor believes that the African ‘psychophysiology’ 
(something like a unique ethnic ‘personality’) is the metaphysical basis upon 
which all African culture is formed. This culture is single and specifically 
determined by the unique psychophysiology that all Africans are deemed to 
possess.80 The same is assumed of other cultures, so there is also a specific 
European civilization which, no doubt, derives from the uniquely European 
psychophysiology. 
It is important to recognize what is going on here, for, bizarre though these ideas 
may sound, their origins are not so mysterious. Once again Senghor is responding 
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to two key ideological elements which have characterized Europe’s relations with 
Africa for centuries: the first is the belief that African and European cultures are 
radically different from each other, together with the attendant wondrous 
mystification in the face of the exotic; the second is the (highly successful) 
attempt by Europeans to exclude Africans from the idea of objective historical 
progress, on the grounds that they were savage, or prelogical, or even non-human. 
By setting up a discourse based on the idea of psychophysiology, Senghor hopes 
to explain African ‘difference’ by claiming that it does not stem from a debased 
humanity, but simply another kind of humanity. Armed with this new weapon, 
Senghor tries to subvert the sort of historicism which, in the hands of writers like 
Hegel, excludes Africans on a Eurocentric basis. What he has in mind is an idea 
taken from Teilhard de Chardin, the ‘Civilisation de l’Universel’, which is 
postulated as a synthetic global civilization into which all individual cultures will 
be subsumed.81 Thus, Senghor reassures us of the intrinsic worth of African 
peoples: they are to be part of the great synthesis, therefore they are a necessary 
part of History. 
Psychophysiology aside, Hountondji makes three principal objections to 
Senghor’s account. First, he argues that the conception of African civilization as 
single and uniform is totally misleading and obviously false, which can be seen 
when it is considered that there are many different cultures on the African 
continent, not just one (pp. 226-8). In fact there are scores of societies that define 
themselves variously through different religions, customs, languages, and 
ethnicities. 
Secondly, each one of these cultures is itself composed of a wide range of 
differing, often conflicting, elements. Importantly, Hountondji does not claim that 
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these differences are merely tolerated by the culture of which they are part, but 
rather that they are actually vital to its survival. For cultures are not based on a 
mere consensus on religious, moral, social and practical matters, quite the 
opposite, and if there were no divergence from those practices perceived as 
‘traditional’, societies would come to a stagnant halt (p. 227). This means that 
there is no straightforward way to delineate a ‘single’ culture on the basis of 
shared traditions, since, by its very nature, culture is heterogeneous. If it were not, 
then the innovator, by the very fact of her/his innovation, would no longer be part 
of her/his culture. Given that the criteria according to which we demarcate 
cultures are in fact criteria of difference, picking out one sort of difference, say 
ethnicity, as an intercultural boundary rather than an intracultural difference is 
likely to come down to a matter of arbitrary decision, and we may wonder as to 
the identity and intentions of the arbiter. 
Thirdly, Hountondji repudiates the assumption that cultures are, or should 
ideally be, stable entities, and that cultural authenticity consists in the preservation 
of unbroken traditions. On the contrary, cultures are (not only synchronically, but 
also diachronically) heterogeneous. Consequently, we can no longer assume that 
there is an unchanging African essence that will define African culture throughout 
history, nor should we assume that colonialism was some kind of break in the 
thread of African culture, because ‘la tradition culturelle africaine n’est pas close, 
[…] elle ne s’arrête pas quand commence la colonisation mais inclut aussi bien la 
vie culturelle coloniale et postcoloniale’ (p. 228). 
The upshot of all this is that the idea of a single, monolithic African civilization 
is sustainable only when Africa and African cultures are approached from the 
outside, in the form of a discourse serving the needs of a Europe which defines 
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itself through images of what it believes it is not, namely, the ‘dark’ continent. 
The only obvious way in which Africa is a single entity is as a geographical 
landmass: 
C’est seulement en ce sens — au sens d’une désignation externe et non 
d’une impossible caractérisation interne — qu’on peut parler de ‘la’ 
civilisation africaine au singulier, la seule unité réelle étant ici celle d’un 
continent. (p. 227, emphasis added) 
So this implicit exteriority is itself a sign of inauthenticity: Senghor claims to be 
speaking for Africans, yet his discourse originates from outside Africa; it imposes 
itself from outside, and it remains outside. His position is untenable because, 
while ignoring the inherent change and diversity of African culture, he continues 
to write from an unreflectedly Eurocentric position (p. 228). 
Once we understand that even localized cultures are by nature heterogeneous it 
becomes clear that the idea of a synthetic ‘world-civilization’ is simply 
incoherent. For if culture consists in successive conflicts and contradictions, how 
could we ever come to the point where we agree on everything? Hountondji puts 
it thus: 
La civilisation mondiale, telle qu’elle existe effectivement, est loin d’être 
une synthèse. C’est au contraire l’approfondissement des conflits culturels 
qui existaient jusque-là à l’intérieur de chaque société et la prise de 
conscience que ces conflits sont finalement les mêmes dans les diverses 
sociétés. (p. 235) 
In Hountondji’s view, the effect of Senghor’s efforts was not to valorize African 
culture, as had been hoped, but instead to shackle it and its supposed substratum, 
African philosophy, by forcing them into a restrictive metaphysical category. Or, 
in the words of Mudimbé, Senghor ‘[aurait] pris simplement et fidèlement 
catégories, concepts, schèmes et systèmes occidentaux pour y couler des ‘entités’ 
africaines’ (L’Odeur du Père, p. 43). Since these efforts were strongly influenced 
by European anthropological and ethnological sources, Hountondji’s accusation 
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becomes one of complicity between the ‘nationalist-ideologist’ (Senghor) and the 
ex-colonialists. 
Thus, the hypertrophy of Senghor’s culturalism brings him to a state of political 
disablement, where arguments about the essence of African culture are only ‘un 
alibi servant à éluder le problème politique de la libération nationale’ (p. 225). 
Although originating in a desire to protect African culture from what was seen as 
a gradual extinction due to the Westernization of Africa (of the sort decried by 
Tempels, in La Philosophie bantoue, p. 123), what Négritude actually achieved 
was a sort of cultural fetishization, by promoting degraded stereotypical images of 
African culture as something rare and exotically different. The result was that, 
à vouloir coûte que coûte défendre nos civilisations, nous avons fini par les 
figer, par les momifier. Nous avons trahi nos cultures d’origine en voulant à 
tout prix les donner en spectacle, en en faisant des objets de consommation 
externe, des objets de discours, des mythes. Nous faisons ainsi 
inconsciemment le jeu de l’Europe, de cette même Europe contre laquelle 
nous prétendions au départ nous défendre. Et nous ne trouvons au bout du 
chemin que cette même platitude, cette misère étalée, ce renoncement 
tragique à penser par nous-mêmes et pour nous-mêmes: l’esclavage. (pp. 43-
4) 
Now let us proceed to look at the details of Hountondji’s critique of what he 
sees as another major obstacle in the search for an authentic African philosophy: 
ethnophilosophy. 
3.3 Critique of Ethnophilosophy 
In order to examine Hountondji’s critique of ethnophilosophy we should have a 
more accurate idea of what it is we are dealing with. Ethnophilosophy is one 
member of the family of so-called ‘ethnosciences’, which take peoples or cultures 
as the focal objects of study. Thus, ethnobotany is the branch of botany which 
studies the use of plants in folklore and religion. Ethnology is the branch of 
anthropology which takes as its subject ‘races’ or peoples, their relations to one 
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another, their origins, and their more distinctive characteristics. Hountondji 
describes ethnophilosophy as ‘l’ethnologie à prétention philosophique’ (p. 14). A 
prime example of an ethnophilosophical work is Placide Tempels’ La Philosophie 
bantoue, which was intended to reveal the philosophical structures intrinsic to 
Bantu culture.82 The implied sources of this text are anonymous and silent — the 
Bantu themselves do not speak, for they are the objects of study — and the only 
voice belongs to the Belgian missionary, Tempels. 
Although ethnophilosophy started out as a development of European ethnology, 
it swiftly attracted African writers such as Kagame, Nkrumah and Diop.83 Thus 
sprang up the first growth of what would come to be called African philosophy, 
which consisted in a series of attempts to reconstruct an ‘authentically’ African 
world-view from the remnants of pre-colonial culture. When Hountondji initiated 
his critique of African philosophy, this sort of approach predominated to such an 
extent that he wrote the following: 
L’histoire de notre philosophie n’a été de ce fait jusqu’ici, pour une grande 
part, que l’histoire des interprétations successives de cette ‘philosophie’ 
collective, de cette vision du monde qu’on supposait donnée d’avance, sous-
jacente à toutes nos traditions et à tout notre comportement, et que l’analyse 
n’avait plus qu’à mettre au jour, modestement. (pp. 20-21)84 
But neither the origins nor the ends of ethnophilosophy were merely academic. 
Tempels himself wrote that one of his work’s primary aims was to give 
Europeans a deeper and more sympathetic insight into the Bantu peoples, in order 
to make Europe’s ‘mission civilisatrice’ more efficient and less traumatic (La 
Philosophie bantoue, p. 17). Marcien Towa says of this work that it ‘n’était 
qu’une propédeutique à la Catéchèse bantoue’.85 
There were also less opportunistic ends in sight, of which Lausana Keita writes: 
As defined both by African and European scholars, ethnophilosophy serves 
the function of the subjective valorization of traditional African thought in 
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contradistinction to colonial anthropological thought which engaged in a 
purportedly objective devalorization of the African’s intellectual efforts. 
(African Philosophy: The Essential Readings, p. 137) 
For the liberal European scholar, as for the nationalist African scholar, 
ethnophilosophy becomes a way to demonstrate the value of African civilization 
by showing that it too possesses what writers from classical Greece to the 
Enlightenment urge is one of the defining characteristics of humanity: 
philosophical thinking.86 For Hountondji, the desire to prove the validity of 
African cultures takes on the form of a ‘quête passionnée d’une identité niée par 
le colonisateur’ (pp. 60-1). He continues: 
mais avec cette idée sous-jacente que l’un des éléments de l’identité 
culturelle est précisement la ‘philosophie’, l’idée que toute culture repose 
sur un substrat métaphysique particulier, permanent, inaltérable. (Ibid.) 
Since traditional African philosophy is taken to be something which underlies or 
informs traditional African culture, the correct way to study the former is assumed 
to be a straightforward analysis of the latter, by examining myths, fables, 
cosmogonic and cosmological stories and poems. Conversely, the more Africa 
seems to leave behind its pre-colonial past, the more it seems to be in danger of 
losing (the elements that might enable a reconstruction of) traditional African 
philosophy. Thus, if we are to hold on to what is seen as the proof of African 
rationality and the basis of an authentic African philosophy, we must do all we 
can to prevent African culture from becoming less African. Essentially this would 
be a matter of shielding it from the forces of modernization and Westernization, 
which are so alien to African culture.87 
Hountondji believes that such arguments as these lead to intellectual and 
cultural stagnation, for they assert that what is truly African does not change, and 
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thus any attempt to introduce change is instantly vilified as being inauthentically 
African, or Eurocentric. In opposition he contends that 
la prétendue acculturation, la prétendue ‘rencontre’ de la civilisation 
africaine avec celle d’Europe, n’est en fait qu’une mutation supplémentaire 
opérée par la civilisation africaine elle-même. (p. 233) 
But the main reason for the attack on ethnophilosophy is that Hountondji finds it 
does not fulfil the goal it set itself, which was to reveal an African system of 
thought that is authentically philosophical. Hountondji criticizes ethnophilosophy 
for taking what is essentially un-philosophical to be philosophical, that is, 
ethnophilosophy bases its reconstruction of ‘traditional African philosophy’ on 
the wrong sorts of sources. In order to compete with the long history of European 
philosophy, ethnophilosophers appropriate ‘matériaux extra-philosophiques tels 
que les contes, les légendes, les proverbes, les poèmes dynastiques, etc.’ (pp. 44-
5). This is objectionable because such sources were not created to be 
philosophical, instead they are mainly religious, cultural, and literary texts. 
Although they may reveal certain metaphysical prejudices unique to a group’s 
social conventions, they do not form an explicitly philosophical discourse. 
Hountondji’s concept of philosophy here refers to a discipline that it is more 
scientific than literary, more akin to the mathematical and experimental sciences 
than to the arts or theology. To interpret non-philosophical sources in a 
principally philosophical manner is, therefore, to be caught in ‘une confusion des 
genres’ (p. 31). Furthermore, 
la rigueur scientifique veut que d’un document sociologique on donne 
d’abord une interprétation sociologique, que d’un texte de botanique […] on 
donne d’abord une interprétation biologique […] Cette même rigueur 
scientifique interdit de projeter arbitrairement un discours philosophique 
derrière des produits du langage qui se donnent eux-mêmes, expressément, 
pour autre chose que la philosophie. (p. 30) 
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As the closing sentence of this quotation may indicate, Hountondji goes further 
than the claim that ethnophilosophy uses the wrong sort of text, he also sees 
ethnophilosophy as a blatant act of projection: 
l’effacement du philosophe devant son propre discours était inséparable 
d’une projection qui lui faisait attribuer arbitrairement à son peuple ses 
propres choix théoriques, ses option idéologiques. (p. 21) 
Hountondji does indeed recognize ethnophilosophical works as works of 
philosophy, but argues that the sources of these works, the material which they 
claim simply to be ordering and interpreting, are not in fact philosophical. All that 
is philosophical in the texts comes from the ethnophilosophers themselves. Yet 
this translation from explicitly non-philosophical sources into explicitly 
philosophical texts is not perceived by the ethnophilosophers as anything more 
than the collection and ordering of data: they claim that the philosophy already 
exists in the original sources.88 For this reason, Hountondji describes 
ethnophilosophy as: ‘une interprétation […] croyant traduire un texte qui n’existe 
nulle part, et méconnaissant, de ce fait, sa propre activité créatrice’ (p. 29, note 
16, original emphasis). Of course, he is not stating that the texts do not exist at all, 
that they are fabricated, but rather that they do not exist in the form of a 
philosophical discourse. Since this is the case, ethnophilosophers cannot be 
performing a philosophical interpretation of traditional African philosophy, they 
are actually creating it, from information of a non-philosophical nature. 
Dans le cas de la ‘philosophie’ africaine, les sources manquent; ou du moins, 
si elles existent, elles ne sont pas des textes, des discours philosophiques [… 
Les documents] sont radicalement hétérogènes à la philosophie; ils n’ont 
rien de comparable aux ‘sources’ que constitueraient par exemple, pour un 
interprète de l’hégélianisme, du matérialisme dialectique, de la théorie 
freudienne ou même du confucianisme, les textes explicites de Hegel, Marx, 
Freud ou Confucius dans leur teneur discursive, en tant que produits du 
langage perpétuellement disponibles. (p. 29) 
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By ignoring this fact, argues Hountondji, the ethnophilosophers are in fact 
ignoring their own liberty. He is at pains to stress that he does regard their work 
as genuine philosophy, because it attempts to apply a philosophical method, even 
though the objects of this application are mainly cultural remnants: ‘ils font 
preuve néanmoins de qualités philosophiques incontestables, dans la manière dont 
ils prétendent justifier cette fiction’ (p. 22, original emphasis). But 
ethnophilosophy is an inauthentic form of philosophy because it denies its own 
creative power, which amounts to a denial of the freedom to produce original 
thought. 
Once more Hountondji is emphasizing that the development of African 
philosophy lies in the present and the future, and is not something which has 
already been done, requiring nothing more than to be sifted out from all the other 
material. He is reclaiming his own immediate intellectual power, and urging 
others to do likewise. 
So what happens when this creative freedom is not recognized? According to 
Hountondji, the result for the ethnophilosopher is an objectification both of the 
ethnophilosophical text and of the source, namely African cultural traditions. This 
objectification transforms the two into what are essentially artefacts, museum-
pieces to be viewed and manipulated, thus nullifying the possibility of 
philosophical discourse and rendering old customs dry and lifeless. 
We are given an analogy with African languages. Although universities both 
within and without Africa are taking an ever greater interest in indigenous African 
languages, the emphasis tends to be on teaching about African languages — their 
origins, morphology, semantic structure, and so on — but not in them: they are 
treated as objects rather than vehicles of learning (p. 237). Similarly, cultures and 
 76 
philosophies are transformed by the ethnologist into objects of study, instead of 
ways of life and critical discourses in which anyone may take part. 
This is partly due to ethnophilosophy setting itself in the role of a descriptive, 
rather than discursive, discipline. What the ethnophilosopher aims to do is to 
reconstruct the collective philosophy of a pre-colonial society, in order to 
demonstrate and explore this society’s philosophical capabilities.89 Yet there is no 
obvious attempt to engage in a critical way with what is ‘discovered’. Peter 
Bodunrin, a Nigerian ‘professional’ philosopher, argues: 
Criticism and argument are essential characteristics of anything which is to 
pass as philosophy. Hence mere descriptive accounts of African thought 
systems or the thought systems of any other society would not pass as 
philosophy. (African Philosophy: The Essential Readings, p. 65) 
Now there are many areas of history in which we are not sure how the 
individuals of a particular society thought about certain aspects of their existence. 
Ancient Greece, especially of the Presocratic period, is a good example, all the 
more so because Greece is commonly held to be one of the first civilizations to 
have engaged in specifically philosophical speculation. There have been attempts 
to reconstruct Heraclitean thought, to take a single author, from surviving 
fragments of papyrus and the extant reports of contemporary and later writers. 
This sort of reconstructive work seems to be purely descriptive, so is it therefore 
unphilosophical? 
An answer to this question should probably equivocate: such works may or may 
not be philosophical, depending on the use to which they are to be put. Insofar as 
we are only trying to discover what Heraclitus thought we are only practising a 
form of historical studies, or, if we are trying to learn something about the mores 
of the time, a form of anthropology. This is true even though we know that the 
primary text was written with philosophical intention (allowances made for the 
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discrepancy between ancient and modern senses of ‘philosophy’). It is only 
insofar as we engage philosophically with a text that we are treating it as 
philosophy, for then we are taking the author to be a real interlocutor, someone to 
engage with and criticize. It is no great problem that the original author is no 
longer alive, what he has produced is still an invitation to dialogue. By studying a 
text philosophically we are leaving open the possibility that our objections were 
anticipated and satisfactorily dealt with; we are simultaneously leaving open the 
possibility that they were not. 
It is this openness of discourse that Hountondji finds lacking in the 
ethnophilosophical text, and that leads him to make the charge of philosophical 
inauthenticity. He objects that ethnophilosophers claim that the discourse they 
reveal is a philosophy, yet do not treat it as philosophy for they do not allow it to 
be brought into doubt or contradicted (pp. 14 and 22). He also argues that  
une contradiction entre deux thèses ethnophilosophiques est nécessairement 
circulaire, ne pouvant être tranchée par aucune expérimentation ni par 
quelque autre procès de vérification. (p. 64) 
Since the texts it claims to interpret or reconstruct are non-existent, because 
there is no unanimous, implicit African philosophy, ethnophilosophy is ‘une 
science sans objet’. Scraps of oral tradition and literature are patched together to 
form a screen onto which the philosophical beliefs of the academic authors are 
projected (pp. 64-5). Moreover, the key interest lies not in the truth of this new 
‘traditional’ philosophy, but in its Africanness. As Marcien Towa writes, 
ethnophilosophy presents ‘[un] système que les Africains sont invités à assumer, 
non parce qu’il serait plus vrai que les autres systèmes, non parce qu’il jouirait 
d’une supériorité quelconque qu’on s’efforcerait d’établir, mais du seul fait qu’il 
est africain’ (‘Conditions d’une affirmation …’, p. 348). 
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But the recurring representation of the traditional African as the unskilled bearer 
of a philosophy of which s/he is blissfully ignorant, and which will only be 
discovered by ethnologists, effectively casts the African subject as ‘le Monsieur 
Jourdain de la philosophie’.90 This is perfectly consonant with the following 
remark, from the ethnologist and missionary, Placide Tempels’: 
C’est nous qui pourrons leur dire, d’une façon précise, quel est le contenu de 
leur conception des êtres, de telle sorte qu’ils se reconnaîtront dans nos 
paroles et acquiesceront en disant: ‘Tu nous as compris, tu nous connais à 
présent complètement’. (La Philosophie bantoue, p. 24) 
Not only does this attitude support the continuation of an ideology which posits 
Africans as unconscious primitive beings, thus reasserting the fundamental 
superiority of Europe over Africa, but furthermore, this sort of representation 
encourages the objectification of culture (as discussed above). 
Another analogy may be apposite here: a common attempt to justify colonialism 
has consisted in a claim that it was the duty of the colonizers to exploit the 
otherwise untouched sources of material wealth that lay in the colonized lands. 
Although in normal circumstances liberal humanism encourages respect for others 
and states that it is wrong to dispossess people of their land and wealth, in this 
case it is the colonizers’ duty to do so, as it will have the beneficial effect of 
global enrichment.91 Similarly, if traditional Africans constitute a source of 
scientific or philosophical wealth that they themselves are unable to exploit due to 
their ignorance, then it becomes very easy to suggest that someone should attempt 
to do it for them, for their own good, or perhaps for the good of humanity. It is a 
short step from the image of Africans as the unwitting bearers of an implicit 
philosophy, to the picture of the African psyche as a treasure-trove waiting to be 
plundered by the intrepid explorer. 
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And who should this explorer be other than the European-formed ethnologist? 
Hountondji comments: 
On oublie trop facilement que l’africanisme a été aussi inventé par l’Europe 
et que les ‘sciences’ ethnographiques sont partie intégrante du patrimoine 
culturel de l’Occident, ne formant, somme tout, qu’un épisode passager dans 
la tradition théorique des peuples occidentaux. (p. 47) 
At this point Hountondji is berating the African ethnologist for failing to 
recognize the provenance of her/his own discipline. Ethnology and 
ethnophilosophy were first conceived by Europeans and this origin is evident, not 
only in the way African philosophy is reduced to nothing more than a collective 
belief system, but also in the continued exclusion of African subjects from the 
discourse. Even African ethnophilosophers do not seem to be talking to their 
fellow Africans, but, like Senghor, addressing European academia in an effort to 
prove the value of their traditional cultures. Consequently, for Europeans ‘le Noir 
continue […] d’être tout le contraire d’un interlocuteur: il est ce dont on parle, un 
visage sans voix qu’on tente de déchiffrer, entre soi, objet à définir et non sujet 
d’un discours possible’ (Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, p. 15). 
Hountondji believes that this exclusion is possible because the societies studied 
by the ethnological disciplines are characteristically dominated (e.g. colonized) 
societies. Generally without access to a standard of (a particular type of) 
education which would allow them to reciprocate the anthropologists’ questioning 
and enter into a true dialogue, the ‘silence’ of these societies gives ethnology the 
security of a certain distance between the maker of the discourse and its subjects. 
Thus ‘le discours savant de l’anthropologue n’a de sens qu’à l’intérieur d’un débat 
scientifique auquel ces peuples n’ont aucune part, mais qui a toujours son origine 
ailleurs: dans les classes dominatrices elles-mêmes…’ (p. 16).92 
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In the hands of Africanist writers such as Senghor this uneven arrangement is 
maintained because the terms of the discourse are simply taken over from its 
originators. Thus, the language of difference continues to dominate the debate and 
continues to generate binary oppositions: ‘primitive/civilized’ becomes 
‘African/European’ or ‘négro-africain/européen’. Although at first it seems as if 
the former colonialist ideology is no longer at work in these new terms, we soon 
find that they are put to exactly the same use as the old ones, for the next step is to 
comment on the intrinsic and substantial difference between the two types, and 
the following step to try to account for this difference. 
In the case of ethnophilosophy, the difference is that what is taken for 
philosophy in European academies is quite distinct from what is called ‘African 
philosophy, both in form and content. The reduction of African philosophy to a 
collective world-view is in part a consequence of what Hountondji calls ‘le mythe 
de l’unanimité’ (p. 62), which is the supposition that, in ‘primitive’ societies, 
group consensus on all things is a way of life, that the thoughts and beliefs of 
individual members are eternally subordinate to something approaching a herd 
instinct. In such a society there could be no distinct individual beliefs, but only 
collective systems of belief, which is why it is assumed that if there is a traditional 
African philosophy it must exist in the form of a collective thought-system. 
Clearly this is an ethnocentric bias; no-one would suppose that there was a single 
system of philosophical beliefs, or indeed a single system of any sort of beliefs, 
held by all of the people who live in Great Britain, or Europe; yet this is the order 
of the premises that ethnophilosophy requires us to accept.93 
With the myth of unanimity there co-exists another misconception, together 
they are mutually reinforcing. The other misconception lies in the presumption 
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that any member of the subject-society may be taken as a fair representative of 
their cultural group: clearly, if every person in a society agrees with one another, 
then each person is an equally good indicator of the group’s cultural conventions. 
So while sociological studies of Western cultures take into account the human 
diversity within a population, and therefore try to effect a ‘representative’ sample, 
in an African society there is no need to conduct a broad survey. For Tempels, the 
conclusions of his research into Bantu world-views are susceptible to an 
immediate and direct extrapolation to cover all African peoples, indeed 
‘sauvages’ in general. Similarly, when the ethnologist Marcel Griaule goes into 
the field, his main concern is to take for his subject an individual suitably well-
versed in the traditional culture. Griaule analyses his interviews with the sage, 
Ogotemmêli, as if his sample were an authentic representative of all Africans, 
simply because the subject is a wise man who is particularly knowledgeable about 
certain esoteric traditions.94 
Henry Odera Oruka objects that this amounts to the presumption that 
precolonial Africa could not support personalized critical thinking, that only an 
anonymous, collective and implicit view of the world could develop. Oruka 
argues that the truth of such a presumption would mean that Africa was empty of 
paradigmatically philosophical thought, for what is a philosophy if it is not auto-
critical? (African Philosophy: The Essential Readings, pp. 47-63). 
A striking feature of the ethnophilosophical enterprise is that it depends upon a 
concept of culture as a stable and unifaceted artefact, such as we find in Senghor. 
For if one’s authentic philosophy is to be found in the culture of one’s ancestors, 
then this culture, in order to be the carrier of a stable and non-contradictory 
philosophy, must itself be stable and non-contradictory. Yet if cultures really do 
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evolve while remaining authentic (whatever that might mean), there is no need for 
this fixation with the past because the past is not the sole, true repository of 
culture, it is simply a previous incarnation. 
A further criticism levelled at ethnology and its associated disciplines is that, as 
critical disciplines, they fail from the beginning because their foundations rest 
upon the assumption of the very thesis they wish to demonstrate, namely, that the 
subject-cultures of the study are radically different in nature from the ethnological 
culture. On this point, Towa and Hountondji are in agreement: 
L’ethnophilosophie est essentiellement stérile. Aucun véritable esprit de 
recherche ne l’anime, puisque l’ethnophilosophie est déjà en possession de 
son credo. (‘Conditions d’une affirmation …’, p. 344) 
L’ethnologie […] présuppose toujours ce qui est à démontrer: la distinction 
réelle entre son objet et celui de la sociologie en général, la differénce de 
nature entre les sociétés ‘primitives’ […] et les autres sociétés. (Sur la 
‘philosophie africaine’, p. 16, note 4) 
One of the foundations of ethnophilosophy is therefore: 
la thèse, généralement tacite, d’une spécificité absolue des sociétés non 
occidentales, le postulat silencieux d’une différence de nature […] entre les 
sociétés dites primitives et les sociétés ‘evoluées’. (Sur la ‘philosophie 
africaine’, p. 62) 
It is this assumption of the existence of a fundamental difference in nature 
between European and African societies which explains why, within the domains 
of the ethnological discipline, it seems perfectly natural that the term ‘philosophy’ 
should have a different meaning in an African context, compared with its 
paradigmatic European usage. But Hountondji objects that the notion of 
traditional philosophy being the substratum of cultural and literary sources is 
based on a confusion of the rigorous, theoretical meaning and the popular, 
ideological meaning of the word ‘philosophy’. The former indicates ‘une 
discipline théorique ayant ses exigences propres et obéissant à des règles 
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méthodologiques déterminées’, while the latter may be nothing more than ‘toute 
sagesse individuelle ou collective, tout ensemble de principes présentant une 
relative cohérence et visant à réagir la pratique quotidienne d’un homme ou d’un 
peuple’ (p. 39). According to the former, we may not be unconscious 
philosophers any more than we may be unconscious mathematicians or physicists; 
according to the latter, we may truly be said to be naturally philosophical. The 
conflation of these two, quite different, senses which leads to the attribution of the 
latter to Africa, while Europe stays the guardian and master of the former, is just 
another example of the patronizing attitude that ethnology assumes with respect to 
the objects of its gaze. 
C’est ce qui se passe pour le mot ‘philosophie’. Quand on l’applique à 
l’Afrique, il n’est plus censé désigner la discipline spécifique qu’il évoque 
dans le contexte occidental, mais seulement une vision du monde collective, 
un système de croyances spontané, implicite, voire inconscient, auquel tous 
les Africains sont censés adhérer: usage vulgaire du mot, autorisé, comme 
on dirait, par la vulgarité présumée du contexte géographique auquel on 
l’applique. (Ibid., p. 62) 
Marcien Towa has an interesting and quite apposite explanation of this 
conceptual confusion. He says that the principal characteristic of ethnophilosophy 
is that it dilates the concept of philosophy to such an extent that it becomes co-
extensive with the concept of culture. So the reason ethnophilosophers look for 
traditional African philosophy within cultural sources is that what they are in fact 
looking for is a cultural artefact in the guise of philosophy. Towa demonstrates his 
point with the following argument: 
Supposer que l’oeuvre de Sartre disparaisse, on peut pas reconstituer 
l’existentialisme sartrien à partir de la structure de la langue française, du 
système éducatif, politique, familial de la France. Or c’est cette impossible 
reconstitution que prétendent effectuer les ethnophilosophes. (‘Conditions 
d’une affirmation …’, p. 350) 
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In examining these arguments against ethnophilosophy, it is important to bear in 
mind that, as an African himself, Hountondji is not attempting to show that 
Africans are or ever were incapable of philosophical dialogue, nor is he claiming 
that Western reason reigns supreme. His arguments against the ethnophilosophical 
rendering of philosophy do not stem from any particular ideological stance on 
African philosophy, but from his own conception of what philosophy is and must 
be in general. We shall now move on to discuss this conception. 
3.4 Hountondji’s Concept of Philosophy 
The text Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’ works towards two principal ends: to 
debunk ethnophilosophy, and to construct a truly African philosophy which is 
dependent neither in theory nor in substance on Europe. In view of these ends, 
Hountondji introduces a concept of African philosophy different from those 
already examined. He intends not only to substitute this new concept for those 
which have so far dominated the field, Senghor-style essentialisms and theories of 
collective implicit philosophies, but also to effect a penetrating critique of those 
positions; and once subjected to this critique it is hoped that they will lose their 
influence. 
Why is there such a need to argue for the existence and philosophical credibility 
of implicit world-views and distinct, racially-determined types of reason? 
Hountondji believes this need originates in the desire to promote a positive idea of 
Africanness: the Négritude movement is primarily animated by a desire to recover 
a racial identity which has been annihilated or mutilated by colonialism (compare 
Mudimbé’s description of ‘a young ideology devoting itself to the needs of a self-
rediscovery’, The Invention of Africa, p. 84). Underlying this desire is the 
conviction that one of the elements of this ‘lost’ identity is precisely philosophy, a 
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conviction which comes down to ‘l’idée que toute culture répose sur un substrat 
métaphysique particulier, permanent, inaltérable’ (Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, 
pp. 60-1). 
From this it results that, in the name of philosophy, a heavier emphasis is placed 
on the revival of an ancestral cultural identity. Authentic African philosophy is 
seen as something which consists solely in authentic African culture, which is in 
turn found only in the conventions of traditional Africa. Since these conventions 
fall increasingly into neglect, discourse about African philosophy frequently 
involves a nostalgia about traditional Africa. 
We have already seen (in section 3.2) that Hountondji takes issue with such 
ideas about culture, and the present section is intended to show how he attempts 
to disentangle the concept of philosophy from those ideas. Since we have 
previously dealt with the negative phase, we shall move on to look at how 
Hountondji tries to effect a reconstruction and redirectioning of African 
philosophy. 
3.4.1 Towards a New Concept of ‘African Philosophy’ 
One of the main problems with the anthropological or ethnological approach to 
African philosophy would appear to be that it leads to a certain closure of 
discourse, limiting African philosophy to something ‘constituée, donnée 
d’avance, recluse une fois pour toutes dans l’âme éternellement immuable de 
l’Africain […] ou tout au moins […] dans l’essence permanente de sa culture’ (p. 
28). Hountondji’s response is to try to open up African philosophy, just as he tries 
to open up the concept of culture. First, though, he has to acknowledge that the 
bulk of what has gone before has been a rather poor substitute for philosophical 
research. In his first chapter, written in 1969, he says: 
 86 
L’histoire de notre philosophie n’a été de ce fait jusqu’ici, pour une grande 
part, que l’histoire des interprétations successives de cette ‘philosophie’ 
collective, de cette vision du monde qu’on supposait donnée d’avance, sous-
jacente à toutes nos traditions et à tout notre comportement, et que l’analyse 
n’avait plus qu’à mettre au jour, modestement. (pp. 20-21) 
This, for Hountondji, is philosophy only in the ‘vulgar’ sense of the term and he 
wants to replace it with philosophy proper: a rigorous and explicit critical 
discourse consisting in a collection of written texts. 
In the opening pages of Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’ we are given an explicit 
definition of his alternative conception of African philosophy: 
J’appelle philosophie africaine un ensemble de textes: l’ensemble, 
précisément, des textes écrits par des Africains et qualifiés par leurs auteurs 
eux-mêmes de ‘philosophiques’. (p. 11) 
It should be remarked that this definition does not involve a specification of 
content, that is, there is as yet no mention of the sort of subject African 
philosophy should be concerned with, nor whether there are any peculiarly 
African ways of thinking about philosophy. Moreover, although the word 
‘philosophy’ is one of the major terms in the definiendum, i.e. the phrase to be 
defined, it also occurs in the definiens, the definition. Hountondji is at pains to 
point out that this does not amount to his begging the question: 
Cette définition n’entraîne, remarquons-le, aucune pétition de principe. […] 
Seul importe le fait de la qualification lui-même, le recours délibéré au mot 
‘philosophie’, quel que soit par ailleurs le sens de ce mot. Seule nous 
importera, en d’autres termes, l’intention philosophique des auteurs, non le 
degré (difficilement appréciable) de sa réalisation effective. (pp. 11-12) 
What does this mean? The first citation makes reference to ‘des textes écrits par 
des Africains’, and we may wonder whether, by the term ‘Africain’, Hountondji 
means to denote nationals of African countries (making it a geographical 
criterion) or ethnic Africans (making it a ‘racial’ one). We might suspect it is the 
former, for four reasons. 
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First, Hountondji insists that he only omits to consider North-African 
philosophical literature for ‘des raisons matérielles’ and that this literature is 
obviously ‘partie intégrante de la littérature africaine en générale’ (p. 14, note 1). 
This is significant as it suggest that Hountondji does not take ‘africain’ to be co-
extensive with ‘négro-africain’ (as Senghor does: see section 2.2).  
Secondly, the expression ‘philosophie africaine’ is supposed to be analogous to 
examples like ‘philosophie européenne’, ‘philosophie française’ and, I suppose, 
‘philosophie britannique’(p. 61). Now, Karl Popper and Ludwig Wittgenstein also 
are said to be British philosophers, yet they were originally Austrian;95 so, by 
analogy with these examples, a European who is naturalized in an African country 
could produce African philosophy.  
Thirdly, when he comes to discuss the concept of African civilization, 
Hountondji reduces it to ‘l’unité réelle et empirique d’une aire géographique 
déterminée’: the only unifying factor amongst the diverse facets of African 
civilization is the continent to which they belong. If the scope of the term ‘African 
civilization’ is limited to those elements of civilization which develop on African 
soil, then, in order to be consistent, the term ‘African philosophy’ must refer to 
the nationals of those countries which comprise the continent of Africa, and not to 
ethnic Africans.  
Lastly, proving that Hountondji holds Africanity separate from the content of 
African philosophical discourse, we find this comment: ‘l’africanité de notre 
philosophie ne résidera donc pas forcément dans ses thèmes, mais avant tout dans 
l’appartenance géographique de ceux qui la produisent et dans leur mise en 
relation intellectuelle’ (p. 48).  
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This point is linked to the second criterion, according to which the class of 
African philosophy is to include all texts that are qualified as philosophical by 
their (African) authors, no matter what the precise subject matter, and ‘même s’ils 
portent sur les auteurs européens les plus classiques’ (p. 13, note1). Again, it is 
through opening up the concept of African philosophy and allowing that it may 
legitimately occupy itself with questions debated in European philosophical 
writings that Hountondji hopes to safeguard its (philosophical) authenticity. The 
conviction that African philosophy should be limited to a study of African thought 
is itself inauthentically African because it derived from a racist idea of what 
Africans should be interested in (namely, ‘their own kind’).96 Hountondji’s 
solution is not to concern himself with questions of Africanity beyond the 
pedestrian sense of ‘belonging’ to an African country. Therefore the subject 
matter is irrelevant to this categorization: ‘ce sont en effet des travaux de 
philosophie, et ils ont été produits par des Africains. Quelle raison aurait-on de les 
exclure?’ (p. 13, note 1). 
There is a danger of misunderstanding Hountondji’s stipulation that it be the 
fact of a work being called philosophical that makes it philosophical. For let us 
suppose that an African author writes what is apparently a work of fiction, a 
novel, for example. Now, would we be satisfied with the author simply calling 
such a work philosophical? Or, conversely, what if someone produced a text 
which seemed quite obviously philosophical, yet this person was quite adamant 
that it was actually a historical novel. In both cases it seems wrong to assume that 
attempting to force an object into a certain category is the same as proving that 
the object really does belong there.  
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But it is at this point that Hountondji takes his leaves from us, for his definition 
is not supposed to address the question of exactly what a philosophical text should 
look like: ‘le sens du qualificatif ‘philosophique’ n’entre pas ici, en effet, en ligne 
de compte, encore moins le bien-fondé de cette qualification’ (p. 11). All that this 
‘définition naïve’ is supposed to do is to allow us to ‘apercevoir les dissonances 
internes de cette littérature’. These discords have already been mentioned, in the 
course of the argument that many of the original sources of ethnophilosophic 
reconstruction, such as ‘proverbes, contes, poèmes dynastiques et toute la 
littérature orale de l’Afrique’ (p. 29, original emphasis), are void of philosophical 
intention. And if, as Hountondji argues, it is true that the only philosophical 
content of these ‘reconstructions’ originates in the delusory projections of their 
Africanist authors, then those works whose authors are not African might properly 
be excluded from the category of African philosophy, even though they claim to 
be bringing to light a traditional African philosophy. 
On the other hand, we might regard this definition as peculiarly Eurocentric, 
reflecting an environment where there is relatively little contention about what is 
and is not a philosophical text (disputes about what counts as good philosophy 
aside) and where relatively little is at stake for the culture as a whole. Indeed, if 
the very idea behind ethnophilosophy is that some things (outlooks, worldviews, 
etc,) are implicitly, secretly, or unconsciously philosophical, then to demand that 
philosophical texts herald themselves as such seems to be, so to speak, a blow 
below the belt. For this is the basic premise that the ethnophilosopher is unwilling 
to concede, namely, that all philosophy must, like European philosophy, exist in 
the form of a deliberately constructed academic discipline. While it is true that 
Hountondji’s subsequent analysis (see below) brings into perspective the 
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importance of explicit debate, stable texts and disciplinary foundations, and serves 
to explain the rationale behind the definition, nevertheless, one may harbour 
doubts about the impartiality of this position. 
Curiously enough, a further discrepancy in this tentative definition is that it is 
somehow intended to include what Hountondji calls ‘Africains de la diaspora’ in 
the list of African philosophers. Thus, Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon number 
among them, even though they are not, strictly speaking, Africans. It is difficult to 
know what to make of this decision, if we are to define the term ‘African’ 
according to nationality and not ethnicity. For although it may be legitimate to 
count Césaire and Fanon as ethnic Africans (perhaps without taking too much 
trouble over the notion of the purity of the ethnos), they are in fact Martinican, 
and thus French nationals. Yet it seemed that the criterion in question had nothing 
to do with ethnicity, so what has happened? Unfortunately, there seems to be no 
answer to this question in the text. The only logically consistent response to which 
Hountondji might have recourse is that ethnicity wholly or partly constitutes 
‘l’appartenance géographique’: that is, Césaire and Fanon may be said to ‘belong 
to’ Africa because their ancestors came from Africa, and they thus have an ethnic 
link with the continent. 
If this explanation fails to convince (for it merely exploits the ambiguity of 
‘appartenance’) then, for want of a better explanation, the discrepancy should be 
regarded as an attempt to reintroduce a racial criterion into the definition of 
African philosophy, and thus as another weakness in Hountondji’s position. In 
another text it is claimed that Antoine-Guillaume Amo, although a naturalized 
German, may be counted as an African philosopher, the argument being that ‘ce 
qui fait l’Africain, [… c’est] la généalogie, renforcée le cas échéant, voire, à la 
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limite, remplacée par la conscience d’une solidarité historique’ (Libertés, p. 39). 
One wonders, in this case, whether a European born and bred, but thoroughly 
convinced of his historical solidarity with Africans (e.g. Tempels?), could 
produce philosophy that could count as African. As Lucius Outlaw writes: ‘it 
takes only a few probing questions to uncover the fact that Hountondji uses 
“African” as a signifier not just for geographical origins, but also for 
race/ethnicity’.97 
It is also significant, and again quite confusing, that Hountondji freely admits 
that neither Césaire nor Fanon themselves claim to be philosophers. So they 
cannot be said to express philosophical intention, and therefore do not fulfil the 
second criterion either. The reason given for their inclusion in the list is that ‘ils 
nous donnent cependant les moyens de mener une critique politique féconde 
d’une certaine forme de philosophie’ (p.13, note 1). 
At first this seems just bizarre, would Hountondji’s justification amount to no 
more than the insistence that the work of two essentially political writers be 
counted as African philosophy simply because it has been influential on certain 
major currents within African philosophy? This is no justification at all. After all, 
following this line of thinking, if I am sufficiently inspired by Shakespeare to 
produce a work of philosophy (perhaps along the lines of there being ‘nothing 
either good or bad but thinking makes it so’) then Shakespeare too, by this token, 
is a philosopher.98 But this leads to some peculiar effects: if we take the line far 
enough there will be no separation between disciplines at all because every 
discipline is to some extent, often to a considerable extent, influenced by other 
areas of study. Of course the boundaries between disciplines are to a degree 
contrived and may frequently be ignored, but when one of the tasks Hountondji 
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sets himself is to delimit the boundaries of philosophy in order to extract it from 
the coils of ethnophilosophy, it seems strange that he should abandon these same 
boundaries within the opening pages of his critique. 
There is no explicit treatment of this problem, indeed it is not even recognized 
as a problem, and I suggest that these considerations should lead us to suspect that 
what Hountondji has given us is not in fact a definition, but something like a point 
of departure, a critical direction in which he wants us to look. He develops this 
initial position in many ways, and, having noted some preliminary objections, we 
shall now move on to examine the position in more detail. 
3.4.2 Universality and Philosophical Authenticity 
In the works of ethnologists such as the Belgian Jesuit missionary, Placide 
Tempels, there is a tendency to use terms such as ‘African philosophy’ to refer to 
what is at most a Weltanschauung, a so-called ‘world-view’. Now this sort of 
thought system is very different from what is called philosophy in European 
academic departments, not just in style or content but also in method. Hountondji 
thinks that this discrepancy is so great that in effect we are confounding two 
senses of ‘philosophy’, the one strict and theoretical, the other popular and 
meaning something like ‘ideology’ or ‘culture’ (p. 33, note 20). 
The question Hountondji poses is whether the word ‘philosophy’ should retain 
its general sense when determined by the epithet ‘African’, or whether it should 
be modified by the addition: 
Est en cause, en un mot, l’univocité du mot philosophie à travers ses 
diverses applications géographiques. (p. 52) 
It is Hountondji’s view that univocity should be retained, not because philosophy 
should develop the same themes or ask the same questions throughout the world, 
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mais parce que ces différences de contenu n’ont de sens qu’en tant que 
différences de contenu, renvoyant, comme telles, à l’unité principale d’une 
même discipline, d’un même style d’interrogation. (pp. 52-3) 
African philosophy can only be recognized as philosophy if it is constructed along 
the same lines as any other type of philosophy. Towa agrees with this position: 
Dans l’expression ‘la philosophie africaine’, il ne faut voir aucun lien 
essentiel entre le sujet et le prédicat. Aucune civilisation n’entretient un tel 
rapport ni avec la philosophie comme telle ni avec une conception 
philosophique quelconque […] La philosophie dans l’expression 
‘philosophie africaine’ n’a pas de contenu particulier mais renvoie au 
concept général de philosophie. (‘Conditions d’une affirmation …’, pp. 347-
8) 
But given that Hountondji admits that the sort of discourse he is talking about 
has not really existed in Africa to date, how can he be so sure that such a 
discipline is what Africa really needs? Moreover, how can he be sure that he is 
actually talking about a universal discipline, rather than one that is specific to 
Europe? This is an objection taken up by Oyenka Owomoyela: 
Hountondji’s suggestion that African Studies as a discipline is suspect 
because it was invented by Europeans and is, therefore, part of a European 
tradition, is strange. It is strange because it comes from someone whose 
central belief is that the only sort of philosophy fit for African attention is 
European style philosophy, and one who advocates the dissolution of 
African particularities (real or imaginary) in the emergent world civilisation, 
meaning, of course, a cultural pax Europeana. (African Philosophy: The 
Essential Readings, p. 177) 
On the contrary, Hountondji does not accept that in insisting on philosophy’s 
univocality he is therefore reducing it to ‘European style philosophy’. He regards 
philosophy as a universal, abstract discipline of the same genre as mathematics 
and physics, hence its development in the West is purely accidental and it may be 
appropriated, assimilated and improved by anyone. Although there have been 
times when European philosophy was strongly Eurocentric, the issue is not for 
Africans to adopt European philosophy, but to participate in philosophy in 
general, that is, the universal discipline that Europe should likewise strive to 
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create. So Henry Oruka writes that one of the remarkable characteristics of 
African ‘professional’ philosophy is that ‘it employs techniques commonly 
associated with European or Western philosophy. Yet, contrary to the general 
claim, such techniques are not unique to the West’ (African Philosophy: The 
Essential Readings, p. 48). 
Africanism, on the other hand, is the particular study of Africa, and was 
invented by Western cultures during a period when their economic, political and 
ideological interests were deeply embedded in African soil. It is suspect as a 
discipline because it is essentially Eurocentric, in its genesis, concerns, and 
context. Ethnophilosophy originates from outside Africa and imposes itself on 
Africa, maintaining the concept of Africans as uncritical, unreflective individuals 
Another of Hountondji’s objections to ethnophilosophy is that the sources it 
uses to construct African philosophy are not the sort of texts that could genuinely 
support philosophy in the strict sense of the word (i.e. ‘une discipline théorique 
ayant ses exigences propres et obéissant à des règles méthodologiques 
déterminées’, p. 39). But might these very methodological principles, which 
Hountondji takes to be essential to the discipline, be subject to change over time 
and context? If so, it would undermine his definition and allow the possibility of 
different, culturally particular philosophies. Lansana Keita urges us to ‘consider 
the fact that “philosophy” in the sense of Aristotle is not “philosophy” in the sense 
of Quine. Newton was regarded as a natural philosopher, whereas Einstein was 
seen as a natural scientist’ (African Philosophy: The Essential Readings, p. 133).99 
This is not an insurmountable obstacle for Hountondji: he can easily admit that 
philosophy’s subject matter has changed over time, but this is not to say that its 
methodological rules have drastically altered. Do we not have much the same sort 
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of criteria as Aristotle did for deciding when an argument is true and when false? 
Perhaps these criteria or their justifications have changed over the years, but we 
have no reason to believe that if we were able now to speak to Aristotle and try to 
explain some of our ideas there would be proofs which were, in principle, 
impossible to communicate. Is it not true to say that Aristotelian philosophy has 
more in common with modern philosophy than with classical mythology?  
However, having dealt with that objection, we must follow Keita a little further: 
there is no consensus as to what methods of investigation are proper to 
philosophy […] For example, philosophical research in the Anglo-American 
world does not share much in common with the methods of research in 
Continental philosophy. In fact, there is the general feeling in the Anglo-
American world that Continental philosophy is not genuine philosophy, and 
those whose main interests are in that area of philosophy hold a similar 
disregard for Anglo-American analytic philosophy. (Ibid.) 
And if this is the case then why should African philosophers worry about being 
‘unphilosophical’ according to someone else’s criterion?  
But Hountondji’s specifications for philosophy are more fundamental than Keita 
imagines, and it is unlikely that adherents of either ‘Anglo-American’ or 
‘Continental’ philosophy will want to quarrel with him, the level of generality of 
his arguments should mean that his position is common to both sides. Would not 
any philosopher claim that the discipline was based on ‘une libre discussion, par 
la confrontation de thèses et d’hypothèses issues de pensées individuelles (ou au 
moins assumées par elles) et s’amendant réciproquement’, and would s/he not 
likewise scorn the idea of a philosophy that is ‘collective, définitive et immuable, 
soustraite à l’histoire et au progrès’ (p. 40)? 
Nevertheless, Towa still finds something wrong with Hountondji’s analysis and 
remarks that ‘le courant de pensée représenté par P. Hountondji n’occulte pas la 
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pensée africaine, il l’écarte ouvertement, au nom de la scientificité, comme non 
pertinente’ (‘Conditions d’une affirmation …’, p. 344).  
But Hountondji is African and obviously considers himself a philosopher, so 
when he produces a philosophical text it evidently belongs, according his own 
criteria, to the category of African philosophy. Moreover, he provides a list of 
African works he considers to be philosophical (pp. 12-3, note 1) and repeatedly 
states that he considers African ethnophilosophy to be included in the category of 
African philosophy (he just thinks it is bad philosophy and no credit to Africa). It 
follows, therefore, that Hountondji cannot be said to exclude all African thought, 
for he would certainly include his own works, and no doubt those of the other 
African professional philosophers, including Towa. This being the case, exactly 
what sort of African thought does Towa think Hountondji is excluding? Although 
there is no immediately explicit answer, it seems likely that he is talking about so-
called ‘traditional’ African thought, especially since, in another text, he extolls the 
philosophical insights of certain ancient Egyptian parables.100 Furthermore, Towa 
believes the professional philosophers reduce the scope of the term ‘philosophy’ 
to mere epistemology (or rather épistémologie, the philosophy of scientific 
methodology), and the term ‘pensée africaine’ could certainly refer to a far wider 
range of activities than Hountondji’s ‘strictly’ defined philosophy. 
Towa’s accusation is a serious one, for it amounts to the charge that Hountondji, 
and whoever supports him, are perpetuating the same intellectual exclusion that 
has been practised against Africans by Europeans. Whether or not it is true that 
philosophy, in the strict sense of the term, must consist in rigorous, explicitly 
philosophical, written texts, is there nothing at all to be learned from traditional 
African culture? 
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On the contrary, Hountondji recognizes that there is a lot to be gained from 
studying African history (cf. p. 250). But on the question of philosophy, his 
answer remains the same: only the sources which were explicitly given as 
philosophy should be assumed to be philosophy, only texts which perform the 
function of philosophy must earn the title. This does not mean that we cannot 
study ancient Egyptian stories for their ethical content and, in so doing, learn 
something new, nor does it mean that we cannot integrate such findings into 
modern philosophy. However, what we must bear in mind, according to 
Hountondji, is that it is we who are responsible for the ‘philosophication’ of such 
sources; if we chose only to describe them, and never to engage with them 
critically, they would never play the slightest part in the history of philosophy. 
Furthermore, there are texts which are presented as African philosophy, but 
which, because they are closed off from debate and interrogation, actually exclude 
themselves from philosophy. Thus, 
le discours d’un Ogotemmêli, dans la mesure où il prétend énoncer une 
sagesse éternitaire, intangible, un savoir clos issu du fond des âges et 
excluant toute discussion, s’exclut lui-même de l’histoire en générale et, plus 
particulièrement […] de cette recherche inquiète et inachevable, que nous 
appelons philosophie. (p. 101) 
3.4.3 Orality and Literacy 
When Hountondji denies that ethnophilosophy interprets genuine philosophical 
texts, he also mentions that one of the characteristics of a truly philosophical text 
is that it consists in ‘produits du langage perpétuellement disponibles’ (p. 29). By 
this he means that a philosophical text should exist through the medium of the 
written word, in such a way that it is always available for critical analysis and 
reinterpretation. Critics like Oyenka Owomoyela have objected that Hountondji is 
telling us that ‘truth cannot exist except in a written mode’ (African Philosophy: 
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The Essential Readings, p. 171). But Hountondji presses this stipulation of 
literacy, not because he accepts the chauvinism of colonial anthropologists, who 
assumed outright the superiority of the written over the spoken word, but for 
other, more interesting reasons. 
The first reason is that he does not regard philosophy as a system in the way that 
the ethnophilosopher does. Ethnophilosophy attempts to bring to light the 
thought-systems of traditional Africa, fixed groups of beliefs about how the world 
operates — this may take the form of a metaphysics, a cosmology, a cosmogony, 
and so on. But just because they are fixed systems of beliefs, there can be no 
philosophical interrogation, for any criticism of the system immediately appears 
suspicious, even inauthentic.101 As we saw above, for Hountondji this 
intransigency means that the object of the ethnophilosophical discourse 
automatically excludes itself from the domain of philosophy. Far from accepting 
such fixity, we must consider that 
en philosophie, d’une certaine manière, il n’y a pas de vérité absolue. Ou 
plutôt que l’absolu, ici, est dans le relatif: procès illimité, essentiellement 
ouvert. En d’autres termes, que la vérité ne saurait être un ensemble de 
propositions indépassables, définitives, mais le processus même par lequel 
nous cherchons, par lequel nous énonçons des propositions en essayant de 
les justifier, de les fonder. (p. 83) 
It is clear that Hountondji is not talking about the content of philosophy, but its 
structure. Philosophy does not reveal a final truth, as such; it is a particular 
method for testing our ideas about the world, and there may be others. So 
(according to this definition at least) the charge that professional philosophy 
falsely restricts truth to the written medium does not stick. Not only does 
philosophy consist in revisable argumentation, but it is also persists (i.e. through 
time) in the continual movement from one thesis to the next, which is why it 
cannot be considered as a finished product, an artefact to be displayed or 
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‘revealed’. For if an argument could say everything there was to be said, it would 
close the discipline as an inquiry, and turn it into dogma. Philosophical 
conclusions are by their nature imperfect and imperfectable, provisional and 
supersedable. When a discourse is supposed to attain a kind of all-encompassing 
perfection it either becomes a historicist philosophy, like Hegelianism, which tries 
to include all possible dialectical movement (and thereby historical development) 
and contain the multiple in one; or the discourse ceases to be philosophy, turning 
from a continuously revisable and revised debate into a thoroughly determined 
credo (cf. pp. 79-88). 
The view of philosophy as an interminable debate is not a form of 
epistemological pessimism, it is not that we are somehow failing in our 
philosophic endeavour by not reaching some final answer. On the contrary, the 
perfection of philosophy is itself a continual movement, a continuing process of 
self-reinvention; when we treat arguments as temporary stages, ever to be 
surpassed, we are being perfectly philosophical. But, on the other hand, this is not 
to say that we do not aim to produce philosophical conclusions as if they were 
final. This, according to Hountondji, is the paradoxical but necessary situation in 
which we find ourselves: 
Nous croyons prononcer le vrai comme un tribunal prononce une sentence. 
Nous ne pouvons progresser que grâce à cette croyance. La vérité — la 
vérité de notre discours comme la vérité en général — n’est pas seulement 
un mythe idéologique, c’est un mythe idéologique nécessaire, fécond. (p.87) 
Although we are inclined to believe that our best argument is the right one (and 
therefore the only right one) we are also constrained to see that any philosophical 
argument can be extended, criticized, refined. 
The third reason for Hountondji’s insistence that literacy is prerequisite for 
philosophy is a more practical matter: democratic access to philosophical texts. 
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Hountondji grants that pre-colonial Africa was not entirely void of writing 
(especially in areas with Arab populations), but he argues that there is no evidence 
that it was on a wide enough scale to support rigorous and sustained theoretical 
enquiry, and that it was most probably a medium of privilege, accessible only to 
those in power: 
la première et la plus élémentaire condition de la philosophie comme de la 
science (au sens strict de ces mots), c’est une large et démocratique pratique 
de l’écriture. (p. 127, original emphasis)  
Without such widespread literature there is no way to make the substance of 
philosophy, formal texts, permanently available. Indeed, in a largely illiterate 
society, philosophy, as a literate discipline, can only remain an esoteric and 
mysterious pursuit. 
On the basis of these three conditions Hountondji concludes that the subjects of 
ethnophilosophical study cannot in themselves be philosophy. Quite simply, this 
is because ‘dire que la philosophie est une histoire et non un système, c’est aussi 
dire qu’il n’y a pas de philosophie collective’ (p. 88). The very idea of a collective 
implicit philosophy is heterogeneous to the idea of philosophy as a discontinuous 
history: 
Il n’y a pas de philosophie qui serait un système de propositions implicites, 
un système de croyances implicites auquel adhéreraient spontanément tous 
les individus passés, présents et à venir d’une société donnée. (pp. 88-9) 
Yet Towa accuses him of denying ‘a priori la possibilité d’une philosophie 
africaine pré-coloniale’ (‘Conditions d’une affirmation …’, p. 345). In defence of 
Hountondji, we may say that he does not aim to exclude traditional world-views 
from the philosophical category. What he does is present a positive 
characterization of philosophy (as a discontinuous history, etc.) from which it 
results that collective representations or world-views as finished systems of 
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communal, consensual belief cannot be categorized as philosophy. He regards this 
procedure to be analogous to defining a discipline like physics in such a way that 
the definition will very probably exclude the like of folk-songs, myth and legend, 
though this is not to say that the latter are not valuable and worthwhile elements 
of our cultures. 
As for the difference between the written and spoken word, he admits that there 
is no reason a non-literate society could not produce valuable philosophical 
insights: ‘l’absence de transcription n’enlève certes rien à la valeur intrinsèque 
d’un discours philosophique’. It is simply a matter of pragmatics, he continues: 
‘elle l’empêche cependant de s’intégrer à une tradition théorique collective’ (p. 
135). The reason for this lies in the natural tendency of oral traditions to move 
towards a dogmatic representation of knowledge. In fact, a critical, literate culture 
also tends towards dogmatism because, as was mentioned above, the motive for 
our employing an argument is generally because we think it is right. So this 
feature is common to both oral and written traditions, as it appears to be the way 
humans approach the notion of truth. However, in an open, literate culture there 
are likely to be records which remind us that, for example, before we came to 
think the earth was round, we thought it flat. Thus, even though all traditions, oral 
and literate alike, attempt to establish dogmatic certainty (which is why it is 
possible to believe that the conclusions we reach right now are the right ones—
see the discussion of the mythe idéologique, above), nevertheless the written 
culture retains the marks of its own dialectical, and hence discontinuous, 
development. It is this dialectic which is the hallmark of philosophical thinking: 
la tradition orale aurait plutôt tendance à favoriser la consolidation du savoir 
en une système dogmatique et intangible, tandis que la transmission par voie 
d’archive rendrait davantage possible, d’un individu à l’autre, d’une 
génération à l’autre, la critique du savoir. (p. 131) 
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Collective memory would only recall the result, the conclusion of a 
philosophical investigation, forgetting the ‘long cheminement théorique qui y a 
conduit’ (p. 133). Hountondji concludes that there could at most exist 
philosophers in the preliterate culture, but not a philosophy (p. 135). The 
philosophical morsels present in traditional cultural texts comprise ‘non une 
recherche mais au mieux les résultats d’une recherche, non une philosophie mais 
tout au plus une sagesse’ (p. 134). 
3.5 A New African Philosophy 
To understand the general direction and modalities for the future African 
philosophy which Hountondji prescribes in Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, it is 
enough to invert the preceding critique of Négritude and ethnophilosophy, two 
areas which he considers to be inadequate and highly misleading representations 
of what African philosophy is and should be. 
To take the first term of this expression ‘African philosophy’, the African 
qualities of the discourse will no longer be limited to an essentialist expression of 
difference, instead they will be manifest in the dynamism of African culture, 
which, like any culture, is a constant flux of diverse and contradictory elements. 
So Hountondji does not intend to give up the idea of Africanity, but indicates that 
the latter is to be understood to reside in the geographical origins of the authors of 
African philosophy and, importantly, in the fact that they form a real academic 
community:  
L’africanité de notre philosophie ne résidera donc pas forcément dans ses 
thèmes, mais avant tout dans l’appartenance géographique de ceux qui la 
produisent et dans leur mise en relation intellectuelle.102 
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As is implied by the last phrase, the next prescription is that there should be an 
arena of free and frank discussion between Africans.103 This is with a view to two 
main ends: first, to place the emphasis squarely on the development of philosophy 
within Africa, no longer to take Africa as a mere subject for discussion; secondly, 
to ensure that African philosophical texts are intended primarily for an African 
audience. 
Quel que soit l’objet spécifique de la philosophie, la première tâche des 
philosophes africains d’aujourd’hui, pour autant qu’ils souhaitent développer 
une authentique philosophie africaine, est de promouvoir et d’entretenir 
constamment en leur propre sein une libre discussion sur tous les problèmes 
relatifs à leur discipline, au lieu de se contenter du dialogue individuel et 
quelque peu abstrait de chacun d’eux avec le monde occidental. (p. 74) 
This, it is hoped, would put an end to the ‘polarisation dangereuse’ which 
prevents a true exchange between African and European cultures by promoting an 
impoverished pluralism taking  the form of  
l’alternative truquée entre “aliénation” culturelle (corrélat supposé d’une 
trahison politique) et nationalisme culturel (revers obligé, et parfois substitut 
dérisoire, du nationalisme politique). (p. 234) 
African universities must cease their practice of ideological Africanism, which 
privileges above all discourses which take Africa as their subject, and thus runs 
the risk of creating a ‘particularisme forcené’. Within the context of the colonial 
culture’s false universalism, such strategies are useful resorts, and represent a 
legitimate attempt to come to terms with one’s own origins and context. But the 
danger is that it will lead into a theoretical cul-de-sac where Africanism is 
perceived to be the only legitimate area of research for an African (p. 236).104 
Once again, Hountondji emphasizes the active nature of philosophy: although it 
is important to archive oral texts before they disappear, philosophy cannot be a 
matter of collecting and compiling data from traditional African sources, as the 
ethnophilosophers would have it. No longer is it sufficient to attempt to describe 
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African philosophy, instead the discipline must be transformed from a simple 
collation of writings destined for non-African readers into a vehicle for free and 
rigorous discussion between African philosophers themselves. Hountondji claims 
that ‘c’est seulement ainsi que cette littérature acquerra valeur universelle et 
pourra contribuer à enrichir l’héritage international de la pensée humaine’ (p. 77). 
He also recognizes how important it is for the African philosopher to be 
politically engaged, in order to protect the freedom of expression and association 
which guarantee a space in which philosophy can be developed: 
La responsabilité du philosophe africain […] déborde infiniment le cadre 
étroit de sa discipline, et […] il ne peut se payer le luxe d’un apolitisme 
satisfait, d’une complaisance tranquille à l’égard du désordre établi — à 
moins de se renier lui-même comme philosophe, et comme homme. En 
d’autres termes, la libération théorique du discours philosophique suppose 
une libération politique. (p. 37) 
3.6 Conclusion 
As laid out in the introduction to this chapter, we have followed the lines of 
inquiry that compose the main body of  Hountondji’s argumentation. With the 
first, he denounces the excessive emphasis that writers like Senghor place on the 
role and position of African culture(s), arguing that it serves only to obscure the 
actual political situations of African countries, to stall change, and to mask 
oppression. Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’ is a very careful text and Hountondji 
does not fail, as Senghor does, to confront the problematic notions of ‘West’ and 
‘non-West’. He rejects the assumption that the West is a vast, monolithic and 
uniform cultural group, and dismisses the notion as both scientifically and 
philosophically unsound. In so doing he also discredits the often opposed image 
of Africa as an equally homogeneous unit of humanity: his main arguments for 
this come from his idea of culture as a continuing process of conflict and internal 
contradictions, and the mainly geographical criteria of African identity. 
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Hountondji’s critique of the concept of culture also enables him to deconstruct 
certain myths, such as the myth of unanimity, and the myth of cultural pluralism. 
He unmasks the apparently dynamic concept of a world civilization, and shows 
that it actually rests on a very static idea of regional cultures. Once we have 
accepted the innate heterogeneity and fluidity of the latter, the cultural 
essentialism which is a precondition for the ‘Civilisation de l’Universel’ becomes 
quite unthinkable. This position also leads Hountondji to question the assumption 
that colonization has been a time of deculturation, that African cultures are 
somehow being ‘watered down’ by excessive Western influence. On the contrary, 
he affirms that  
le pluralisme ne survient pas de l’extérieur à une société quelle qu’elle soit, 
mais qu’il lui est toujours déjà inhérent. La prétendue acculturation, la 
prétendue ‘rencontre’ de la civilisation africaine avec celle de l’Europe, n’est 
en fait qu’une mutation supplémentaire opérée par la civilisation africaine 
elle-même. (p. 233) 
The second line of thought that we followed led to a general critique of 
ethnophilosophy, aiming to demystify a discipline which Hountondji believes is 
founded upon sleight-of-hand and the consistent failure to open one’s theorizing 
to critical examination. In particular, he emphasizes the 
colonialist/anthropological origins of ethnophilosophy, its claims to reveal the 
‘mentality’ of the ‘native’, and its unbending metaphysics, the latter being a key 
feature of Senghor’s Négritude. The images that ethnophilosophy produces of 
Africans he sees as fetishizations of ‘the’ African which are produced for (and 
mostly by) Europeans. Unfortunately Africans, too, have in some instances come 
to accept and reproduce these images of themselves. 
As a corrective for this situation, Hountondji proposes a different understanding 
of the concept of African philosophy. First, he hopes to expunge from the debate 
 106
the ‘vulgar’ sense of the term, according to which people can possess 
unconscious, implicit philosophies and whole societies can share a common 
philosophy or Weltanschauung (world-view). Next, he plainly states some of the 
criteria that he thinks should belong to a definition of philosophy: it is a rigorous 
academic discipline and cannot, therefore, consist in ‘folk philosophy’ or world-
views; in a historical sense it is a progression of thought. This means that what 
matters in philosophy is not just the answer that is produced, but above all the 
path that is taken to get to the answer, i.e. the development of thought. This 
understanding of philosophy leads Hountondji to the conclusion that non-literate 
cultures are intrinsically unable to elaborate a philosophy, due to their tendency to 
preserve knowledge (as a collection of truth propositions) rather than the 
dialectical discontinuity which is the true heart of philosophy. 
In the end it seems that Hountondji is not as others have portrayed him, and that 
his emphasis on the universality of philosophy, its univocalité, stems from a 
determination to avoid the Eurocentric attitude which reserves philosophy as a 
serious discipline for Europe alone, while allotting Africa an impoverished 
‘mythologized’ form. His position does not rule out sage philosophy on the 
grounds that it is not, or cannot be, philosophical, though he is represented as 
saying that it is only through writing that ideas can become philosophy.105 This is 
not quite what he says, and we must refer once more to his idea of philosophy as a 
process. Non-literate systems, it is argued, are disadvantaged when it comes to an 
area of activity like philosophy because they tend not to preserve the long process 
of thought (creation as creating) in memory, but rather concentrate on 
remembering the finished article (creation as a created product) and in philosophy 
it is not the finished article which counts or even, strictly speaking, exists, so 
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much as the whole process. So Hountondji’s claim is that oral traditions are, 
practically speaking, incapable of holding and preserving philosophical texts, and 
this is because they are better suited to elements of culture which are less open 
and liable to change.  
Finally, taking what precedes as justificatory basis, the text puts forward 
proposals for a new direction for an authentic African philosophy. In discussing 
what this might mean, Hountondji repeats that a key criterion is the destination of 
the discourse: a truly African discipline will evolve within Africa, amongst 
Africans, and address African problems. This is not to say that African philosophy 
must only concern itself with African themes, writers, and texts, for it is not the 
content of the discipline that must be fixed on Africa (as the Africanists hold), but 
the application.  
Nevertheless, having said all this there are still certain questions which seem to 
linger, despite Hountondji’s efforts to dispel their influence. These questions 
consist in problems of cultural identity and difference, and philosophy and value. 
In the final analysis, what is the difference between African and non-African 
philosophies? For Hountondji, it is nothing more than a difference in the 
‘appartenance géographique’ of the authors. But this reply, as Appiah says, 
‘knowingly sidesteps what has been one of the cruces of philosophical debate in 
post-colonial black Africa’ (In My Father’s House, p. 135). It ignores the fact that 
Western writers can afford to gloss over or ignore their differences, that they have 
no pressing need to assert their identities because the latter are already protected, 
enshrined within the dominant culture. By contrast, the African writer must 
always be aware of his Africanity because, if it is not always seen as inferior, it is 
inevitably seen as a form of ‘difference’.106 
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We might put the origin of this discrepancy down to a simple choice of subject, 
that  Hountondji does not want to discuss African identity or assert cultural 
difference, whereas other authors do. But the fact that he reintroduces ethnicity 
into the ‘geographical criterion’ (see section 4.1 above) shows that there is more 
at issue than a simple matter of geography. 
In connection with the last point is the concern that, although Hountondji’s 
concept of philosophy as an abstract, value-free discipline is plausible in itself, it 
is out of line with the way philosophy is commonly regarded. However much we 
would like to isolate the discipline from the glamour which surrounds it, 
nevertheless, the statement that Africa has not, to date, had a philosophy to speak 
of is not of the same order as to say that Africa has not, to date, had tractors, 
algebra, or a school of linguistics. The latter may or may not have prestige, apart 
from their practical utility, but they have never been taken as the measure of 
humanity. Given the history of Africa’s portrayal as the ‘poor relation’ or 
intellectual inferior vis-à-vis the ‘West’, admitting that Africa has no indigenous 
philosophy sounds dangerously like admitting that the racist distinction made by 
the historians, anthropologists and ethnologists of Europe was, in fact, correct. 
After all, according to the analysis we made of the aims of the Négritude 
movement, this was one of the principal reasons for Senghor’s radical division of 
reason into ‘black/sympathetic’ and ‘white/discursive’. In denying this split, 
Hountondji recognizes that he cannot make associated claims about the existence 
of African philosophies. Nor would he want to, since for him they clearly have 
not existed until recently, but he cannot detach this conclusion from the painful 
and destructive influence of the pre-Négritude Western concepts of Africa. 
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Hountondji accepts both that Africa did not have its own philosophy, in his 
sense of the word, and that this discipline is something valuable, yet he would 
deny that his view allows or promotes a reassertion of the typical notion of the 
West’s superiority over African countries. 
In conclusion, the most serious accusation that is levelled at Hountondji is one 
of complicity with the strain of European ethnocentric thought which refuses to 
believe that Africa is capable of philosophy.107 Thus he is said to exclude 
traditional African thought from the concept of philosophy from the very 
beginning. In response we may say that Hountondji’s critics confuse his 
unintentional exclusion of folk thought from philosophy, which is a consequence 
of the definition he adopts, with European colonial thought, which consciously 
aimed to do the same thing. 
Or, for the sake of argument, let us allow that Hountondji is a westernized 
academic philosopher, and that the type of philosophy he is recommending 
Africans to engage in is basically Western philosophy. Why should this render 
what he says invalid? Is it sufficient to claim that a writer is westernized in order 
to discredit his discourse? Even if it is true that Hountondji is writing from a 
Western standpoint, it would be peculiar to criticize him on these grounds alone. 
For if it is not a good argument to say that a text is invalid because it is the work 
of an African, then surely it cannot be a good argument to say that a text is invalid 
because it is produced by a Westerner, or a westernized African. 
It is also possible that we are witnessing what Eleni Coundouriotis identifies as 
‘a tendency to equate anticolonialism with an anti-Western […] attitude’, the 
result of which is often that ‘if we fail to identify an anti-Western attitude, we do 
not recognize the resistance against colonialism’.108 
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Nevertheless, although it cannot be labelled outright as a clear instance of 
eurocentrism, the fact that Hountondji ignores the real differences between 
African and European thought is at least highly worrying and might lead us to 
suspect that he is taking a (European) particular for a universal. The differences 
between African and European thought need not be essential differences, as 
Senghor tries to argue, it is enough that there exist between African and European 
societies structural differences which are sufficient to warrant a mise en question 
of the status and role of philosophy. In addition to this, there is the ever-present 
problem of the minor status of African sciences, the subordinate position they 
occupy with regard to the West, and above all, the unresolved issue of African 
reason, which, as Mudimbé says, ‘d’habiles contempteurs mettent encore 
savamment et régulièrement en miettes au nom d’une raison et d’une science 
parfaitement au service de projets politiques’ (L’Odeur du Père, p. 13). This last 
idea is the theme of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Colonial Violence 
4.1 Introduction 
Given the violence of Africa’s encounter with Europe through which the 
‘dark’ continent was introduced into the modern world, the question of 
violence should have a central importance for the discourse of contemporary 
African philosophy. And yet, to date, African philosophers have not 
properly dealt with or even engaged the question. (The Hermeneutics of 
African Philosophy, p. 55) 
One of the criticisms that was common to our commentaries on both Senghor and 
Hountondji was that neither writer appears to be able to engage fully with the 
question of colonial violence because each one idealizes the concept of African 
reason, the former by glossing over material inequalities with essentialist rhetoric, 
the latter by not even acknowledging such a thing as an African reason. 
The purpose of the present chapter is to re-examine the ground already covered 
and the provisional conclusions we have reached, but in a new light, so as to 
provide a deeper understanding of the issues involved. We shall begin by 
summarizing the argumentation relating to Léopold Senghor and Paulin 
Hountondji’s conceptions of African philosophy and restating the major faults 
that were found therein, this time with particular reference to the concept of 
colonial violence. After this, we shall move on to discuss colonial violence as an 
instance of the violence of political domination, and this will lead us to look at 
minority discourse. Although this route may at first appear to be something of a 
digression from the question initially proposed, Qu’est-ce que la ‘philosophie 
africaine’?, it will soon become clear that the texts we have studied so far share 
several of the main concerns of minority discourse: for instance, the revaluation 
of previously neglected and/or abused discourses, and the re-appropriation of 
autonomous speech by marginalized subjects. 
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On the other hand, the recognition of the differences between the texts will 
bring into relief the ways and extent to which Hountondji’s discourse is truly both 
an advancement on Négritude and a valuable alternative to other contemporary 
methods of conceptual decolonization. 
In the last analytical section we inquire into the logic of racial terms and 
propose the hypothesis that the liberal goal of the complete eradication of racial 
violence presupposes that we supercede racial concepts themselves.  
4.2 The Discussion So Far 
4.2.1 Senghor 
As we saw in chapter 2, Senghor’s theory of ‘African personality’ is built around 
a series of oppositions based on putatively racial identities. First, he makes a hard 
distinction between Nègres and Blancs and rationalizes this division by portraying 
it as a segregation of objectively different types of ‘soul’. The quite clinical, 
matter-of-fact, manner of the division is emphasized by the use of the singular 
definite article: ‘le Nègre’ and ‘le Blanc’, so it is clear that these are supposed to 
be two discrete, internally uniform categories.109 He attributes specific 
characteristics to each so-called race: blacks use synthetic reason, and base their 
knowledge on ‘concrete’ perception and ‘sympathetic’ participation in the world, 
whereas white reason is analytic and uses abstract conception and detached 
observation of the object in order to construct knowledge.110 The type of reason 
one has is supposed to be determined exclusively by the type of soul one 
possesses, the formula being quite straightforward: black soul, black reason; white 
soul, white reason. According to Senghor, the type of reason one possesses in turn 
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determines one’s manner of cultural existence or, in the case of an entire people, 
civilization. 
Thus, a hierarchy of concepts is established, ranked in pairs, and each with its 
opposite number. Consisting of a strict black/white distinction under the rubrics 
race, reason, culture, and civilization, the foundations of the edifice lie in the 
original racial distinction.111 
Aside from this hierarchy of racializing concepts, there are other conceptual 
dichotomies to be found in Senghor. For instance, he repeatedly emphasizes the 
difference between Africa and Europe (which is also called ‘the West’ 
(l’Occident)) and moulds this distinction closely around the primary black/white 
split. In other words, he assumes that ‘black’ and ‘African’ are equivalent 
concepts: if you are one, you must also be the other, likewise for the terms ‘white’ 
and ‘European’. Thus, when he comes to speak of Afro-Americans he treats them 
in just the same way as the Africans about whom he usually speaks; there is no 
salient distinction for Senghor because he sees them all as essentially black 
(Liberté 1, p. 217). Then there is the nature/technology divide, which is brought 
into play when it is said that ‘le Nègre est l’homme de la nature’ (p. 202). It is 
clearly understood that this characteristic is to be attributed to the African’s 
immutable soul. Elsewhere, high technological and economical development are 
identified as the province of the white.112 
From what has been said, it would appear that Senghor is reproducing and 
synthesizing a number of stereotypes traditionally used to the advantage of white 
identity, and to the detriment of blacks: whites being characterized as coolly 
rational, detached and of high technical skill; while blacks are portrayed as semi-
rational, emotional beings, closer perhaps to animality than humanity.113 
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Yet despite the seeming imbalance of these views, Senghor is in fact preparing 
the terrain for a vigorous defence, and even an ecstatic celebration, of black 
cultural identity, civilization and values. As he develops his themes it becomes 
apparent that he views whiteness as in some way decadent and deficient, mainly 
through an overemphasis on analysis and abstraction. Blackness is portrayed as a 
complementary, indeed salutary, force in relation to whiteness. 
Mere discursive reason, the reason which only sees [is] inadequate to 
‘comprehend’ the world, to gather it up and transform it. […It needs] the 
help of intuitive reason, the reason which comes to grips, which delves 
beneath the surface of facts and things. (p. 202, italics in original) 
In the name of Négritude, Senghor assaults the myths of Western ideology, 
according to which the white is pre-eminently rational and civilized and the black 
abjectly sensual and savage. The first sentence of L’Esthétique runs as follows: ‘le 
XXe siècle restera celui de la découverte de la Civilisation négro-africaine’; on the 
next page it is emphasized that ‘le Nègre n’est pas dénué de raison […] mais sa 
raison n’est pas discursive; elle est synthétique’ (Liberté 1, pp. 202-3). Within the 
first two pages of the essay Senghor presents the central claim of Négritude: that 
the African is fully the equal of the European. 
Nevertheless, even as an equal, the African remains the European’s opposite 
number. For both the form and the content of the traditional racial distinctions 
remain intact: the black/white divide is maintained, and with approximately the 
same symbolic content (blackness still connotes sensuousness). The difference 
now is that each side is assigned an independent and positive value. Senghor 
exploits the structure of the racist binary by subverting it from the inside; he does 
not reject, but instead transforms, the binary. It could be argued that, in 
performing this transformation, Senghor tries to disrupt the centrality of white 
reason by calling into question its effectiveness and promoting an equal and 
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complementary opposite. Yet there still remains the question of why he should 
choose to work within the terms of the colonialist discursive framework at all.114 
For the moment I would like to focus on the fact that, while accepting the 
blanc/nègre divide, Senghor does reject the civilized/savage and the rational/non-
rational (or pre-rational) distinctions mentioned above. While acknowledging the 
pertinence of Soyinka’s critique, which accuses Senghor of accepting the ‘racist 
syllogism’,115 there remains something to be said about the orientation and 
validity of Senghor’s Négritude. As Abiola Irele writes: 
the concept of African personality and its more elaborate variant of 
négritude represented a genuine attempt to think through the tensions of an 
especially difficult historical experience to some form of balance. There is 
no question, therefore, that they were both necessary and valuable.116 
For even if Senghor does accept the general framework of colonial discourse, it 
is clear that his project is progressive in its intention.117 Within this accepted 
framework he focuses attention on the positive characteristics of African 
‘difference’ from European forms, and it is this difference that Senghor charges 
with value: it is the complement to white existence, and it will occupy a special 
position in the ‘Civilization of the Universal’.118 
Nevertheless, even if his portrayal of Africans leaves room for hope, the critique 
Senghor makes of colonialism is hardly at all effective. Although he drops 
occasional remarks about the greed and exploitation inherent in the system, there 
is no attempt to link this abstract critique with particular countries, individuals, 
policies or historical facts.119 
To highlight the ideality of these writings, their detachment from reality, it may 
help to relocate them in their proper historical setting. During the Second World 
War, it was common that black prisoners-of-war captured by Germans were 
separated from their white comrades and shot, the Geneva Convention 
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notwithstanding. In 1948 apartheid began in South Africa, with millions of black 
South-Africans forced into townships, and consequently almost irrevocable 
poverty. L’Esthétique négro-africaine was published in 1956 and Pierre Teilhard 
de Chardin et la Politique Africaine in 1962, which was also the final year of 
France’s ‘War of Peace’ in Algeria. The Sharpeville massacre, with 69 dead, took 
place in 1960. Patrice Lumumba, the first prime minister of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, was assassinated a year later. Across the ocean, in the 
home of the new world power, the lynching of African-Americans continued from 
the nineteenth century into the 1950s and 1960s. The American Civil Rights Act, 
which outlawed racial discrimination in America’s institutions, was not created 
until 1964; while the Voting Rights Act, establishing suffrage for Afro-
Americans, came the following year.120 
Apart from his generally casual, abstract and un-contextualized reference to 
colonial exploitation, we may note at least two serious flaws in Senghor’s theory. 
First, he neglects the factual reality of racially based oppression, of which the 
prime example is his referring to the use of black labour in America as if it were 
prized for its superior skill, not despised and used for its cheapness.121 Senghor 
does not recognize that his vision is at quite a remove from the actual state of 
world affairs, and his failure to articulate the modes of oppression which continue 
to afflict Africans and their descendants constitutes a major lacuna in his 
polemical strategy. 
Secondly, there is no attempt to come to terms with the problem of black reason. 
Senghor writes as if all that is required is a demonstration of the existence and 
modalities of black reason, not realizing, or appearing not to realize, that there are 
interests involved, which is to say that it is in the interests of certain individuals 
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and groups that black reason is denied or ‘denigrated’. Given this fact, a simple 
description of black reason is bound to be ineffective so long as it is not 
accompanied by a profound critique of those structures which keep the African in 
the role of subaltern, and of those interests which originate and reinforce the 
structure of racist colonial discourse. 
Moreover, Senghor is pre-occupied with describing the form of black reason, 
the génie of black civilization, and does not ever discuss the possibility that the 
former is not reason, and that the latter is not civilization, according to the 
accepted sense of the terms (See Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, p. 61). Nor is it 
obvious that he is bringing about some sort of rupture within Western discourse, 
by using the same terms as colonial racism but in a new, subversive way 
(although that does not mean that this is not what he is doing). 
But at least this much is certain: by contending that all blacks share a common 
substance, i.e. their ‘blackness’ or Négritude, Senghor admits the cogency of the 
colonial discourse, and inadvertently perpetuates the structures of domination. 
When he says nègres he does not seem to feel the need to justify his 
pronouncement. Indeed, this is understandable, for it is a category which by the 
time of Senghor’s writings has already acquired a long history. The context in 
which he writes makes it seem uncontroversial to speak of nègres as a natural and 
homogeneous group, although, as we have seen, this is far from the case. The 
various contexts surrounding Senghor’s utterance, colonialism, African 
nationalism, anthropological and ethnological discourses, etc., make this ellipsis 
possible. The same contexts also mask the fact that there actually is an omission. 
Although there is an explanatory gap there appears to be none, for the concepts 
which are in common currency make it possible to take the term nègre to 
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represent a natural category. It is not clear whether these contexts blind Senghor 
to his own free act of imagination, or whether he consciously recreates the 
nègre/blanc binary. 
Ironically the mode of solidarity that he proposes through Négritude, while it 
may be unifying, is intrinsically oppressive. For his theory includes no concerted 
effort to understand and disempower the structures of domination, but is at bottom 
superbly idealistic. The supposedly imminent utopia that is described as a 
‘Civilization of the Universal’ is a world where white and black people exist side 
by side and in perfect harmony; it is a world where white and black cultures have 
fused together in a mutually beneficial synthesis.122 The saccharine sweetness of 
this vision disguises the bitter historical truth of continuing segregation, 
discrimination, harassment, oppression, and persecution on the grounds of race. 
4.2.2 Hountondji 
Contrary to his predecessor, Hountondji rejects the distinction between Nègres 
and Blancs, and a fortiori the notion of a specifically black reason, which he finds 
untenable, a vestige of colonial racism. The final chapter of Sur la ‘philosophie 
africaine’ includes a brief but compelling section in which it is argued that every 
civilization is essentially ‘un choc permanent de décisions culturelles 
contradictoires’ (p. 226). Not only would Hountondji agree with the post-colonial 
theorists who claim that the previously colonized peoples have diverse identities, 
which have consistently been overwritten through the use of simplified binaries 
like civilized/savage, but he shows no interest whatsoever in the concept of 
‘blackness’. Whether or not the term is supposed to indicate a uniform class, 
blackness simply is not a concept to which he assigns philosophical content. 
Instead, his position appears to consist in part in a form of nominalism about 
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Africanity, i.e. the term ‘African’ refers to the empirically and arbitrarily 
demarcated continent of Africa and its peoples; it does not denote a form or kind. 
Africanity, he argues, exists as a unity only when it is viewed from an external 
perspective, ‘au sens d’une désignation externe et non d’une impossible 
caractérisation interne […] la seule unité réelle étant ici celle d’un continent’ (Sur 
la ‘philosophie africaine’, p. 227). This leads him to denounce the hypothesis of 
an essentially African culture, and an essentially European culture likewise. With 
such a perspective, Senghor’s adoption of Teilhard de Chardin’s ‘Civilisation de 
l’Universel’ becomes meaningless; for Hountondji, cultures are intrinsically 
heterogeneous, so it is impossible for there to be discrete and internally consistent 
cultures, and the latter are prerequisites for the form of cultural syncretism 
espoused by Senghor. Hountondji debunks Senghor’s apparently pluralist cultural 
theory (i.e. that the many unique cultures will be subsumed in a single, global 
synthesis) by showing that this hypothesis in fact depends upon an untenable 
opposition: 
La conception apparemment dynamique de la civilisation mondiale, telle 
qu’elle est habituellement professée, repose donc en fait sur une conception 
statique des cultures régionales. […] La civilisation mondiale, telle qu’elle 
existe effectivement, est loin d’être une synthèse. C’est au contraire 
l’approfondissement des conflits culturels qui existaient jusque-là à 
l’intérieur de chaque société et la prise de conscience que ces conflits sont 
finalement les mêmes dans les diverses sociétés. (p. 235) 
If Hountondji views African cultural identity as heterogeneous, he does not feel 
the same way about philosophy and reason. According to the ethnologists and the 
Négritudinists, Africans possess a different sort of reason from the Western kind 
and so produce a different philosophy. But Hountondji argues that if African 
philosophy is to be truly philosophical then it must fulfil the same criteria as 
Western philosophy. This does not come down to a question of Western 
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superiority, but to the fact that philosophy is a universal discipline. In Platonic 
language we would say that philosophy is an archetype which Western 
philosophical traditions strive to instantiate. It follows that Africans, if they are to 
produce a genuinely philosophical discourse, must do no less.  
As well as emphasizing the unity of the discipline and, broadly speaking, its 
methodology,123 Hountondji argues that philosophy is a dynamic process, a 
history of thinking and debate, and takes issue with those who believe that 
philosophy can exist ‘subconsciously’ or ‘implicitly’ in the cultural productions 
and customs of any people. Given his specific understanding of the role and 
sources of African philosophy, together with his concept of cultures as dynamic 
and internally contradictory, it follows that for Hountondji it must be a myth that 
there exists 
une philosophie africaine spécifique, une vision du monde commune à tous 
les Africains d’hier, d’aujourd’hui et de demain, un système de pensée 
collectif et immuable, éternellement opposable à celui de l’Europe. (p. 46)124 
The basis of Hountondji’s oppositional schema is the notion of ‘authentic 
philosophy’, which he characterizes as a rigorous, scientific, methodologically 
universal, ideologically neutral, and primarily academic discipline. On the other 
side of the divide he locates such things as the philosophy claimed to consist in 
the Weltanschauungen (world-views) of African peoples, and various forms of 
Africanist nationalist ideology, none of which, it is argued, are genuine 
philosophy.125 We are given a working definition of philosophy, which is 
followed by an in-depth critique of the sources of a number of works, indeed a 
whole tradition (ethnology/ethnophilosophy), on the basis that they do not exhibit 
the specifically philosophical characteristics that he has outlined. 
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Hountondji criticizes ethnophilosophers because they imply that the type of 
discourse coming most easily to ‘authentic’ Africans is one of mythology and 
superstition, and not reason and argument (pp. 53-65). There is no question for 
Hountondji that African reason is capable of engaging in this universal 
philosophy, any more than there is such a question about Western reason, for in 
fact African and Western reason are one and the same. In other words, it is 
assumed that one’s ability to produce works of philosophy, and the specific 
content of these works, does not depend upon one’s ethnicity, but rather upon 
one’s capacity for critical thinking, and the latter is itself independent of ethnicity.  
So philosophy and reason are taken to be universals which transcend colour 
divides. Philosophically this presents few problems. Any would-be attacker of 
black intelligence would be hard-pressed to make a sound case for the view that 
blacks are not capable of reason because, in the first place, the term ‘black’ does 
not denote a well-defined category, in either biology or philosophy (see section 
2.3). 
However, this attitude is politically unsound because blackness is a real political 
category. Even if the category consists in nothing more substantial than a badly 
founded and badly reasoned racializing classification, nonetheless it is politically 
real because it is politically visible, and hence causally active. People discriminate 
against, abuse, attack, and kill each other on grounds of race, even without a clear 
understanding of what race might actually be. As Margaret A. Simmons 
comments: ‘if racial differences are not cast in stone, they are nonetheless salient 
features of individual lives in a racist society’.126 Racist ideologies still abound, 
according to which perceived colour is a faithful indicator of intellectual 
capabilities, so the conditions still exist which make it possible to say: ‘In short, 
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this fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was 
stupid’.127 
Consequently, even if we believe that reason is in fact universal, we must accept 
that not everyone will recognize this fact, with the result that what is in effect a 
nominally black reason (i.e. the exercise of reason by those perceived/classed as 
black) may be undermined by essentialist racist ideologies which represent blacks 
as a priori irrational, or at least imperfectly rational, beings. And ironically, racist 
practice such as racial discrimination and violence and the lack of equal 
opportunities within education and employment may well constitute a substantial 
obstacle to the full development of the (black) individual’s intellectual potential. 
In summary, it may be said that in some important respects Hountondji fails to 
commit himself to the problematic of black reason. His discourse is also idealistic 
in that its theoretical range is limited to the notion of a universal philosophy and 
so does not come to terms with the suppression of black reason, which is surely a 
feature closely connected to ‘le maintien et l’épanouissement […], ou la réduction 
et la mort pure et simple’ of African philosophy (L’Odeur du Père, p. 11). 
In other words, Hountondji neglects the honorific status of philosophy. By 
arguing that since there is no question of constructing an essentially African 
physics or algebra it is equally incoherent to speak of an essentially African 
philosophy, he may be missing a quite important aspect of the debate. For 
philosophy has been often been held up as the essence or defining characteristic 
of humanity, hence it is of signal importance. And yet, looking back over the first 
two chapters of our analysis it is apparent that, even without bringing about an in-
depth critique of colonial violence, Hountondji’s text fares rather better than 
Senghor’s, and I would like to spend a little time discussing just why this is so. 
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First of all, the former’s texts are obviously far closer to what one would expect 
to find in a Western philosophical text. The style is more analytical and less 
rhetorical, the arguments are more immediately convincing and do not require 
belief in non-observable entities like souls and racial essences. Of course, 
Hountondji also supplies a conceptual and historically informed analysis of 
Senghor’s texts, contexts, sources and aims; thus his own theory surpasses his 
predecessor’s by explaining it, recognizing its initial historical validity, but then 
arguing that the moment for Négritude is past (see Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, 
p. 240). 
Nevertheless, in the preceding chapter it was argued that there are many 
questions that Hountondji does not answer satisfactorily, including certain 
incongruities in his own definitions of Africanity and philosophy. More serious, 
though, is the possibility that, by returning to a Western notion of philosophy 
which automatically excludes pre-colonial African thought, he reproduces 
Eurocentric attitudes within his analyses. This is serious because it means that his 
position coincides, albeit accidentally, with the prejudice that before the advent of 
colonization Africa was unable to produce thinkers with philosophical 
capabilities. As Fanon says, ‘the history of the conquest, the historic development 
of the colonization [… is] substituted for the real time of the exploited’ (Towards 
an African Revolution, p. 158). 
It is hard to bring to a definitive resolution the question of whether Hountondji’s 
universalism is emancipatory, by virtue of avoiding the particularism inspired and 
justified by colonial discourse, or is simply a recurrence of the ethnocentric 
viewpoint that sets up the particularities of the colonial culture as what is 
universal and necessary. But what I wish to avoid doing is reading Hountondji in 
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a favourable light simply because his text is not so unfamiliar as Senghor’s (in the 
sense described above). Until we are in a position to review the situation, perhaps 
with fresh arguments, we shall abstain from further comment. 
To these ends, the discussion will now take something of a detour, as we turn to 
look at minority discourse. The most obvious, and most relevant, characteristic of 
this type of discourse is that it takes the violence of marginalization as a given and 
tries to articulate a critique of this violence, while simultaneously bringing into 
question the status of the categories of the rational and the universal. 
4.3 Colonial Violence I 
4.3.1 Minority Discourse128 
By ‘minority discourse’, we mean a theoretical articulation of the political 
and cultural structures that connect different minority cultures in their 
subjugation and opposition to the dominant culture. (The Nature and 
Context of Minority Discourse, p. ix ) 
Here we see the relevance that minority discourse bears to our problem, as this 
short quotation contains all the major elements which characterize colonial 
violence: difference, minority, subjugation and opposition. 
In a sense, minority discourse can be said to work towards goals similar to 
Senghor’s, most notably the reordering of values based on a recentring, a 
refocusing on marginal values. However, minority discourse also tries to show the 
diversity of marginal voices and attacks the ‘dominant’ discourse which 
represents them as an indiscriminate negation of the Western norms of positivity. 
According to JanMohamed and Lloyd, the uniting factor of marginalized groups 
is the common oppression they face: ‘different minority groups, despite all the 
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diversity and specificity of their cultures, share the common experience of 
domination and exclusion by the majority (p. ix). 
In the article, ‘Rethinking Modernism’, Nancy Hartsock considers whether it is 
possible to build a general theory in order to analyse this common oppression, 
while doing justice to the range of different voices that speak from minority 
perspectives.129 If such a theory can be constructed it must pay attention to the 
specificities of each group in order to avoid the sort of false universalism that 
plagues the dominant discourse. Wondering what sort of common claims can be 
made and by whom, she asks whether it is legitimate to presuppose general 
categories, such as ‘woman’ (or, by the same token, ‘black’, etc.). In a tone that is 
reminiscent of the debate provoked by Négritude’s extreme particularism, 
Hartsock queries whether ‘theories produced by “minorities” [should] rest on 
different epistemologies than those of the “majority”’ (ibid., p. 19). How can it be 
possible to give an account of the many and varied experiences of minority 
groups from within the canonical discourse of the centre which dominates them? 
As Mudimbé says: 
L’ordre du discours occidental, espace parfaitement délimité, fonction d’une 
structure socio-économique et d’une archéologie culturelle, ne rend et ne 
pourrait rendre compte d’autres cultures ou d’autres systèmes que par 
référence à lui-même et point, me semble-t-il, dans la spécificité d’une 
experience qui lui serait irréductible. (L’Odeur du Père, pp. 44-45) 
We have said that minority discourse and Négritude have certain shared goals. 
On the other hand, the complacent acceptance of colonial ideology which in 
Senghor’s texts occasionally verges on fawning admiration, marks a large 
difference from those of minority discourse. 130 The latter are strongly critical of 
the dominant culture, and in contrast to the very cautious way in which she 
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addresses the issue of the diversity of minority identities, with complete ease 
Hartsock names the opposite number, the oppressor. Her critique focuses on 
a way of looking at the world, characteristic of the dominant white, male, 
Eurocentric ruling class, a way of dividing up the world that puts an 
omnipotent subject at the centre and constructs marginal Others as sets of 
negative qualities. (p. 22) 
The ‘omnipotent subject’ is the ‘dominant white, male, Eurocentric ruling class’ 
of the Western world. The foundations of Western discourse, a discourse which 
represents itself as pre-eminently rational, civilized and developed, are said to be 
set in an array of binary oppositions which assert the superiority of the ideal 
subject (the rational, civilized, developed being), in counter-balance with the 
inferiority of the other (the irrational, savage, under-developed element). The 
identity of the occupants of this other space varies between non-white racial 
types, women, colonized peoples, lower classes, and other minority or 
marginalized groups.131 
The construction and maintenance of these radical dichotomies originates in the 
dominant culture’s need for self-definition. Hartsock cites Beauvoir, who writes 
that ‘au moment où l’homme s’affirme comme sujet et liberté, l’idée d’Autre se 
médiatise’.132 The exalted liberty, humanity and intelligence of Western man is 
contrasted with the abject determinism, animal-like existence and debased 
rationality of the Other. According to Hartsock, this conceptual device evolves 
from thoroughly political motives: ‘radical dichotomy […] functions to maintain a 
certain kind of order’ (p. 25). Thus, the nineteenth and twentieth century Europe 
that sends hordes of missionaries into the colonies with the express purpose of 
converting the indigenous population, justifies itself by claiming that it is done in 
order to save their souls or to ‘conduire les nègres vers une véritable civilisation 
bantoue’.133 This violence, both physical and conceptual, is theorized and justified 
 127
by a discourse which represents itself as rational and just, but whose structures are 
shot through with the desire for domination and self-exaltation.134  
Already it is noticeable that there is a group of terms which are roughly 
interchangeable and which recur throughout this critique, namely, terms such as 
‘majority’, ‘hegemonic’, ‘Western’, ‘dominant’, and so on. It appears that the 
uniform identity of this category is assumed without question: the majority 
consists of the dominating hegemonic West, more specifically, it is the white, 
middle-class male population of the West who are the ‘centre’. 
It is interesting to note that, while so much is made of the diversity of minority 
cultures, it is still possible to assume the cogency of terms like ‘the West’ and 
‘dominant’, when these are understood to refer to unitary categories. Even after 
we have diversified the conventionally minor side of the dichotomy — e.g. 
‘African’, ‘black’, ‘female’ — by recognizing its plurality and heterogeneity, we 
are left with a remainder which resists fragmentation. 
Yet the dominant culture is not single and monolithic. Just as black identity 
really consists in diverse black identities, the same can be said of any grouping. 
As Hountondji comments: 
La culture européenne est elle-même pluraliste, traversée par les tendances 
et les courants les plus divers […] lorsque nous parlons de ‘la’ civilisation 
occidentale au singulier, nous ne savons peut-être pas bien de quoi nous 
parlons. Nous supposons peut-être à tort une identité de sens entre des 
courants opposés et inconciliables. (Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, p. 220) 
One of the reasons for this strategy lies in an attempt to identify the ‘enemy’, as 
is apparent from Hartsock’s use of an ‘Us and Them’ language: 
It is clear who ‘they’ are, the ‘we’ refers to a ‘we’ who are not and never 
will be a unitary ‘we’, a ‘we” artificially constructed by the totalizing, 
Eurocentric, masculine discourse of the Enlightenment.135 
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The consequences of this are quite serious: first, the radical dichotomy 
West/Other is maintained. Though the previously marginalized side is now 
positively identified, diversified and given a voice, it is assumed that the 
representation of the West as uniform and homogeneous has some degree of 
accuracy. Secondly, Hartsock does not take into account the fact that the 
oppressed can also be oppressors, as the distinction she makes is disjunctive: 
either dominant or dominated, indeed the term ‘minority’ is defined through 
reference to relations of domination. Thirdly, it is implied that oppressed subjects 
cannot collude in their own oppression: there are some who do the talking (the 
dominant subjects) and others who are talked about (the minority subjects). Thus 
being ‘minor’ is supposed to consist in being acted upon, having something done 
to oneself: the role is intrinsically passive.136 
What can be said about this? We have already noted that the claim of uniformity 
is no more defensible with respect to the West than it is with respect to Africa. 
The view that the oppressed cannot be oppressors is obviously false: even within 
the minority discourse framework that we have set up, a black man, oppressed by 
white society, may oppress the women in his circle; similarly, a white woman, 
oppressed by a patriarchal society, may oppress the blacks with whom she enters 
into contact. But then, who in these cases is the oppressor and who the oppressed? 
(Who is the ‘we’ and who the ‘they’?) Lastly, Fanon and Memmi have already 
taught us in what ways the colonial subject is often instrumental in her/his 
oppression.137 
Furthermore, by committing herself to a hard distinction between ‘major’ and 
‘minor’, ‘central’ and ‘marginal’, etc., but defining the ‘minor/marginal’ term as 
subjugation to the dominant culture, through being oppressed, Hartsock petrifies 
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the concept of minorities in a form of passivity and thus erases all mention of the 
historical agency of marginalized groups. For there are obviously people who 
might be said to come from a ‘minority’ background and who have come to 
occupy positions of power. Insofar as such people are then part of the system of 
domination they can no longer be conceived as minor, as their minority consisted 
in the purely relational fact of their being dominated, and this relation no longer 
obtains. But there are also people who, although in relatively empowered 
positions, are complicit in their own domination: let us take Senghor as an 
example, for he finds a place from which to speak within the dominant discourse, 
yet continues to emit a text which reinforces the bonds of colonial racism. 
Therefore, he is at once victim and oppressor because both of these roles are 
relational and he stands in both relations. In other words, he occupies a dominant 
role because he stands in a certain relation to others through participating in the 
dominant discourse. At the same time he is dominated because the dominant 
discourse in which he participates establishes the same dominating relation 
towards himself. But when the categories of marginality and centrality are 
mutually exclusive, how can one person be both at once?138 
This problem only arises so long as we believe that one’s marginal status is 
constructed through the activity (i.e. oppression) of the dominant party. If we 
were to recognize that every person exists within a network of social forces, many 
of them highly ambiguous in nature and open to various interpretations, then we 
would be able to reintroduce the notion of individual agency. But as soon as we 
do this the categories upon which the minority discourse critique is based appear 
to dissolve, because one’s being dominated is not enough to establish that one is 
marginal, and likewise one’s dominance over (some) others is not enough to 
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establish that one is dominant (in the sense that excludes being simultaneously 
marginal). In other words, we might say that these criteria for minority and 
majority status, as given by Hartsock, are at best necessary but not sufficient. 
Thus, it is impossible to say with any certainty that ‘it is clear who “they” are’, 
and nor is it clear who the opposing ‘we’ might be.  
Given that at least part of ‘the dominant culture’s’ pre-eminence and ability to 
relegate other cultures to a negative status derives from the very myth of a united, 
dominant West, any critique of ‘the centre’ cannot afford to reinscribe the same 
delusory representation of centrality. Unless we can find a more plausible way of 
theorizing the violence of marginalization, it does not appear that we can say 
much about it at all. 
4.3.2 Another Definition of Marginal Status 
Kobena Mercer gives a useful explanation of marginalization: 
It is the problematic of enunciation that circumscribes the marginalized 
positions of subjects historically misrepresented or underrepresented in the 
dominant culture, for to be marginalized is to have no place from which to 
speak.139 
 To be marginalized is to have no place from which to speak. And the other side 
of the equation is that if you have no place from which to speak, it is quite likely 
that other people will take it upon themselves to speak for you. Thus Placide 
Tempels, the Belgian ethnologist and missionary, sets himself the task to describe 
to the world (the European, colonial world, that is) the details of Bantu 
metaphysics, details which are so esoteric that even the Bantu themselves cannot 
explain them: 
C’est nous qui pourrons leur dire, d’une façon précise, quel est le contenu de 
leur conception des êtres, de telle sorte qu’ils se reconnaîtront dans nos 
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paroles et acquiesceront en disant: ‘Tu nous as compris, tu nous connais à 
présent complètement’. (La Philosophie bantoue, p. 24) 
As we have seen, such arrogating paternalism is not the only way in which 
Africans have been affected by colonialism. In addition to asking who is allowed 
to speak, Mercer also mentions two specific forms of marginalization, which take 
effect when one has lost the power of speech: misrepresentation and under-
representation. These forms, too, we have already discussed, the latter in the way 
that disciplines like ethnology grant themselves the licence to talk about other 
cultures, without expecting the objects of their studies to ‘speak back’, the former 
in the way that European control over Africanist discourse, even when it is in the 
mouths of Africans, has tended to reproduce unfavourable and inaccurate 
portrayals of Africans. 
This is all very well, but there is another problem with the concept of 
marginalization that we have not yet confronted. Supposing that marginalization 
is indeed ‘to have no place from which to speak’, the question that should follow 
is: ‘to speak to whom?’. In other words, perhaps the notion of having a ‘place 
from which to speak’ leads to a rather unhelpful oversimplification, for surely 
everyone who has any position at all in a culture has a place from which to speak? 
Without further precision, it sounds as if Mercer is simply claiming the right for 
minorities (e.g. blacks) to address the dominant (i.e. white) audience. Clearly this 
is a problem, both in a general and a specific sense: generally, the idea is 
problematic because it refocuses attention on the centre and suggests that this is 
the only important audience; more specifically, it is in direct contradiction with 
Hountondji’s quite legitimate complaint that the extraversion of African 
philosophy, the performance to a foreign audience, is a major obstacle to 
authentic development of the discipline. 
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The fact is that where there are marginal cultures (and we must wonder what it 
is for an entire culture to be ‘marginal’) there will be voices and places to speak 
within those cultures. What is often claimed by marginal speakers is the right to 
empower one’s speech, in such a way as to make it a discourse that can compete 
with dominant voices. The question then becomes twofold: first, how can one’s 
voice be empowered (how can one gain voting rights, for example), and secondly, 
to whom can one speak (e.g. if one is prohibited from disseminating information)? 
The converse, therefore, the luxury that dominant elements — individuals, 
organizations, and cultures — enjoy is adequate representation within structures 
and systems of power, and the right and ability to speak to whom one chooses. If 
marginal subjects were to find a place from which to speak, they would be able to 
represent and to revalue their diverse difference from the dominant culture: 
The contestation of marginality […] inevitably brings the issue of authorship 
back into play, not as the centered origin that determines or guarantees the 
aesthetic and political value of a text, but as a vital question about agency in 
cultural struggles to ‘find a voice’ and ‘give voice’ to subordinate 
experiences, identities and subjectivities. (p. 194) 
But still, even a marginalized audience is still an audience: why is being 
unheard within the dominant culture described as being ‘unheard’ tout court? Is 
this a recurrence of the problem of false universalization? For if it is imperative to 
relativize and contextualize (to de-centre) speakers, it seems just as important to 
do the same for audiences. But then it would be possible to claim that, relative to 
a particular audience, say a predominantly black neighbourhood, Western white 
middle-class voices (i.e. the traditionally ‘dominant’) were marginalized or 
silenced. So does it all come down to the same thing in the end? 
No, there are certain obvious differences. There are real disparities in economic 
and socio-political standing between groups, differences that may be said to make 
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the West a dominant centre in a way that many other cultures cannot be, and the 
same may be said for individuals. For those Western middle-class white voices 
have considerable power over how the predominantly black neighbourhoods are 
managed, how they are policed, how their children are educated, and so on. As 
Mercer comments: 
In social, economic and political terms, black men in the United States today 
constitute one of the ‘lowest’ social classes: disenfranchised, disadvantaged 
and disempowered as a distinct collective subject in the late capitalist 
underclass. (p. 200) 
But he also says this: 
In the contemporary situation, the essentialist rhetoric of categorical identity 
politics threatens to erase the connectedness of our different struggles. At its 
worst, such forms of identity politics play into the hands of the Right, as the 
fundamentalist belief in an essential and immutable identity keeps us locked 
in the prisonhouse of marginality in which oppressions of race, class, and 
gender would have us live. (p.218) 
But I wonder whether it is consistent to reject ‘categorical identity politics’ and 
yet to preserve the solidarity of a diversity of minorities. While seeking to create 
allegiances among all kinds of minority subjects in order to subvert the 
dominance of the canonical, Eurocentric, text and to undermine the hegemony 
which threatens one’s freedom of expression, is it still possible to articulate a 
notion of identity that is sufficiently fluid? For even in mentioning such a thing as 
a ‘canon’, a ‘dominant culture’, or a ‘centre’, it seems that we are instantly 
committed to presupposing the existence of at least one categorical identity, 
which is precisely the object of our critique. 
4.3.3 True Interests 
Let us return to the quotation at the top of the last section: 
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It is the problematic of enunciation that circumscribes the marginalized 
positions of subjects historically misrepresented or underrepresented in the 
dominant culture.140 
What is meant here by ‘misrepresented’ and ‘underrepresented’? To be 
represented is to have one’s views and interests represented. If a group is 
represented (or misrepresented, or underrepresented) then the group’s interests, 
i.e. their common interests, are represented (or misrepresented, or 
underrepresented). Now we may ask whether sets of interests pick out minority 
groups with any degree of accuracy. Of course they do: for example, it was in the 
interests of black Americans to obtain the vote, to be paid as much as whites, not 
to suffer physical or mental abuse, and so on. But did all black Americans want 
such things? Even if they did, let us suppose that just one individual from that 
group did not share those interests, let us say that for some reason s/he was 
indifferent to them.141 We would probably want to say that this person did not 
recognize his true interests, that s/he was mistaken, that s/he missed something 
important. I think that this is the case, but I wonder what it is that tells us so. 
Historical context usually guarantees a commonality of interests by creating a 
common destiny, but it is possible for someone to fail to perceive this 
commonality, or just not be interested in it. There must be some kind of objective 
criterion by which we can determine common interests and against which such 
abnormal attitudes can be measured. There must be some way of distinguishing 
between what a person feels to be her/his interests (i.e. whatever it is that s/he 
finds to be her/his interests) and her/his true interests (i.e. whatever is best for 
her/him). 
The point of all this is not to argue that minority/marginal status cannot be 
explained by reference to representation, but to show that this explanation cannot 
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function without appealing to some notion of interests. The next step is to argue 
for a distinction between perceived interests and true interests, because one does 
not cease to be minor/marginal simply because one is indifferent or insensitive to 
one’s fate. If one’s true interests are not straightforwardly those interests that one 
would assign to oneself, there must be some objective criteria which determine 
one’s true interests. But those objective criteria cannot consist in an essence, as it 
was part of our hypothesis that minority status had nothing to do with essence, 
and we cannot appeal to the notion of the group because it is precisely this notion 
that we are trying to define (by determining ‘common true interests’). 
Let us take another definition of minority provided by Abdul JanMohamed and 
David Lloyd: 
Becoming ‘minor’ is not a question of essence […] but a question of 
position: a subject-position that in the final analysis can be defined only in 
‘political’ terms — that is, in terms of the effects of economic exploitation, 
political disenfranchisement, social manipulation, and ideological 
domination in the cultural formation of minority subjects and discourses. 
(The Nature and Context of Minority Discourse, p. 9) 
Becoming minor is not a question of essence, that is, it is not a matter of being 
black, female, gay, Jewish, etc., what is crucial is one’s position. But this 
formulation does not actually remove the problem of essence, but only pushes it a 
step further away, for we may now ask: are minor ‘positions’ essentially minor or 
not? The reply will probably be an affirmation: positions such as being exploited, 
disenfranchised, manipulated or dominated are all instances of essentially minor 
positions.  
Yet many people, especially in the West, ignore things like voting rights — they 
simply do not care about their suffrage, hence they do not vote. Should we say 
that they are deliberately marginalizing themselves? Perhaps we do not need to 
answer that question, for we can refer to the vast majority of people who are not 
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indifferent to such things as voting. So on this view being deprived of one’s 
voting rights is marginalizing because the majority of people, society in general, 
believe that having a vote is a crucial element of being represented. 
But then what about the groups we have been discussing over the course of the 
last two chapters, i.e. the Africanists and ethnophilosophers on one side, and the 
professional philosophers on the other? These two groups have greatly diverging 
views on what it is to occupy a marginal position. Hountondji believes that it is 
using Western notions of race and culture, and conforming to colonialist 
expectations that African philosophy is no more than an unconscious world-view. 
For him, the ethnophilosophers accept a minor position insofar as they do not 
raise their thinking to the level of the universal but remain trapped in colonial 
discourse. Yet for the defenders of ethnophilosophy and sage philosophy, it is 
Hountondji who is complicit with Western marginalization of Africa, by 
accepting the Western notion of philosophy and insisting that African philosophy 
conform to this standard as if it were a universal. 
So once more we are faced with the question of how we can distinguish, 
objectively, between true and false interests. If this cannot be done, and generally 
speaking this is the state of affairs in the argument that continues to rage over 
African philosophy, then there is no chance of prescribing a genuine future for 
Africa, because it is impossible to decide on the continent’s true interests. 
We shall leave this subject now, and take it up again in chapter 6.  
4.4 Colonial Violence II 
It seems that we are faced with a dilemma: if, like Senghor, we do not make a 
concerted effort to interrogate the discourses of colonialism and Eurocentric 
Western philosophy then it may be said that we allow the processes of 
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marginalization and oppression to continue without challenge. If, on the other 
hand, we do challenge Western discourses on the basis that they are totalizing, 
marginalizing and rely on a false universality, we lay ourselves open to exactly 
the same charge because on inspection it becomes obvious that our own critical 
discourse relies on the very concepts for which Western discourses are criticized. 
In what follows we shall focus on the issue of racial violence in order to explore 
the paradoxical nature of racializing language then we shall apply our findings to 
the specific instance of African philosophy, as it has been discussed so far. 
4.4.1 The Paradox of Racial Violence 
The thesis we shall consider may be expressed thus: 
If we continue to represent the violence of racism, in all its forms (race-
crime, racist ideology, segregation, etc.), as racist violence then we 
perpetuate and substantiate the basis for that violence.142 
The violence which is the object of our discussion consists partly in the violence 
of racial terms like ‘black’ and ‘white’, which purport to denote categories that do 
not, in fact, exist (see section 2.3). The conceptual segregation of individuals into 
discrete races also carries a rationale which may be utilized for actual segregation, 
and for the reification and classification of people in general. The idea, then, is 
that racializing attitudes, even when apparently innocuous, are inherently suspect 
since they support a manner of thinking and acting which makes actual racial 
violence possible.143 
Let us take a concrete example in order to work through this idea. Imagine a 
criminal attack whose sole motive is based on racializing thought and prejudice: 
the assailant does not know the victim, cannot bear him any specific ill-will, and 
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has not been threatened. The victim is perceived as a member of the hated race, 
and it is this fact alone which leads the racist attacker to commit the crime. 
The violence of the event is manifest in several ways, the most obvious of 
which is the actual physical or verbal violence inflicted on the victim. Anterior to 
this there is the conceptual (discursive) process by which the attacker comes to 
justify his malevolent inclinations on the grounds of race. But prior even to this 
act of justification there is an original violence, namely, the concept of race itself. 
When the crime is reported by the media or by witnesses, and if the facts of the 
case, including intentions and motives, have become known, then the event will 
accurately be represented and referred to as a ‘race-crime’. In other words, the 
motive for the attack will be said to have arisen wholly (or principally, or partly) 
from malevolent racist beliefs, and this is in line with our initial hypothesis, which 
stated the existence of that motive and those beliefs. 
Yet, in another sense, the attitude of those reporting the affair will be mistaken. 
After all, as we discussed in the chapter on Senghor, races do not really exist — at 
least, not as neat categories. So in a manner of speaking, although the attacker 
thought he was perpetrating a race-based act, he was mistaken: in truth he 
committed a crime that was based on a set of poorly-defined beliefs which do not 
objectively refer to anything. Although it is true that we require the notion of race 
in order to make sense of the attack, i.e. to understand the attacker’s subjectivity, 
we are also bound to ask ourselves whether making sense of such an action is 
really what is called for.144 By reporting the crime as a race-crime, we are 
unwittingly privileging a certain way of looking at the world, which is in fact the 
attacker’s point of view. How ironic that in representing and condemning his 
actions we should help to make sense of them! 
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Let us change the example and imagine that, instead of racial motivations, it 
turns out that the perpetrator of the attack undertakes the violence on the unique 
basis that the victim is considerably taller than average. Instantly, the thought-
experiment seems absurd, and we should say that the attacker is not quite sane, no 
matter what reasons he might adduce in justification. The unreason and 
immorality of violence is one thing, but the notion of attacking another purely on 
account of his height seems ridiculous. Tallness just is not a good reason for 
attacking someone else, even when backed up by a whole series of rationally 
derived explanations. We may also express this by saying that there does not 
appear to be anything seriously at stake in the matter of tallness, a property which 
could be offensive only to a quite unbalanced individual. 
But by adding a little historical background to our story it will start to gain 
substance. In the not so distant past, systems of socio-political oppression have 
been constructed on the basis of height discrimination, perhaps with eugenic 
inspiration, in order to breed taller, stronger humans. Smaller people were 
systematically excluded from positions of importance, discouraged from 
procreating, and, in short, were subject to all manner of violence. After a period of 
struggle, the oppressed section of society were given back their rights and 
freedoms, and by the time of the attack that we are imagining the society is 
considered by most people to be more or less just. What difference would these 
details make to our example? 
Well, instead of the attack appearing transparently absurd, there is now a 
background, a context within which sentiments of resentment and vengeance gain 
a more natural colour. It is because the victim is perceived as a member of the 
hated class that the violence takes place. Clearly, tallness would still not be a good 
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reason for attacking another person, for the simple fact of one’s being tall implies 
strictly nothing about one’s other characteristics, such as one’s fairness, respect 
for others, lawfulness, love for one’s parents, and so on. But on the other hand, 
body-size is now a sufficiently meaningful explanation for us to have a historical 
understanding of the attack. 
Essentially, what we are saying is here that the property of tallness in our 
example, and signs of ethnicity in the real world, are important symbols. Being 
symbols, they may connote (i.e. through association they invoke other thoughts 
and feelings), but they do not denote (tallness does not mean anything at all, it is 
plainly non-intentional), and moreover they do not reliably indicate anything 
about a person’s character. Physical features as symbols connote other 
characteristics which are more important to us than the symbols themselves, but 
there is in fact no objective connection between the symbols and their field of 
reference. Within the context of our imaginary history of height-based 
discrimination, the factor of height takes on a symbolic meaning which enables us 
to understand a situation that is and remains absurd. The fact that we can come a 
little closer to an understanding of the attacker does not make his action any more 
reasonable, but rather allows us to explain his unreason, so to speak. 
And the conclusion will be no different when the focus is shifted onto race-
crimes. By admitting that an act is comprehensible as a race-crime, even while 
lamenting its inhumanity and repugnance, we support the very framework within 
which such events take place, a framework which is necessary for those events to 
be able to take place. In effect this is nothing more than the truism that if there 
were no concept of race, then race-crimes could not exist qua race-crimes. For a 
crime to exist as a race-crime the notion of race must make sense. 
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Against this background, racial violence is understandable because racial 
categories are understandable, it makes no difference that the violence is wrong 
(either because racial difference is not a good reason for violence, or because 
violence is just wrong). Ironically, it is the racial element of racial violence that is 
more understandable than the violence itself; hence people say ‘I don’t understand 
why these people hate and attack others just because of the colour of their skin!’ 
It is not the racialization which is incomprehensible, but the causal link between 
racialization and violence. 
But there are two dangers here. The first is that, if racial categories are 
considered really to exist the fact that we no longer assign positive and negative 
values to these categories is a merely fortuitous circumstance and susceptible to 
reversal.145 Moreover, there is always the possibility of introducing pertinent 
‘exceptions’ to otherwise universalizing moral codes. Hence Mill portrays slavery 
and colonization as an unfortunate and painful, but sadly necessary phase of 
history, in order to enable ‘less developed’ peoples to profit from the tutelage of 
their more advanced masters, the scandal here consisting not only in the 
subversion and betrayal of humanist ethics in order to justify colonial violence, 
but in the daring hypothesis that it is actually for the good of the colonized.146 
But it is the second danger that we are really interested in. This is that racial 
terms form part of a structure of understanding which makes sense of the 
perception of individuals as instances of a kind. While they may be used to 
reinforce liberal moral codes (e.g. ‘it is wrong to discriminate against people on 
racial grounds’, ‘all people are morally equal, regardless of race’, etc.) they also 
provide a meaningful classification of individuals which allows or facilitates the 
violation of these same universal codes. By ‘allows or facilitates’, I mean that if 
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the terms were incomprehensible then race-crimes would also be 
incomprehensible, whether in the form of single instances, or as general 
movements and institutions. This is not to say that the mere use of racial terms is 
sufficient for (physical) racial violence, but it does mean that such a use 
comprises a conceptual racial violence (as defined at the beginning of this 
subsection), and it also means that we cannot hope to supercede racism entirely so 
long as we continue to use racializing language. 
Yet in some ways we do need to retain the language of race. Without it we 
would be unable to understand or report to any great degree of accuracy the 
reality of racism (for though race is not real, racism certainly is). Unprovoked 
attacks on ethnically distinct individuals (who, depending on the circumstances, 
can be anyone) and which are motivated by ethnic distinctness, are obviously 
instances of racial violence. So there would appear to be another dilemma, 
analogous to the one described at the beginning of the section: either to continue 
the discursive violence of racialization, and hence to continue to make racism 
thinkable (and so possible), or to give up the ability to speak about racial violence, 
which seems tantamount to pretending that it does not exist. 
Any liberal theorist for whom the elimination of racism is an imperative must 
begin to feel anxious at this point, for there is something real at stake. As we 
remarked, racism is a reality, and for most people an undesirable one, so giving 
up all critique of racism does not seem to be a conscionable option. 
Fortunately, the dilemma is not inevitable, but the strategy of neutralizing, 
rather than fighting racial violence requires the skills of a polyglot. No longer can 
we be content to speak either the subjective language of racial facts or the 
objective language of race-less humanity. It is necessary at once to recognize the 
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subjective reality of race — the beliefs, desires, motivations and prejudices which 
can provoke, enable, and also overwhelm the experiencing subject — as well as 
the objective fictionality of the concept. 
Thus, the paradox is that it appears that in order to reach the liberal goal of zero 
racial violence it is necessary to give up our attachment to this goal (at least, as it 
is described in the current form). Striving for racial harmony only suspends racial 
discord, which is but a momentary respite: the cycle does not end. 
Yet by working for the dissolution of racialization, and thus foregoing harmony, 
racial discord becomes unthinkable. And this is not a case of thinking away racial 
violence, or calling it by another name and then concluding that it no longer 
exists: that would be mere wishful thinking. Believing that we can all live in 
harmony is wishful thinking: we probably cannot, but perhaps we can choose the 
terms on which to disagree. 
As R. Radhakrishnan writes: 
The momentous undertaking that radical ethnicity is entrusted with is the 
creation of a future where oppression will not just be immoral or 
unconscionable, but virtually ‘unthinkable’.147 
4.4.2 African Philosophy 
From the foregoing discussion we can give a new interpretation to Hountondji’s 
work and read him as trying to remove the concept of Africanity from the picture 
altogether, and in so doing, to escape the vicious circle. This also gives us a new 
way of understanding what was termed the ‘ideality’ of his discourse. (His 
discourse was supposedly idealizing because it seems to assume that there is no 
longer a challenge to the existence or status of African reason, when this is clearly 
an unwarranted optimism.) It was argued that Senghor’s discourse was ideal 
because, even while accepting racial distinctions, he ignored the real oppressive 
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effect to which these distinctions were being put at the time of his writing. Now if 
Hountondji does not even recognize racial categories, if he wants to remove 
philosophy from any racializing environment whatsoever, then it may be that 
what at first sight appears to be a silence with respect to the inequalities faced by 
African reason, is actually an ongoing effort to make racial violence against the 
concept of African philosophy unthinkable. 
But that is only half the story, as Hountondji also refrains from essentializing 
the idea of the West, consequently he is unable to articulate in general terms a 
critique of the West’s domination of Africa. Yet this is no bad thing, as it 
facilitates a dispassionate and measured assessment of the modalities of African 
dependence on the West, while maintaining an awareness of the imperfections of 
the terms that are in use. 
This reading is supported by the text: 
L’enjeu de cette critique pourrait ne pas apparaître d’emblée. Du point de 
vue qui nous intéresse ici, elle a pour effet de relativiser les idées 
d’africanité, d’occidentalité, etc., en en faisant de purs concepts formels dont 
le contenu, loin de pouvoir se déterminer une fois pour toutes, est par 
essence ouvert, plurivoque, contradictoire. (Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, 
p. 249) 
For Fanon, the black subject, as a subject, faces the dilemma ‘se blanchir ou 
disparaître’(Peau noire, masques blancs, p. 80). Perhaps from our new 
perspective emancipation would render such a dilemma obsolete. Instead, we 
could invert the proposition: true emancipation would make blackness as invisible 
as whiteness (for where currently the white exists primarily as a human being, the 
black is always seen as a black human being). 
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4.5 Conclusion 
The point of departure for this chapter was our dissatisfaction with both Senghor 
and Hountondji’s treatment of the subject of colonial violence. It was observed 
that Senghor’s celebratory essentialism and optimistic expectation of a 
Civilisation de l’Universel, in which humanity would eventually come to live in 
harmony, prevented his truly engaging the question of violence. Rather than face 
up to the real inequalities and problems confronting Africans in the world as it is 
today, he chooses to focus on the exposition of a mythical essence in order to 
explain the perceived differences between African and European societies. 
On the other hand, Hountondji appears to be unable to articulate a critique of 
colonial violence, simply because he eschews the use of categories like ‘the 
West’, or at least he relativizes them to the point where they can no longer be 
utilized for a strong critique of the enduring structures of colonialism. 
Given their common failing, we expressed concern for the relative attractiveness 
of Hountondji’s position in comparison with Senghor’s, and wondered whether 
this could not be due to the fact that Hountondji, as a professional philosopher, 
treats the subject of African philosophy with an approach that may be instantly 
recognized as philosophy, whereas the techniques of Senghor and the ethnologists 
and ethnophilosophers with whom he is associated seem far less consonant with 
the discipline as it is conventionally known in the West. One of the aims of this 
chapter was, therefore, to ensure that our own viewpoint is not unduly influenced 
by the relative distance between ourselves and the texts. 
In order to do this, and also to see whether it is possible to set in motion a 
strong, general critique of colonial discourse, we looked at some of the texts of 
minority discourse. In the course of that study we discovered that even when 
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conventionally minor identities are represented in all their diversity, unless the 
same is done for the so-called dominant centre, we inadvertently continue to 
support the predominance of the centre. Minorities are still positioned by relation 
to the majority, and their minority status is secured by the active oppression of the 
majority. However, even then the falsity of the terms ‘major’ and ‘minor’ cannot 
help but show through, for the dichotomy leaves us unable to theorize the 
ambiguities and finer details of social oppression. 
On looking at different formulations of minority/marginal status, based on the 
criteria of representation and social position, we realized that we were unable to 
approach these criteria in an objective fashion. This was not taken as a refutation 
of the criteria, but as an indication that we need to be more aware of the effect of 
our environment upon our own discourse, in order to ensure that our own reason 
is not tainted by bad empirical reality. The development of this theme has been 
deferred until chapter 6. 
Finally, we discussed the problem of the use of racial terms to talk about racial 
violence. Even if we use the terms to condemn acts of racial violence, we are 
helping to maintain an order where such violence makes sense, although widely 
seen as reprehensible. If we truly aim at an end to racial violence then we have to 
project to go beyond racializing language, to attempt a new sort of discourse 
which is based on the knowledge of the objective unreality of races, while 
recognizing their relevance within the field of experience.  
The application of this to the field of African philosophy is that it enables us to 
reconstrue Hountondji’s near silence about the issue of colonial violence. He 
recognizes that to operate with ideas like ‘centre’, ‘dominant’, and ‘Western’, and 
to use them as if to refer to real entities, we accomplish little more than follow in 
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the tracks of the colonial discourse, which has already appropriated the terms of 
our opposition. In the words of Valentin Mudimbé: 
Pour l’Afrique, échapper réellement à l’Occident suppose d’apprécier 
exactement ce qu’il en coûte de se détacher de lui; cela suppose de savoir 
jusqu’où l’Occident, insidieusement peut-être, s’est approché de nous; cela 
suppose de savoir, dans ce qui nous permet de penser contre l’Occident, ce 
qui est encore occidental; et de mesurer en quoi notre recours contre lui est 
encore peut-être une ruse qu’il nous oppose et au terme de laquelle il nous 
attend, immobile et ailleurs. (L’Odeur du Père, p. 13) 
We shall now move on to discuss how this might be so, and what Mudimbé 
suggests should be done to remedy the situation. 
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Chapter 5: Mudimbé’s L’Odeur du Père 
5.1 Introduction 
The first chapter of analysis dealt with the work of Léopold Senghor, a founding 
member of the Négritude movement who wrote extensively on the essential 
characteristics of la culture négro-africaine and hence African philosophy. In the 
next chapter we examined the work of the ‘professional philosopher’, Paulin 
Hountondji, who strongly criticized all such attempts to reduce African life in 
general and African philosophy in particular to a collection of exoticized tropes. 
Hountondji’s critique centres on the exteriority of Africanist discourses and the 
cultural and philosophical inauthenticity of what is known as ‘ethnophilosophy’ 
— a discipline seeking to ‘reconstruct’ African philosophies from their sources in 
indigenous knowledge (usually communicated orally) and to promote these 
‘world-views’ (Weltanschauungen) as alternatives, or complements, to existing 
Western philosophical systems. Hountondji charges the ethnophilosophers with 
being prone to undue Western influence (i.e. African inauthenticity) and failing to 
respect the true meaning of ‘philosophy’ in the strict sense (philosophical 
inauthenticity).148 
In the course of that chapter it became clear that even though Hountondji 
positions himself in direct opposition to the ethnological tradition of much 
Africanist discourse, it may be said that he faces similar problems. For example, 
he accuses Africanists of inauthenticity, of producing putatively African 
philosophical texts which are in fact neither African nor philosophical, of 
reproducing Western stereotypical images of Africa, and of unwittingly 
replicating the discursive structures inherent to colonial power. Yet critics of 
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Hountondji have levelled the same criticisms at his own position. They accuse 
him of working exclusively with a European conception of philosophy, such that 
he discards out of hand all indigenous African thought as fundamentally 
‘unphilosophical’.149 In this way he supposedly betrays both the African culture 
and the open-minded impartiality that should characterize the philosopher. By his 
adherence to so-called Western notions of reason and philosophy he is said to 
perpetuate the structures of power which have legitimized colonialism and 
objectified Africans in the Western consciousness. Thus far, it remains unclear 
whether Hountondji’s problems go deeper than his simply being accused of these 
faults. From the evidence we have considered it does not seem possible to 
determine whether or not his discourse does in fact ‘silently depend on a Western 
episteme’.150  
In chapter 4 these problems acquired greater dimension and complexity as we 
considered the shortcomings inherent in any discourse which deliberately sets up 
rigid conceptual oppositions. Quite consistent with this line of thought, although 
giving the impression of being a curiously disabling sort of conclusion, was the 
argument that even to criticize (i.e. to oppose) opposition will lead us into this sort 
of trap: what is required is emancipation from oppositional forms of thought 
altogether. We also looked at the problems that arise when common concepts 
depart from empirical reality. Thus the notion of race is sufficiently imprecise, 
misleading and unscientific to warrant its expulsion from our vocabulary, all the 
more so because the continued use of racial concepts, even to denounce racism, 
contributes to the perpetuation of a logic through which racism can meaningfully 
exist. (See 1.3 and 4.4 of this thesis.) Yet for all that, ‘race’ is still a word on 
everybody’s lips, and it still refers to a politically meaningful category.151 Given 
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this fact, and given that, as politically interested individuals, we want to be able to 
comment on and theorize those events in our societies which are understood 
through the concept of race, we appear to be in something of a quandary: faced 
with two competing, rational, and seemingly irreconcilable languages, how can 
we speak at all? 
And so, by starting from a fairly clear basis then proceeding to doubt the truth of 
that basis, and then to doubt our very doubting, we have come almost full circle, 
soon to arrive back where we began, but this time with far fewer easy answers and 
many more difficult questions. What exactly can be said about the texts we have 
considered, without wrapping them or ourselves in some inextricable web of 
‘traps and reversibilities’?152 Any adequate treatment of this subject should deal 
with, and ideally provide some way of understanding, three main areas: the notion 
of authenticity, with reference to African philosophy, such that it can be 
determined who speaks authentically and who does not; the corresponding, 
contrasting notion of Eurocentricity: who is being Eurocentric and how; and the 
enduring problems of (neo)colonialism. 
These issues will be addressed in the course of the present chapter, which will 
focus on the work of another African philosopher, Valentin Yves Mudimbé, 
whose writings have been cited in previous sections. Originally from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and having studied and taught extensively in 
Africa, Europe and the United States, Mudimbé is described as ‘surtout un 
représentant de cette minorité intellectuelle qui […] ressent avec acuité 
l’aliénation néocoloniale’.153 
Mudimbé’s text, which claims to deal with ‘des limites de la science et de la vie 
en Afrique Noire’, provides a new framework within which the problems 
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developed in this thesis might be rethought and possibly resolved. The structure 
of this chapter may at times be somewhat erratic, due both to the fugitive, non-
linear nature of the texts in question and the multiple complexities of the subject 
itself.154 But these confusions should be resolved, and order restored, by the 
conclusions that will be drawn at the end. 
The chapter takes an overview of Mudimbé’s work, looking mainly at the 
essays contained in his L´Odeur du Père (1982), but also L’Autre Face du 
Royaume (1974), and making additional reference to his other critical works as 
the occasion arises. We shall work through two key themes: first, the theme of 
(residual) colonial presence in post-colonial Africa, and secondly, that of the 
possibility of Africa’s escape from Western discourse. The former idea is most 
noticeably and most evocatively expressed by the eponymous phrase, l´Odeur du 
Père; the latter finds expression through the ideas of l’écart and la ruse. These 
metaphors are extremely fecund and may help us to understand the debate to a 
greater depth and with greater clarity. The first phrase will be our point of 
departure in section 5.3. But first, an exegesis of the broad lines of Mudimbé’s 
work. 
5.2 Exegesis 
5.2.1 Mudimbé’s Analysis 
The initial commentary that Mudimbé makes upon the situation in post-colonial 
African social and academic life seems, despite his determination not to provide a 
‘voie de lecture’ which would ‘s’imposer comme unique’, also to pick up the 
principal threads which run the length of his work. The following points are 
 152
emphasized: complexity, dependence, violence and alienness, étreinte or 
étouffement, and the enjeu.155 We shall outline some of these interlinked elements. 
Throughout L’Odeur du Père, Mudimbé draws attention to the fundamental 
complexity of the post-colonial/neo-colonial situation and the fact of Africa’s 
multiform dependence on external entities. The extent and consequences of this 
dependence are considerable, consisting in: 
[des] liens complexes qui, aujourd’hui, plus fortement qu’hier, arriment 
l’Afrique à l’Occident, déterminant ainsi non seulement les attitudes d’être 
mais aussi l’exercice de la pensée, les pratiques de connaissance et les 
manières de vivre. (pp. 11-12, italics added) 156 
In this first section he makes reference to economic, ideological, scientific, 
academic and social forms of dependence; some of these references are developed 
straightaway and some later in the book. Briefly, the most obvious mode of 
Africa’s dependence on the West is in the domain of economy, where not only are 
African countries obliged to take part in a global trade market in which they are 
vastly and increasingly disadvantaged, but are also compromised by the fiscal 
‘aid’ granted them by richer Western countries, aid which, because strongly 
linked to normative directives, ‘[sert] remarquablement bien à la 
recolonisation’.157 The other elements are referred to in passing (and dealt with 
separately later on) through the idea that, in some subtly pervasive and deeply-
rooted way, the West is almost inextricably present in the theoretical traditions, 
educational systems and even the cultures of Africa. In some instances this is due 
to Western pre-eminence in a particular area, and in others to the fact that 
Africans have effectively taken over, and made their own, certain Western 
discourses.158 
But African dependence is also a matter of something altogether more insidious. 
Somehow, even in thinking against the West, the African theorist is liable to find 
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her/his own words turning back on her/him and once again declaring Western 
omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience. In commenting on L’Odeur du 
Père, Manthia Diawara writes: 
A problem concerning traps and reversibilities arises whenever an African 
theorist uses the dominant canon to represent African realities […] African 
theorists who assume a violence towards the West run the risk of unwittingly 
reasserting the superiority of the Western notion of rationality. (Dangerous 
Liaisons, p. 457) 
Although by now Mudimbé’s text may appear to be a tract on anti-Westernism, 
in fact he is far from seeking to prove that Western culture or influence is 
intrinsically vicious. Nor is it a feature of his programme, as was the case with 
Négritude and other black consciousness or nationalist movements, to glorify 
Africa by negation or vilification of its Other. On the contrary, Mudimbé is well 
aware of the shortcomings and the restricted life-span of such a narcissism.159 
Nevertheless, he continues to emphasize the dangers inherent in the surrender of, 
or the failure to reclaim, Africa’s autonomy from the West. It may be recalled that 
Senghor, whose audience was largely European, theorized on African subjects 
while professing his concern to guide the attention of ‘certains intellectuels 
d’Europe’, so that they might better appreciate African arts and culture. For 
Senghor, and probably as a function of the climate in which he found himself, the 
matter of key importance was that Africa should be valued, or indeed revalued. 
Since it did not seem possible to do this through traditional Western ideals, he 
attempted to effect the change through an exaltation of the antithesis, and hence 
extreme difference. For Mudimbé, however, not only is such a procedure doomed 
to failure, but also: 
il est sans utilité de nous dépenser, comme certains de nos aînés, à vouloir 
‘prouver’ notre humanité où l’intelligence qui nous furent longtemps 
refusées. (p. 13)160 
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There are several reasons for this contrast with Senghor. Mudimbé expresses the 
concern that, even when poised in an attitude of charity, the Western gaze may 
constitute a violence towards African life, if only through the ever-present 
potential for manipulation. Western culture and influence, while not intrinsically 
vicious, are all the same intrinsically dangerous for the African theorist, who must 
find a way not to fall into the traps which objectify Africa and thus deny its reality 
as a region of activity and authentic production. 
The West also represents a danger for African existence in general, thus: 
‘L’Occident qui nous étreint […] pourrait nous étouffer’.161 Three ideas may be 
present here: first, and again in contrast with Senghor, that the popularity (in the 
West) of African arts, cultures, crafts, music, literature, cuisine, and so on, is no 
guarantee that African people are fundamentally any better off in real terms.162 
The West can very easily accept the values of an African aesthetic while leaving 
all material factors unchanged. Secondly, even if relations between Africa and 
Eur-America are presently characterized by an air of indulgence and respect, so 
long as Africans do not control their own fate this eventuality is not guaranteed 
but remains contingent upon the goodwill of the dominant party. Thirdly, 
recalling Hountondji, it is quite possible, through the valorization of an exoticized 
and essentialized difference, by making one’s culture a product to be consumed 
— commercially, as the exotic ‘other’ culture; intellectually, as the object of 
scientific study — that finally one achieves nothing more than the petrifaction of 
one’s culture in the strata of self-imposed stereotypes (Sur la ‘philosophie 
africaine’, pp. 43-44). The difficulties and dangers inherent in this situation 
necessitate: 
une compréhension rigoureuse des modalités actuelles de notre intégration 
[des Africains] dans les mythes de l’Occident  
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and 
questions explicites qui nous permettraient d’être sincèrement critiques face 
à ces ‘corpus’ (p. 13) 
One of the questions that Mudimbé asks, and a key term in the text we are 
considering, may be understood through the notion of the enjeu, or what is at 
stake in this process of self-determination. Although other writers have dealt with 
the themes of the loss and possible recuperation of African ‘authenticity’, often 
this issue has been reduced to the question of how to recover from the loss of self 
suffered through colonialism. Mudimbé, too, speaks of a ‘réadaptation de notre 
psychisme après les violences subies’ (ibid.), but he resolutely refuses to theorize 
colonialism as a ‘parenthesis’ in African history, a period when Africans simply 
lost control of their selves and their future.163 The enjeu, for Mudimbé, is a matter 
of ‘le maintien et l’épanouissement par l’adaptation, ou la réduction et la mort 
pure et simple d’expériences socio-historiques singulières’ (p. 11). He does 
indeed wish to protect Africanity, but it is also possible to read him as suggesting 
that the very attempt to determine the exact content of such a concept, and in 
particular trying to fix any particular elements as the essence of African history, is 
precisely one of the dangers that continues to menace African existence. (We may 
note the correspondence here with the theme of complexity: it is implied that 
simplicity leads to, or is identifiable with, loss; while success and continuation 
necessarily involve the maintenance and respect of multiplicity.) 
Mudimbé condemns the temptation to take refuge in stylized essentialisms and 
featureless universalisms which are not answerable to the facts of individuals’ 
experience. If the trophies to be won, or retained, in the fight to protect African 
cultures are plurality and specificity (‘expériences socio-historique singulières’), 
these are also the means by which Africans can emerge victorious, through ‘un 
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retour constant sur ce que nous sommes avec une ferveur et une attention 
particulières, accordées à notre milieu archéologique’ (p. 14). This last idea, of the 
importance of one’s own environment or socio-historical and epistemological 
contexts, represents the element which, for Mudimbé, both enables and explains 
our discourse, and it is to this factor that we shall now turn. 
5.2.2 Particularism and Universalism 
As we have seen, Mudimbé emphasizes the complexity of post-colonial situations 
in Africa, to such an extent that he virtually identifies simplicity (i.e. over-
simplification) with the death of local (i.e. non-global, non-homogenized) culture. 
He also applies such a mode of thought to his own work, rigorously abstaining 
from bringing a single, linear interpretation to bear on his critique. Hence the 
opening sentence: 
L’Odeur du Père…On l’entendra comme on le voudra. Et s’il me fallait, en 
liminaire aux textes que je livre, tracer une voie de lecture, je me 
demanderais si elle doit, en vérité, s’imposer comme unique. (p.14) 
In this statement one might hear echoes of the voice of Frantz Fanon: ‘je 
n’arrive point armé de vérités décisives’ (Peau noire, masques blancs, p. 5). And 
just as the latter declares, ‘Ma conscience n’est pas traversée de fulgurances 
essentielles’, Mudimbé also expresses a pressing concern to maintain the 
particularity of his perspective: ‘Je pars du fait que ma conscience et mon effort 
sont d’un lieu, d’un espace et d’un moment donnés’ (p. 13).164 Aware of the need 
to account for this extreme particularism, he cites a passage from Aimé Césaire: 
Il y a deux manières de se perdre: par ségrégation murée dans le particulier 
ou par dilution dans l’universel. Ma conception de l’universel est celle d’un 
universel riche de tout le particulier, riche de tous les particuliers, 
approfondissement et coexistence de tous les particuliers.165 
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Perhaps in this reference we can see a clue to Mudimbé’s strategy: he will 
tentatively steer a course between Scylla and Charybdis — on the one side 
essentializing particularisms (e.g. Négritude), and on the other abstract 
universalisms (e.g. ‘universal’ philosophy). This is not to say that he simply 
eschews all forms of universalism, on the contrary. But in contrast to the 
traditional Western (Platonic) idea of the universal as an ideal form empty of all 
particular elements, where the universal is that which inhabits or informs each 
particular, Mudimbé posits a universal which only exists by virtue of its thorough 
multiplicity. So a discourse which aims to be truly universal must itself be 
grounded in particularity: ‘l’universalité ne peut exister qu’à partir d’une 
expérience critique et permanente d’une authenticité singulière …’166 In the rest 
of this chapter, and throughout the following one, we shall see just how close 
Mudimbé’s idea of universality comes to that expressed by Césaire. 
The notion of particularity, especially in terms of one’s own critical background 
and positioning, forms a recurrent theme in Mudimbé’s work, one might say the 
keystone of his discourse, for the ‘milieu archéologique’ seems to be for him that 
which ultimately determines the pertinence of any discourse. One of the most 
important expressions of this particularity consists in the idea of the reciprocity 
between one’s discourse and one’s environment. What he calls the ‘conditions de 
possibilité’ of our speech also recur within our discourse. We may understand 
‘conditions de possibilité’ in two distinct ways: first, the factors which can permit 
(or prohibit) and regulate the manner of production and formulation of a 
discourse, e.g. cultural particularities, laws, social rules, institutions, disciplinary 
structures, and other formal conditions;167 secondly, the specific historical and 
theoretical contexts which surround, inspire, incite, or nourish a discourse. By 
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examining the circumstances giving rise to a text, we can explain not only its 
origins but also, to some extent, the signification of what is said: ‘ce milieu qui, 
s’il permet nos prises de parole, les explique aussi’ (p. 14).168 Often it is only by 
examining historical circumstances that we can divine those elements which, 
conventionally, are not mentioned within formal academic texts, but which are 
nevertheless inherent to their structure and argument. In particular, this formula is 
applicable to texts like philosophical arguments, and extra-textual elements like 
personal and political history, biases, interests and so on, for the latter are 
traditionally excluded, suppressed, or silenced by the former. 
Bearing in mind the idea of ‘conditions de possibilité’, it is possible to give 
another explanation of what went wrong with Senghor’s project: by failing to 
investigate the context which gave rise to Négritude, he also failed to see how that 
same context permeated the substance of his discourse. The result is the paradox 
of a discourse which proclaims to reveal the essence, i.e. the interior, of the 
African soul, yet which is fundamentally exterior to its subject. So the major 
failing of Négritude consists not so much in its European sources, its 
eurocentricity, or its not telling the truth about Africa and Africans, but rather in 
the fact that it surreptitiously elides the truth about its own essence, and covers 
over this lacuna with claims to universality and abstract truth, which are 
themselves borrowings from the West: 
La Négritude, dans son projet comme dans sa signification, fut et est encore, 
forme vibrante et paradoxale de la culture contre laquelle il s’élève. 
(L’Odeur du Père, p. 137) 
For Mudimbé, the denial or misrepresentation of one’s discursive origins leads 
both to a grave loss of potency and to a very serious sort of instability — what 
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could have been the foundational stone of a thought system becomes instead a 
shifting sand that undermines the superstructure. 
Of course, these remarks are also pertinent to the Western texts that influenced 
Senghor, and another of Mudimbé’s aims appears to be to show that those 
discourses which have been promoted as perfectly abstract, disinterested and 
universal are often far from such. This objection is raised explicitly in reference to 
ethnology and anthropology, both of which are subjected to incisive criticism in 
L’Odeur du Père and L’Autre Face du Royaume. However, the tenor of the 
discussion applies equally to all the social sciences, and no less to the domain of 
philosophy.169 Essentially, the claim is that the humanities and social sciences can 
but approximate the rigour and precision of the natural sciences, and that, 
regardless of their claims or concerns, they inevitably consist in particular forms 
of thought having precise historical and textual roots, causes and conditions, all of 
which shape and direct the path of their development. Importantly, not only do 
these factors have an influence on the form of a discourse, but also on its content, 
for the factors themselves are reproduced within the discourse: ‘l’ethnologie […] 
est, en effet, [un] discours englué dans un ordre qui la fonde et l’explique’ 
(L’Autre face du royaume, p. 9). Hountondji gives a suitable example, speaking of 
the missionary ethnologists who abounded during the first half of the twentieth 
century:  
Double problématique de la ‘mission civilisatrice’ et du ‘supplément 
d’âme’: l’une ne va pas sans l’autre. Le colonisateur ‘civilise’, mais ne peut 
le faire qu’à condition de se réhumaniser lui-même, de retrouver son âme. 
(Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, p. 42) 
Both Hountondji and Mudimbé criticize the foundations of ethnology, grounded 
in the gratuitous distinction between the civilized subject (i.e. the European) and 
the savage object (e.g. the African) of the discourse: 
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L’ethnologie … repose […] sur un fondement idéologique [… et] 
présuppose toujours ce qui est à démontrer: la distinction réelle entre son 
objet et celui de la sociologie en général, la différence de nature entre les 
sociétés ‘primitives’ […] et les autres sociétés. Dans le même temps, par 
contre, elle prétend faire abstraction du rapport des forces réel entre ces 
sociétés et les ‘autres’, c’est-à-dire, tout simplement, de l’impérialisme. (Sur 
la ‘philosophie africaine’, p. 16) 
Yet how could it be possible truly to abstract from the very conditions which 
permit one’s discourse — the ideological and material violence intrinsic to 
colonialism? Ethnology is an ‘encultured’ discipline which claims to produce a 
text that will order and theorize information about other cultures, but it is based 
on a series of positions which simply would not be thinkable without the advent 
of colonialism. It is not only that the subject/object (mind/world, reason/passion) 
relation that typically characterizes the position of the Western ethnologist vis-à-
vis the colonized would be impossible in the absence of a system of radical 
inequities. But it is also possible to imagine that in a world of equal exchange, 
mutual respect and true multiplicity, the desire to emit an ethnological discourse 
upon other peoples might well come to be perceived as a freakish and alien 
impulse, if it did not disappear altogether. 
In addition, we may wonder ‘quelle justifications scientifiques donner à la 
coexistence de la sociologie et de l’ethnologie, mis à part le fait de la vocation 
impériale de l’Occident’ (L’Odeur du Père, p. 52). Conventionally, the tacit 
assumption is that there is some salient logic in the distinction between the study 
of communities based on rational motivations (sociology) and the study of those 
based on traditional motivations (ethnology). But does this distinction reveal more 
about the state of the European psyche than it does about real differences in the 
world? 
As is the case with all sciences, even the natural ones, the objectivity of the 
ethnological text is brought into question by the thesis that, fundamentally, 
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observation is not neutral with respect to that which is observed. The case in point 
is further complicated by the fact that both the authors and the subjects of such 
studies are historical beings who are already in interaction both within and 
without the ethnological text. The scientificity of ethnology, therefore, suffers 
from the nature of the unspoken relation between the subjects and the authors of 
the project, a relation which is itself loaded with ideology and political interests: 
Les Occidentaux, à l’instar des adultes vis-à-vis des enfants, des psychiatres 
vis-à-vis des malades, ont ‘imposé’ aux non-Occidentaux, selon un modèle 
spécifique, des manières aberrantes d’être des non-Occidentaux; ils ont 
ensuite donné le nom de ‘ethno-x’ à l’étude des produits de ce ‘x’ 
artificiellement provoqué. (L’Odeur du Père, p. 27) 
Hountondji argues that even the conversion to structuralism, when ethnologists 
saw the light in cultural relativism and tried to re-evaluate the similarities and 
differences between cultures, to allow space for other values, this movement was 
occasioned by a need internal to the Western scientific culture: 
Puis [l’Européen, ci-devant colonisateur] avait fini, dans un geste de 
repentir, ou plutôt pour résoudre sa propre crise interne, par valoriser cette 
différence même. (Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, p. 34) 
First and foremost, Mudimbé argues, such currents of thought could only be a 
further evolution of the Western ratio. While representing a moment of 
‘infidelity’ with respect to the preceding dominant theory, and even though 
disclaiming the universality that had always been the hub of Western discourse, 
these developments were nevertheless none other than the latest form of a history 
of metamorphoses proper to a particular culture. According to Diawara, 
what is feared most in the West is not the emergence of the discourses of 
Foucault, Marx, Freud, or Nietzsche, which are always already appropriated; 
what is feared is the emergence of (an)other discourse, one that excludes the 
Western ratio. (Dangerous Liaisons, p. 462) 
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The type of subversive Western discourse which disclaims the old totalities in 
fact comprises a new totality, allowing marginal subjects to delimit, denounce and 
reject Western colonialism, but not, of course, to find a way out of the new phase 
of Western discourse that enables their limited resistance.170 Evidently, this 
paradoxical situation is far from reassuring for the African theorist. It means that 
problems of Western colonial influence seem to recur persistently in every area of 
discourse that we have considered: African essentialism, professional philosophy, 
minority discourse, cultural relativism, and so on. At this point it becomes 
imperative to determine exactly who and what is the real enemy of the African 
theorist who desires to enounce an authentic statement. And so we turn to the 
eponymous phrase: l’Odeur du Père. 
5.3 L’Odeur 
5.3.1 Smells 
The title of the book and arguably the central and unifying theme of this 
collection of essays is L’Odeur du Père. The first question to pose must of course 
be how we should understand the phrase. Although it is fairly obvious that the key 
concept is that of a smell, or the experience of a smell, it would be inaccurate to 
translate odeur as either ‘smell’ or ‘odour’ (the French odeur is a quite neutral 
term, without the unpleasant connotations of either of the English words).171 
So if we cannot translate the phrase simply and directly, let us try to approach it 
in a more roundabout way. The concept of ‘the father’ connotes quite strongly a 
sense of authority. In the particular context of post-colonialism the most obvious 
interpretation of the word Père is that it indicates some manifestation of 
colonialism or colonial power in general, and more specifically, that it refers to a 
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particular colonial event, i.e. the Western colonization of African countries.172 
Thus far then, the phrase l’odeur du Père would seem to denote a lingering, 
perceptible trace of this colonial presence. This interpretation is supported by the 
text:  
En somme, il nous faudrait nous défaire de ‘l’odeur’ d’un père abusif: 
l’odeur d’un ordre, d’une région essentielle, particulière à une culture. (p. 
35) 
ce père qu’incarnait le colonisateur, mais aussi la puissance métropolitaine. 
(p. 143) 
In the first quotation above ‘un ordre’ refers to a particular external system of 
constraints which operates upon Africa. So Mudimbé claims that something, 
namely a colonial power, has in the past invaded the African space173 and that 
there remains a post-colonial presence which has considerable control over what 
happens in Africa today in the form of ‘[des] liens complexes qui […] arriment 
l’Afrique à l’Occident’ (pp. 11-12). But why does Mudimbé choose an image 
evoking the faculty of smell to refer to this concept?174 Why not l’ombre du Père, 
or l’écho du Père? In fact, this idea of the sense of smell is the most apt for 
teasing out the complexities of the relations characterizing post-colonial African 
thought, which are also, I shall argue, at the root of many of the problems we 
encountered in the preceding chapters. 
The image of this presence consisting in an odeur suggests what some of its 
characteristics may be: first, it is a trace of something else, something more 
substantial which may no longer be present, that is, the Père himself. Secondly, 
smells are phenomena whose exact locations are often very difficult, if not 
impossible, to pinpoint; even though we can sense them, we often cannot measure 
them accurately because smells are diffuse and pervasive. 
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The way in which smells relate us to the objective contents of the world forms a 
strong disanalogy with, say, visual stimuli. Generally speaking, if we receive 
visual stimuli, then we see the object from which the stimuli originate. Now, there 
are some smells which seem to refer to or to indicate their object: the smell of a 
rose, for example, which ‘refers’ to the flower from which it emanates (i.e. the 
smell and the rose are in a genitive relation, it is the smell of the rose) But there 
are other smells which seem to ‘refer’ only to themselves, such as a smell of gas. 
More importantly, there seems to be a certain rupture or distance between 
olefactory stimuli and their objects (or, alternatively, olefactory data are ‘opaque’ 
whereas visual data are ‘transparent’): we do not claim to ‘see’ light-waves — we 
see objects by virtue of our receiving or picking-up light-waves — but surely we 
smell smells? Often a smell may linger on, without perceptible diminution, even 
when there is no other trace of its object in the vicinity. 
Also, smells seem to be subject to a large degree of relativity: odours are often 
experienced differently by different people, simultaneously or over a period of 
time, and may even be different for the same person at different times. Now 
pleasant, now repellent, now strong, now faint; one can grow used to an 
unpleasant odour and after a while no longer notice it. Yet smells can be very 
powerful, and subtle, evoking memories of other experiences without appealing to 
the conscious intellect. For what is more unsettling, more alienating than a 
strange, lingering odour, perhaps not even any odour in particular, nothing we can 
trace to a precise origin or cause, but simply a sign of something that does not 
belong? 
Finally, one of the corollaries of all these considerations — vagueness, 
relativity, subjectivity, derivative existence — is that there is room for 
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disagreement that there is any smell at all. And if the smell itself is vague, diffuse 
and relative to the perceiver, what about the object from which it emanates? 
5.3.2 The Relation with Past Problems and Texts 
Having discussed the implications of the phenomenology of smell experience, let 
us go on to apply these notions to the rather less abstract situation of African 
colonial experience. Recalling that the notion of the odeur is meant to indicate a 
trace of colonial presence, we may ask whether it is a trace that recreates 
(simulates) or only refers to the object, whether the experience refers objectively 
to what it represents, and how different perceivers understand and identify the 
odeur. 
Let us take some examples. First, Senghor’s treatment of African art. A number 
of essays  set out a quasi-philosophical exposition of what we might term ‘the 
African aesthetic’.175 Directly linking the particular forms of real, physical 
artifacts produced by Africans to an essential African psyche, Senghor intends to 
explain to the Western amateur of ‘exotic’ art all the glorious differences that 
define his culture. 
This might be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it may be said that 
Senghor sacrifices purity and soundness of method (by including objects and 
practices whose primary purposes may not be artistic) in order to expound what is 
basically ideology, and that in so doing he manoeuvres African artifacts into a 
rigid and perhaps ill-fitting definition of art. (Here we notice the parallel with 
Hountondji’s critique of ethnophilosophy.) Therefore, the odeur du Père pervades 
Senghor’s text insofar as the theses it expresses are complicit with colonial 
discourses and lack methodological rigour, and all for the sake of a politicized 
posturing. 
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On the other hand, it might be argued that what is actually underway is a 
subversion of the Western category of art, which (unsurprisingly) has been 
controlled mainly through Western theory and practice, and hence that Senghor is 
distorting the category in order to force it to take account of African realities. 
Diawara illustrates this possibility: 
With poets such as Senghor, we face a reverse exoticism: the ‘barbarian’ 
assumes the position of the writer and defamiliarizes the French language 
for French readers. Thus the newness of the writings: the négritude poems 
are ‘authentic’ and ‘unmediated’ because they represent the primitive’s own 
subjectivity. (Dangerous Liaisons, p. 458) 
Senghor is thus working from inside Western patterns of thought, but 
manipulating them into unstable and uncomfortable shapes in order to necessitate 
the recognition of another reality. This brings us back to the conclusion of Kobena 
Mercer’s critique of Robert Mapplethorpe’s photographic work: 
The subaltern black social subject who was historically excluded from 
dominant regimes of representation […] is made visible within the codes 
and conventions of the dominant culture whose ethnocentrism is thereby 
exposed as a result. (Welcome to the Jungle, p. 200) 
So, the fact that instances of African ‘art’ fit imperfectly within the category of 
art is only a sign that the concept itself must be expanded in order to take into 
account other forms of life. 
Of course, there is also the counter-criticism that Senghor has ‘pris simplement 
et fidèlement catégories, concepts, schèmes et systèmes occidentaux pour y couler 
des ‘entités’ africaines’ (p. 43).176 For example, it is not clear that all of the 
activities cited by Senghor as instances of African art really do serve that purpose 
in their ‘proper’, that is to say original environments. A term like ‘art’ inevitably 
carries with it a whole series of connotations that are particular to the societies 
which have elaborated it, which have lived it. Nevertheless, on this second 
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interpretation, we may say that the odeur certainly does not pervade Senghor’s 
texts. 
A second case: the work of the ethnologists, ethnophilosophers and Africanists. 
On the one hand, they may be accused of distorting concepts like ‘philosophy’ in 
their haste to prove that Africans, too, possess a capacity for and history of this 
kind of critical thinking. The consequences of this distortion include an 
impoverishment of the notion of philosophy (such that any system of thought or 
implicit cultural consciousness will do) and a manipulation of African data in 
order to maintain the thesis of alternative world-views. Here the odeur would 
once again consist in the subordination of African realities to the political needs 
of Western colonial societies. Marcien Towa goes further and identifies a rather 
insidious ‘master-text’ to the anthropological discourse: 
Les ethnophilosophes rétro-jettent dans la tradition africaine les dogmes 
chrétiens ou musulmans […] Il s’agit […] d’une stratégie pour mieux 
inculquer aux Africains le message évangélique. (‘Conditions d’une 
affirmation … , p. 343) 
Thus, Africans who take part are either duped by or implicated in the tradition 
which spawned the evangelizing mission. 
On the other hand, we might agree with Owomoyela that the real aim of 
Africanist studies is to replace the emphasis on genuine African realities, and that: 
A true African philosophy would aim at reconciling Africans to Africaness 
[sic], not at advocating dissolution in a European cultural mélange. (African 
Philosophy: The Essential Readings, p. 178) 
Or take N’Daw, who argues that: 
La réflexion philosophique africaine … ne sera pas seulement restitution, ni 
répétition d’une tradition figée, mais création à partir d’un fondement 
authentique, … la tentative de donner un fondement conceptuel à la vision 
de la réalité propre aux peuples d’Afrique.177 
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Ethnology and ethnophilosophy would therefore be a means of realizing a truly 
African philosophy and ensuring the survival and the prosperity of the diverse 
particularity that Mudimbé, among others, cherishes. In this case, the odeur must 
be elsewhere. 
As a third example let us take the work of writers such as Paulin Hountondji, 
who flatly disowns the tradition of ethnophilosophy, instead asserting that 
Africans should engage in the sort of analytical philosophy that characterizes the 
history of this discipline in the West. On the one hand, Hountondji represents 
himself as liberating African thought from the need to reconstruct itself in the 
form of a mythical past, an undertaking which limits African philosophy to a 
rather nostalgic archeological reconstruction of traditional modes of thought. On 
the other hand, some critics accuse him of trying to force modern African culture 
and thought into ill-fitting Western forms, and of denigrating the values of 
traditional African culture. Hence Marcien Towa’s view that: 
Le courant de pensée représenté par P. Hountondji n’occulte pas la pensée 
africaine, il l’écarte ouvertement, au nom de la scientificité, comme non 
pertinente. […] Hountondji nous semble […] prisonnier du préjugé d’une 
Afrique primitive à mentalité purement mythique. (‘Conditions d’une 
affirmation d’une pensée philosophique africaine moderne’, pp. 344-
5)  
The odeur in this case inheres quite straightforwardly in the uncritical and 
ethnocentric acceptance of categories like ‘philosophy’, in the demand that 
African research follow the trends and developments of the Western academy, 
and in the envisioning of a single, Westernized, future for Africa. 
With all these different interpretations it now becomes increasingly difficult to 
determine which is correct. Does it finally come down to anything other than a 
more or less arbitrary decision? Would such a decision be anything but an 
expression of one’s own theoretical background and political convictions? Once 
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the idea of an odeur is accepted as common currency, it remains to be seen how 
much closer we are to a clear understanding of what it actually is, where it exists, 
and how it may be eradicated. To facilitate this, we shall return to Mudimbé’s 
texts and then, in the following section, introduce a further device which will 
enable us to understand the source of this pervasive odeur. 
5.3.3 Application to Mudimbé’s Text 
So, how does all this speculation help us to understand any better Mudimbé’s text 
and the problems with which it is concerned? Let us draw a few comparisons. In 
the same way that a smell may linger long after the object from which it 
originates has disappeared, Mudimbé’s phrase implies that even when the Père, 
i.e. colonial power, is no longer physically present in Africa his odeur, a trace of 
his presence, remains. So the fact that there exists an odeur du Père does not 
mean that he is still present, or even that he still exists.178 At the same time there 
is clearly some remnant of his presence, but, insubstantial as this is, it may consist 
in many disparate elements, not all clearly discernible and liable to be located in a 
variety of spaces according to different observers. 
Indeed, Mudimbé seems to go further, with the opening remark: ‘L’Odeur du 
Père … on l’entendra comme on le voudra’ (p. 11). The phrase is ambiguous, but 
it would appear to mean at least two things: first, that the odeur is multiple, i.e. 
the presence of the West may be perceived in various phenomena; secondly and 
more importantly, that its identity depends in a key way on its observers, and may 
at bottom be a matter of volition (hence voudra). Compare the following 
statement: 
le père à tuer ou à célébrer, lorsqu’il paraît, n’est plus le même au Sénégal, 
au Congo ou à Madagascar… (p. 143) 
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The remainder of the paragraph makes reference to the ‘contexte social’ of post-
colonial countries, so we know that Mudimbé is merely claiming that there are 
differences in the social structures of such countries, and that these differences 
render the issue of neo-colonialism thoroughly heterogeneous — an important but 
not astounding observation. 
On the other hand, the opening comment cited above would seem to locate one 
of the reasons for the multiplicity of the odeur in the actual will of the 
observer/perceiver. By implication, then, one would see the West where one 
wishes to see it? Thus, Hountondji sees it in ethnology and ethnophilosophy, 
which he sees as falsely African discourses, whilst ethnologists and 
Negritudinists, etc., see it in people like Hountondji, who are (said to be) 
producing non-African or even anti-African texts. But this would appear to render 
the concept of the odeur as subjective and ultimately vacuous as the grammaire 
africaine criticized by Barthes: 
Le vocabulaire officiel des affaires africaines est … purement axiomatique. 
C’est dire qu’il n’a aucune valeur de communication, mais seulement 
d’intimidation.179 
Il suffit de lire […] authentique […] pour flairer là le creux de la rhétorique. 
(p. 134) 
Evidently this conclusion will not do: whether or not it is true that the odeur is 
no more substantial than a waft of air, it is clear that a large number of African 
writers, Mudimbé included, give credence to this notion or something like it. This 
fact alone necessitates our engaging with the issue. 
So far, the analysis of the phrase l’odeur du Père has been rather speculative: 
we have not analyzed an argument, but rather tried to make explicit what may lie 
implicitly within the phrase, given a certain context. And there is no reason to 
think that all of the peculiarities of olefactory experiences are relevant to the 
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concept of l’odeur du Père. But there is further evidence within the text that 
points to the conclusion that what has been discussed above is indeed what 
Mudimbé is trying to say. (The remainder of this chapter and the following one 
work out the details of this correspondence.) Furthermore, it does provide us with 
a starting point from which we may hope to reach understanding of those key 
issues which were outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Those were: 
authenticity; Eurocentricity; colonialism and neo-colonialism; and the future of 
African philosophy.  
The metaphor of the odeur is useful because it works in analogy with the 
notions of ‘inauthenticity’, colonial influence’, ‘Eurocentricity’, etc. Indeed, we 
might propose these concepts as partial translations of Mudimbé’s term. But the 
concept of the odeur takes us beyond the reach of the others and, though vague 
(or perhaps because it is vague), it encourages us to re-examine the context of our 
judgements. Of course, one of the most obvious differences between the concept 
of the odeur and the other concepts is that the former introduces the element of 
relativity: it is easy to think that authenticity, for instance, could be defined 
through the way a discourse is and not necessarily the way it appears, but an 
odeur obviously demands a ‘phenomenology’. 
Both Senghor and Hountondji seem to assume that African authenticity is a 
fairly clear-cut affair (for Senghor it is the embodiment of the African essence; 
Hountondji renders it sometimes as a fairly dry geographical criterion, sometimes 
as the commitment to create a dialogue between Africans). But Mudimbé 
encourages us to rethink these propositions, and instead to see authenticity as 
something far less tangible than we had imagined; multiple in nature and location, 
liable to metamorphose at any moment. Likewise, the concept of inauthenticity is 
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not limited to an oppositional role, and refers to a mode of experience more than a 
particular object. 
In the next section it will be argued that the economy of this reasoning is best 
served by giving up the search for a substantial odeur. 
5.4 L’Odeur and Beetles in Boxes: Towards a (Dis)solution of our Problems 
5.4.1 Insubstantiality 
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a ‘beetle’. No 
one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a 
beetle is only by looking at his beetle. — Here it would be quite possible for 
everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine 
such a thing constantly changing.180 
In this famous passage from the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein is 
commenting on the practical impossibility of comparing one’s own physical pain 
(i.e. the sensation, or experience) with someone else’s. The illustration of the 
‘beetle in the box’ shows that the pain itself cannot be treated as anything 
substantial: ‘No one can “divide through” by the thing in the box; it cancels out, 
whatever it is.’ And he continues: ‘… if we construe the grammar of the 
expression of sensation on the model of “object and designation” the object drops 
out of the consideration as irrelevant.’ It is important to note that Wittgenstein is 
not claiming that there is no such thing as pain, nor is it immediately obvious that 
he is proposing to reduce privately experienced pain to public symptoms like 
bodily changes or behaviour. The claim so far consists in nothing more than the 
proposition that pain cannot be treated as a substantial object without leading to 
serious and telling difficulties. 
Wittgenstein argues that to treat pains as objects that we can label, words here 
functioning as ‘pointers’, is to incur a suite of problems, deriving mainly from the 
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fact that pains just do not have the same properties as the things we usually think 
of as objects. So it is not that pains do not exist, but that we should not talk about 
them as if they were of the same category of things as the contents of one’s 
pockets. It is not possible, except in metaphor, to turn out one’s pains for all to 
see. To return to the image of the beetle in the box, there is nothing that could 
count as publicly opening all boxes — there is no way of accessing a deeper 
reality that will settle questions such as who carries the biggest, ugliest beetle. 
It was argued above that no single answer to the problem of the odeur du Père 
finds satisfaction with all parties. To utilize the language of the beetle in the box, 
it is impossible to specify some final position which would count as having 
opened the box, and so definitively revealing the identity and nature of colonial 
presence (accessing the deeper reality). Moreover, when a writer claims to do just 
that, i.e. to reveal colonial influence, the very same move is seen by another as 
one more instance of the noxious odeur. 
The conclusion to be drawn is analogous to Wittgenstein’s: it is not that there is 
no such thing as a colonial trace, but the trace must not be treated as anything 
substantial. If we construe the grammar of this problem on the model of ‘object 
and designation’, the object drops out of the consideration as irrelevant (because it 
is possible that everyone is referring to something different, and even to many 
different things over time). Since it is clear that the ‘object’ — the Father’s 
presence — is far from irrelevant, we must revise our grammar. 
5.4.2 Beetles-in-Boxes and the Odeur 
There may be several sorts of neo-colonial presence existing in Africa today, all 
capable of having a direct influence on African lives and thinking. One sort is 
fairly easy to spot: for example, the disproportionate strength of European 
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languages with respect to indigenous ones, while the prospect of a less alien 
lingua franca occupies a still-distant and possibly utopian horizon. There are also 
the Eur-American economic and cultural invasions which are facilitated by the 
multiple networks of trade, finance and basic monetary aid which strongly link 
modern-day Africa to the West.181  
But the manifestation of neo-colonial presence which is especially relevant to 
the problems encountered in any enquiry into the nature of African philosophy is 
more insidious and subject to argument over exactly what it is and where it lies. 
The notion of odeur with which we have been working would seem to indicate an 
indistinct and hard to define, though generally perceived, phenomenon. No-one 
can, to everyone else’s satisfaction, describe the nature or workings of this odeur; 
it is a trace of something undesirable, and that is all that can be said for sure. This 
is why it is unhelpful to treat the odeur as something substantial, something that 
can be clearly and neatly defined in order to facilitate a complete excision, once 
and for all.182 For if the location and modes of Western influence in Africa were 
as easy to determine as, say, networks of stocks and shares, then we should be 
able to cite clear and uncontroversial instances of such influence. But we have 
already seen that charges of African inauthenticity abound on all sides, and are 
largely based on identical criteria, so a definitive and impartial account is not to 
be hoped for. 
It is also worth noting that it tends to be at the level of ideas that concepts like 
the odeur come into play. Following the demise of actual physical colonization 
(which may be seen as the most conspicuous, though not the unique, phase of 
colonialism) and with the advent of independent African states, African writers 
seem to be preoccupied with the question of how one’s ideas may be infiltrated 
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and manoeuvred by colonial influences. This sort of anxiety is truly epidemic 
insofar as any theory which, in the search for an African ‘identity’, makes use of a 
concept like ‘authenticity’, must by its nature repose, implicitly or explicitly, on 
an assumption that there can be such a thing as ‘inauthenticity’. Such a theory 
insinuates, implies, or denounces outright the effects of neocolonial influence as 
inauthenticity. Dualisms like this are inevitable so long as concepts like 
‘authenticity’ function in binary opposition with concepts like ‘colonial 
influence’. 
Initially there are at least two problems raised by this sort of opposition. First: 
by claiming, or even proving, that an African text is undeniably linked to and 
dependent on Western texts nothing immediately follows as to the degree of 
veracity or utility of that text. Indeed, when a discipline or practice is foreign to a 
culture (which, according to Hountondji, is true of philosophy in African 
contexts) any contribution to the discipline is likely to take a fundamentally 
derivative form. 
Nor is it clear why the simple presence of Western ideas in a text should 
necessarily be harmful. Senghor often made much of the argument that it was 
through assimilating and advancing the culture, civilization and intellectual 
prowess of the classical Greeks and Romans that Europe became great. Indeed, a 
large proportion of Western literary and philosophical works are only meaningful 
in relation to the life, practices and heritage of the ancient world, and it is well-
known that the Greeks themselves imported and adapted elements from African, 
Palestinian and Babylonian cultures, among others.183 So it is not immediately 
clear what should be so objectionable about an African text containing 
‘exogenous’ material. 
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Senghor willingly admits not only that Europeans are technologically and 
academically superior to Africans, but also that they provide the latter with a vital 
link to their past. After all, it was through anthropological and ethnological work 
initiated and developed by Europeans that so much was learnt about African 
culture which would otherwise have been ignored or forgotten. One might even 
go further and say that without the timely introduction of cultural relativist theses 
into Western discourses, the well-entrenched prejudices of colonial ideology 
would have continued to obstruct the paths to African emancipation. Talking of 
the generation of (European) Africanists responsible for these developments, 
Senghor puts it thus: ‘ceux-ci furent nos ancêtres, qui nous sauvèrent du désespoir 
en nous révélant nos propres richesses.’184 
It may be said that even Hountondji agrees with the assimilationist trajectory of 
Senghor’s ideas: 
Ce n’est pas en contournant et encore moins en ignorant l’héritage 
philosophique international que nous philosopherons vraiment, c’est au 
contraire en l’assimilant pour mieux le dépasser. (Sur la ‘philosophie 
africaine’, p. 82)185 
So although terms like ‘Western influence’ and ‘(neo-)colonial influence’ are 
often used interchangeably, and although the presence of one or the other is often 
taken as proof of inauthenticity, there are further questions as to whether, even if 
these terms are legitimate synonyms, we are yet in a position to say something 
interesting about the truth or usefulness of authentic African discourses as such.186 
5.4.3 The Desire for Truth and the Ruse 
As we noted above, what is viewed by one author as the unmasking of colonial 
presence is often reconstrued by another as merely an additional instance of 
colonial influence. Is it possible to explain this apparent contradiction by 
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interpreting the desire to locate the odeur, to give a final definitive account of its 
existence and modalities, as a desire to impose one’s own perspective? If such is 
the case, then what is at issue is not the truth of the matter, but a series of 
competing interests: it is in effect a very politically-interested manoeuvring which 
is represented as an attempt to preserve what is truly African. 
For example, the Ghanaian philosopher Kwasi Wiredu makes the, by now 
familiar, distinction between ‘those who see African philosophy as coterminous 
with philosophical investigations having a special relevance to Africa and those of 
a “universalist” outlook’ (Cultural Universals and Particulars, p. 149). He goes 
on to argue that  
the contemporary African philosophers who look askance at the 
‘universalist’ predilections of the last-named group tend to regard 
philosophical work as not having special links with Africa […] as a dabbling 
in foreign philosophy, quite forgetting that the same work can, for reasons of 
history, come to belong to two traditions at once. (ibid.) 
Yet it may be more reasonable to suppose that it is not just the positive contents 
of the professional philosophers’ discourse which causes Africanists and 
ethnophilosophers such consternation, but instead the worryingly aggressive 
subtexts which underlie, in the form of prescription and proscription. 
By way of illustration, take this remark that Wiredu makes shortly afterwards: 
‘any unexamined use of a foreign language in philosophical work is a mark of the 
colonial mentality’ (p. 153). I do not wish to assign this phrase more attention 
than it deserves, but it may help to enumerate the more obvious and serious of the 
numerous errors that lead Wiredu to make what may rightly be seen as a highly 
contestable statement. First, Wiredu leaves totally unexamined the notion of 
foreignness: he fails to consider whether this property is categorical or permits of 
degrees, and whether it is relative to one’s place birth, parentage, nationality, 
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place of education, etc. He also ignores the fact of the convergence and 
intermingling of cultures, instead assuming that cultural resistance is the only 
justifiable norm. So there is no space devoted to discussion of what makes a 
language foreign. Is it when it is not one’s first language, or when it is not the 
language of one’s ancestors? Chinua Achebe also wonders what answers to give 
to these simple questions: 
But what is a non-African language? English and French certainly. But what 
about Arabic? What about Swahili even? Is it then a question of how long 
the language has been present on African soil? If so, how many years should 
constitute effective occupation? For me it is a pragmatic matter. A language 
spoken by Africans on African soil, a language in which Africans write, 
justifies itself. (Morning Yet on Creation Day, p. 83)187 
Mudimbé, too, doubts the security that indigenous languages are assumed to 
provide: 
s’il est utile, il n’est toutefois pas essentiel de savoir en quelle langue se fera 
le véritable discours culturel africain, car même une langue nationale peut 
fort bien être un véhicule et un instrument de l’aliénation … (p. 96) 
But Wiredu does not question the mode and sense of the division between 
African and non-African, instead assuming that separating African from Western, 
authentic from derivative, independent from colonial, is as mechanical a process 
as sifting the wheat from the chaff.188 He is silent about the link between the 
‘foreignness’ of a language and the ‘colonialness’ of the mentality that uses it; 
meanwhile, the pejorative tone of the term ‘mentality’ is far from tacit (and is 
reminiscent of Lévy-Bruhl’s concept of ‘prelogical mentality’).189 
So what is being suggested is that the attempt to prefigure the essence of neo-
colonialism may itself be seen as a manifestation of colonial thought, because the 
desire to locate and control the odeur stems from the anxiety to have definitive 
and foundational knowledge of Africa, and this is a characteristic element which 
recurs throughout the development of Western Africanist discourses. The desire 
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to be able to ‘say’ the Other (i.e. to give a definitive, objective reduction) has not 
disappeared but simply changed form, and the determination to describe the locus 
of Africa’s post-colonial malaise in fact proceeds from and presupposes the 
previous colonial desire to know the African essence. The fact that today it is 
often Africans who make use of this type of critique is, as always, both a 
superficial encouragment and a cause for deeper concern. 
Thus, the compulsion to isolate and eradicate neo-colonial presence is itself a 
symptom of colonial thought — the odeur folds in on itself. One may view the 
history of Africanist discourse as a series of developments in Western thought that 
began with the desire to have knowledge of essential African types; now, in a 
moment of reflexive critique, it progresses to the desire to have knowledge of 
colonial presence. 
There is another way in which the attempt to delimit neo-colonial presence is 
itself part of the problem of neo-colonialism, and this is more complicated, 
consisting in the possibility that the West has already theorized its own undoing. 
That certain modern writers in the West have attempted to re-evaluate Western 
culture and to locate and eliminate the prejudices which infect Western discourse 
is certainly a good thing. But the purported end of this enterprise, a completely 
non-ethnocentric discourse, is not merely utopian but clearly inherently 
contradictory, as it is impossible to speak from a culturally neutral position (cf. 
L’Odeur du Père, p. 22). Furthermore, to conceive of Westerners creating a non-
Western discourse is to assume the same sort of discursive essentialism that has 
plagued discussions on African philosophy. 
In analogy with the tendency to delineate racial categories along a 
colourless/coloured (i.e. white/non-white) cleavage, in the case of these self-
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critical discourses abstraction is again mistaken for neutrality, and what results is 
merely a ‘critique interne’ and not a ‘mise en perspective’.190 The best that can be 
achieved is to purge some of the excesses and arrive at a more rational view of the 
world; as Mudimbé writes:  
que l’on ait pu, au sujet du structuralisme, parler d’une ‘désoccidentalisation 
du savoir scientifique’ pour contrer notamment la générosité de certains 
concepts, tel celui de ‘pensée sauvage’, est un signe (p. 84).  
But through trying to ‘de-westernize’ a discourse, at worst we may find 
ourselves once again parading a single culture’s particularities under the banners 
of universal truth and humanity in the abstract.191 
In the following section we shall recall what might be termed the political aims 
of Mudimbé’s discourse, particularly the notion of the distance or rupture which 
he believes Africans must bring into effect in order to avoid just this sort of 
eurocentrism. 
5.5 La Ruse du Père 
5.5.1 Thinking Away from the West 
In the foreword to L’Odeur du Père it is stated that one of the principal activities 
of Mudimbé’s text is the juxtaposition of ‘questions susceptibles d’éclairer les 
liens complexes qui … arriment l’Afrique à l’Occident’ (p. 11). He adds ‘dans 
une certaine mesure, [les textes réunis ici] expriment mes propres contradictions 
d’universitaire africain’ (p. 14). Some of these contradictions have already been 
mentioned: Willame regards the author as 
surtout un représentant de cette minorité intellectuelle qui […] ressent avec 
acuité l’aliénation néocoloniale … [et qui] a été formée par des maîtres 
admirables, certes, mais qui appartient [au] royaume européen … (‘L’Autre 
face du royaume ou le meurtre du père’, p. 90) 
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The status of ‘universitaire africain’ is fraught with tension, for ‘une analyse 
même distraite des universités africaines montrerait que, malgré des 
aménagements parfois importants, ces universités sont calquées sur des 
‘universités-mères’ occidentales’.192 Furthermore, despite the apparent 
‘africanization’ or ‘deoccidentalization’ of African universities: processes 
consisting in a restructuring of syllabi, the ‘creolization’ of disciplines (e.g. 
ethnophilosophy, Africanist studies, etc.), the revision of entry requirements, and 
the re-management of quotas, it is still unclear whether the final product is 
anything more than ‘une simple enclave d’influence culturelle occidentale 
composée d’Européens à peau noire, que la société environnante mépriserait 
comme des intrus’.193 This must give us pause, recalling the modesty of 
Hountondji’s initial criteria for authentic African philosophy — texts written by 
Africans and qualified by their authors as ‘philosophical’. According to 
Hountondji, the simple criterion of nationality guarantees the Africanness of their 
texts; but Mudimbé invites us to consider the limitations of the criterion of 
nationality, by emphasizing the fact that the official forms of education and 
research in Africa are radically alien to anything that might be termed ‘African 
culture’.194  
The interference of particularist or universalist ideologies in this context is a 
complete red herring. For Mudimbé, the future for African scholars, if they are to 
be truly authentic (αυθεντησ, i.e. ‘one who acts independently’), cannot consist 
in a pure and simple commitment to neutral scientific abstraction (‘dilution dans 
l’universel’), any more than in an essentialist immersion in all things African 
(‘ségrégation murée dans le particulier’). Besides, as we have seen, so many of 
the essentialisms which have attracted our attention have not even been proper to 
 182
African cultures, and what is said to be neutral and universal is often ‘un ordre, … 
une région essentielle, particulière à une culture, mais qui se donne et se vit 
paradoxalement comme fondamentale à toute l’humanité’ (p. 35). Instead, 
Mudimbé sees the problem to be far less straightforward, far more anguished than 
do his counterparts. For example, he rejects the too-easy targetting of 
predecessors like Senghor and Kagamé: 
Les critiques adressées à ces initiateurs de nos sciences sociales et humaines 
africaines sont généralement ou mal émises ou mal fondées: elles élident 
trop facilement une question majeure, celle du sens de l’écart à prendre à 
l’égard de l’Occident et ce qu’il en coûte vraiment d’assumer cet écart. (p. 
44) 
Here is the crux of the matter. The central questions which arise for anyone 
writing in post-colonial African studies are to what extent, in what manner and for 
what reasons Africa should dissociate itself from the West. The following section 
considers three of the answers that are conventionally proposed. 
5.5.2 Association, Assimilation, Revolt 
One possible response available to the African in the grip of Western domination 
is to attempt some sort of reconciliation with that order, and this is possible at 
several levels. For example, Diawara represents Senghor as recommending that 
Africans assimilate those cultures which have dominated them because ‘to 
become uncolonizable, Africans must first assimilate that which would enable 
them to be as educated as their colonizers’ (Dangerous Liaisons, p. 460). Indeed, 
Senghor goes further than this and actually posits assimilation as the road to 
freedom: 
la colonisation, économie dirigée, a pour seul but d’enrichir le Colonisateur. 
On comprend, dès lors, que l’assimilation, qui implique une certaine 
émancipation intellectuelle et politique, apparaisse comme la grande 
ennemie. (Liberté 1, p. 44) 
 183
He emphasizes that this possibility of independence requires not only 
technological but, vitally, linguistic prowess, in order to grant Africans ‘les 
qualités les plus essentiellement françaises — clarté, ordre, harmonie’. Once 
again, the models are taken from within the dominant culture, for French writers 
are not only ‘des maîtres à penser’, but also ‘des maîtres à écrire’(ibid., p. 65).195 
Mastery of the colonial culture’s scientific techniques can also bring Africans to 
self-knowledge and thus provide them with an authentic basis: 
Les professeurs d’Ethnologie compléteraient ainsi l’expérience personnelle 
qu’a chaque élève de l’Afrique en l’éclairant à la lumière d’autres 
expériences. (p. 66) 
In this sense Hountondji seems also to propose something which follows, or 
maps onto, the lines of cultural assimilation: 
l’appropriation méthodique de l’héritage philosophique international … est 
la condition absolue de toute réappropriation de notre passé philosophique, 
de toute reconstitution de notre histoire théorique. (Sur la ‘philosophie 
africaine’, p. 136) 
Of course, Hountondji and Africa’s other ‘professional philosophers’ (Towa, 
Wiredu and Bodunrin, among others) regard this as the appropriation of a 
universal and culturally neutral discourse. 196 
By contrast, Hountondji calls ethnophilosophy ‘une prise en charge massive, par 
les Africains eux-mêmes, d’un discours sur l’Afrique initialement produit en 
Europe, […] une extraversion artificielle, réplique scientifique de l’extraversion 
de nos économies dominées. (‘Occidentalisme, élitisme: réponse à deux 
critiques’, p. 63). And yet, Ngugi Wa Thiong’o argues persuasively that: 
All societies develop under conditions of external contact with other 
societies at the economic, political and cultural levels. Under ‘normal’ 
circumstances, a given society is able to absorb whatever it borrows from 
other contacts, digest it and make it its own. But under conditions of external 
domination, conquest for instance, the changes are not as a result of the 
working out of conflicts and tensions within, and do not arise out of the 
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organic development of that society, but are forced upon it externally. 
(Moving the Centre, p. xv-xvi) 
In which case it would appear that any sort of development in Africa, and a 
fortiori any assimilation of disciplines developed in the West (even those of a 
‘universal’ nature) is inevitably born of external constraint. So one might wonder 
why Hountondji believes that his own methodology guards against this danger. 
For without thoroughgoing political, economic and cultural emancipation, any 
decision can be seen as inauthentic and any protest is immediately open to 
recuperation by colonial logic.197 
Another possible response is to strive for association, which entails the free 
interaction of independent states. Given the demise of actual physical colonization 
it would appear likely that such a mode of engagement would prevail and that it 
should be the most desirable state of affairs since ‘les indépendances politiques 
semblent être le garant de l’affirmation de la différence …’ (L’Odeur du Père, p. 
95). 
But Mudimbé questions the reality of this ‘prise de pouvoir et de parole’, 
likening the place of African cultures in the European perspective to that of 
folklore, a relic and remnant of the past, a scientific and cultural curiosity. He 
continues 
il en sera malheureusement ainsi tant que la culture africaine sera comprise 
et définie en référence au passé de l’Afrique, à la tradition africaine. (p. 96) 
The third way that is often put forward is to organize a revolt against the order 
which maintains Western hegemony, what Serequeberhan terms ‘emancipatory 
counter-violence’ (The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy, p. 10).198 According 
to Memmi, the path of violence is ‘la seule issue à la situation coloniale, qui ne 
soit pas un trompe-l’oeil’ (Portrait du colonisé, p. 143). The danger here is that 
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the new authority will simply take the place of the one that has been deposed, 
resulting in the same old problems with new faces. At best, it may be hoped that 
the new power will redefine itself in light of the flaws of the former one. 
But a simple revolt does not free Africans from the logic of Western discourse, 
and in the mythology of this latter it is the Oedipal son who, through deposing his 
father, inherits his mantle. Hence the Sophoclean epigraph with which L’Odeur 
du Père opens: ‘La génération qui monte n’en délivre point la race’ — the line of 
descent is continued and inevitably leads ‘dans la folie des mots et en une frénésie 
vengeresse’.199 
Whichever way to independence is chosen, whether that of assimilation, 
association or revolt, the key problem is that one’s action is always limited to and 
lived essentially as a reaction. The colonial factor is in each case the archetype 
which determines how the colonized, or the formerly colonized, will live; it 
functions as the decisive point in African history, the measure of authenticity, and 
reconstructs the West as the standard. Memmi writes that, ‘en pleine révolte, le 
colonisé continue à penser, sentir et vivre contre et donc par rapport au 
colonisateur et à la colonisation’ (p. 153).  
It is for this reason that Mudimbé believes that it is only by foregoing or 
rejecting the Western heritage that Africans can ever find their own voice. In the 
words of Jean-Claude Willame:  
il doit faire face à une tentative qui est toujours étrangère et d’autant plus 
‘subversive’ qu’elle se présente comme à contre-courant de la science 
occidentale établie. […] le critère de la scientificité ici importe peu; [...] 
cette prise de position, ce témoignage lui apparaît indispensable pour mettre 
un terme à l’aliénation coloniale et néo-coloniale. (p. 93) 
In the following sections we shall move on to consider the possible form of this 
attempt. 
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5.5.3 Christianity and Science — L’Écart 
In L’Odeur du Père, Mudimbé reopens the debate on Christianity in Africa 
(chapter 4, part I). Apart from further criticism of the role and significance of the 
Christian missionary in Africa, towards the end of the chapter we find a very 
interesting section which appears to resolve in a rather dramatic and conclusive 
way the old dilemma which asks: what is it to be, a Christianized Africa, or an 
Africanized Christianity? We shall lay out the lines of this argument and, by 
proposing a substitution of the principal terms, see where it takes us.200  
Mudimbé’s argument starts from the premise of ‘true faith’ as a universal. He 
continues: if we accept that Christianity and true faith are not associated by any 
necessity, but instead by historical contingency, and further admit that, in its 
themes as in its historical development, the evolution of Christianity does not 
necessarily coincide with the axioms of faith, then why should Africans bother to 
burden themselves with the baggage of Western Christianity? Indeed, in order to 
formulate the basic principles of the Word, they need do no more than go straight 
to the earliest Apocryphal texts and sources. Simultaneously, by looking at 
African traditions in a new way they could open up ‘des étendues différentes dans 
lesquelles la vérité de Dieu pourrait être … l’explosion de Jésus-Christ’ (p. 69). 
This would give the Gospels a new visibility, an independence and an autonomy 
from Church commentaries, but equally from the strategic directives issued by the 
Roman Catholic Church. It would also give space to appreciate the ‘états 
ininterrompus de la maturité réligieuse des peuples africains qui témoigne, en des 
dérivations archéologiques propres et originales, d’un Dieu unique et universel’ 
(ibid.). Given this position, sooner or later we would find ourselves asking why 
Africans should need the relay or mediation of Christianity at all, if the God of 
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African religions is the True, Unique, Universal, Creator of Heaven and Earth, 
Master of Life, Death and the Universe. On the other hand, we may refuse to 
countenance the dissociation of Christianity, as it has developed historically, and 
the true faith; it may be argued that the two are a dialectical unity, whose cultural 
sign resides in their complementary role in the exercise of discursive teachings 
embodied by the Western tradition. We may admit their theoretical separation 
uniquely for the purposes of conceptual analysis, sometimes in order to account 
for the one or the other, or to determine the modes which ensure their coherence 
or govern their enunciation, or in order to understand their practical applications 
in a given field, or the regularity of correspondences with other orders or types of 
explanation, other modes of thought, schemes of action, etc. 
In this case, the africanization of Christianity is nonsense, unless it is conceived 
in the manner of a rational prescription, an opportunist adaptation. Commercial 
objects such as cars, radio or television sets, medical packaging and so on, can be 
africanized in this way, with a view to maintain their financial viability: 
on conditionne ainsi certaines de leurs structures afin de rendre ces objets 
‘adaptés’ au climat et à l’ambiance des Tropiques, mais on ne les modifie 
point fondamentalement. 
So the dilemma is posed thus: either we accept a thoroughly africanized faith, 
which need not recognize even the core of Christianity, or we follow Towa, for 
whom the efforts to africanize Christianity are merely ‘cosmetic’ attempts to clear 
the evangelical path of culturally specific obstacles (‘Conditions d’une 
affirmation …’, p. 343). Either way, the result is that ‘le missionnaire … n’a 
strictement rien à dire au païen’ (L’Odeur du Père, p. 71). This, then, may be 
taken as an instance of a post-colonial situation which requires some sort of 
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rupture, for a dehistorized Christianity loses its core strength, and an ‘africanized’ 
Christianity is denounced as a cynical ploy for power. 
Further on, Mudimbé notes that ‘l’Occident cultivait une autre Foi, celle 
justement qui est transmise et inculquée par l’éducation: la Foi en la Science, la 
Scientificité, la Raison …’ (p. 79). Suppose we re-run the above argument with 
Western scientific tradition in the place of Christianity, and the true or ideal 
scientific discourse in the place of religious faith?  
On the one hand, we may believe that Western scientific traditions and the 
ideals of a true, universal scientific discourse are not linked necessarily, but only 
(if at all) by historical contingency. Furthermore, the developments of the former 
do not necessarily coincide with the demands of the latter, so why should Africans 
be bound to follow the same route as Western researchers? Indeed, they do not 
need to rely on the systematized, hierarchicized interpretations of Western 
science, but can go straight to (1) the field of data and (2) disciplinary foundations 
in order to elaborate sciences which reflect African cultures and traditions. This 
would give Africans a freedom from the influence of particular Western theses, 
but also from the successive tides of theoretical ‘revolutions’ that at present 
inundate them. It would also give space to appreciate the rationality of African 
modes of knowledge, given the facts of African environments. Sooner or later it 
would be possible to dismantle African reliance on the prophets and preachings of 
Western science. 
On the other hand, we may refuse to countenance the dissociation of Western 
techniques from the true scientific discourse, seeing the history of Western 
scientific tradition as a story of the ever-closer approximation of the truth. We 
may admit that they are separable only in concept, but that the West is ultimately 
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the cradle of Science and responsible for its elaboration. In this case africanizing 
the sciences is a nonsense, except in terms of ergonomics — the sciences are 
‘conditioned’ in order to be innocuous or even favourable in a particular climate, 
but their essences are fundamentally unchanged. 
Conceived in this way, not only is an africanization of the sciences a debased 
and debasing excercise in mercantilism, but also something of a mystification. For 
as far as the natural sciences are concerned, we may agree with Memmi that ‘il 
n’y a que deux manières de couler le béton, la bonne et la mauvaise’ (p. 163). 
(Although, of course, the ways of scientific development, the reasons for 
favouring one direction rather than another and the rules and givens governing the 
domain of natural science are still likely be culture-specific.) 
In the case of the humanities and social sciences, however, the same cannot be 
said, not least because of the ever-questionable scientificity of these modes of 
discourse.  
les sciences humaines et sociales, à l’exemple des idéologies, ne disent pas 
‘un même’ inoffensif dans ses variables expressions, qui serait fidèle à lui-
même — à l’instar de celui des systèmes logiques. (p. 14) 
This leads to just the sort of situation that Mudimbé describes in L’Autre Face 
du Royaume (1974), when, using the metaphor of the ascenseur, he laments that 
in post-colonial Africa the progress of African theorists is always relative to, and 
in a strong sense dependent on, the major currents of Western discourses. It is as 
if the African were perpetually enclosed in a lift whose movement and function 
are controlled by Western savants. Intermittently, the doors open and close, 
people enter and exit the lift, and the eternal inhabitant snatches glimpses of the 
world beyond. But all the theories that s/he is able to construct must be relative to 
the information s/he is given from outside: 
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Coupé de la réalité concrète qui devrait nourrir et vivifier sa pensée, 
l’exercice de sa liberté se limite ainsi au développement soit d’un discours 
pour ou contre les modèles conçus hors de son champ d’observation, soit 
d’une parole narcissique tournant et retournant ses rêves pour les intégrer au 
monde clos et dérisoire de sa cabine. (L’Autre Face du Royaume, p. 102-3) 
Perhaps the most discouraging irony of all is that even ‘la démystification des 
sciences coloniales en Afrique n’est pas l’oeuvre des Africains eux-mêmes’.201 
If we credit this metaphor of the ascenseur, then we also follow Mudimbé in 
thinking that true science is not possible in such circumstances: it is actually 
further from the spirit of science as a system of independent and unbiased 
investigation for the African theorist to remain in her/his present situation of 
subordination to Western scientific practice.202 And Mudimbé takes this line of 
thought right to the very limit: 
il nous faudrait […] par rapport à cette culture, afin de nous accomplir, nous 
mettre en état d’excommunication majeure, prendre la parole et produire 
‘différemment’. (p. 35) 
What may be the reasons for the extremity of this position? I suggest that the 
first is the dissatisfaction inherent in being delivered from the clutches of Western 
colonial thought by a new revolution of Western thought. The genesis and 
manifestations of this dissatisfaction have already been described by Fanon, who, 
referring to the abolition of slavery, says: 
Le bouleversement a atteint le Noir de l’extérieur. Le Noir a été agi. […] 
L’ancien esclave exige qu’on lui conteste son humanité, il souhaite une lutte, 
une bagarre. Mais trop tard. (Peau noire, masques blancs, pp. 178-9) 
Mudimbé regards the sort of cultural relativism that Lévi-Strauss deploys as ‘la 
continuation infidèle peut-être mais réelle, de l’ancienne pratique coloniale’ 
(L’Autre Face du Royaume, p. 119). The continuation is ‘infidèle’ in that it 
negates or reverses the content of colonial thought; but it is nevertheless a 
continuation because it carries the same form, i.e. an external discourse about 
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Africa, and occupies the same space — that of an all-seeing, all-knowing, all-
saying science — within the same scientific tradition. 
The second reason for Mudimbé’s call for an ‘excommunication majeure’ is 
that, by ascribing to this new revolution of Western thought, Africans surrender 
the sovereignty of their own thought and are thus open to the risk of a new attack 
on their rationality at the hands of ‘l’ethnologie qui peut, au gré des idéologies 
ambiantes en Occident, privilégier tour à tour ou simultanément la thèse du 
relativisme culturel ou son contraire’ (ibid., p. 99). 
Thirdly, the material problems faced by Africans are left unresolved: a Western 
capitulation to cultural relativism or acknowledgement of local nationalisms 
(whatever the reasons, noble or otherwise) allows us to exchange one list of 
names and propositions for another — nothing need change ‘in the field’, for the 
changes are brought about in the academic intellect. As Memmi writes, ‘le fait 
colonial n’est pas une pure idée. […] Il n’est pas si facile de s’évader, par l’esprit, 
d’une situation concrète, d’en refuser l’idéologie tout en continuant à en vivre les 
relations objectives’ (Portrait du colonisé, pp. 47-8). 
But a true emancipation of African thought will work through material 
conditions first, largely because we just cannot anticipate the true needs of an 
emancipated society before it has truly been emancipated. And this is a truth 
about Africans as much as anyone else: as we noted at the end of chapter 4, there 
is a sense in which none of us can know what is best for herself. As Marcuse 
notes: ‘individuals raised to be integrated into the antagonistic labor process 
cannot be judges of their own happiness. They have been prevented from 
knowing their true interest’.203 
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5.5.4 The Ruse 
So in order to escape neo-colonial discourse and not merely to effect a reversal or 
negation (which is always contingent), Africans must assume a rupture or ‘écart’. 
The rupture that Mudimbé wants to effect is supposed to take the radical form of 
an excommunication majeure, though the details of this possibile emancipation 
are not particularly clear in the text. 
One of the more obvious elements to Mudimbé’s strategy consists in the fact 
that he wants to address the post-colonial problem, but as far as possible without 
using Western discursive tools. For there is a problem implicated in the attempt to 
escape the permanence of the West in African thought. This is one of the 
manifestations of the ruse: 
Pour l’Afrique, échapper réellement à l’Occident suppose d’apprécier 
exactement ce qu’il en coûte de se détacher de lui; cela suppose de savoir 
jusqu’où l’Occident, insidieusement peut-être, s’est approché de nous; cela 
suppose de savoir, dans ce qui nous permet de penser contre l’Occident, ce 
qui est encore occidental; et de mesurer en quoi notre recours contre lui est 
encore peut-être une ruse qu’il nous oppose et au terme de laquelle il nous 
attend, immobile et ailleurs. (p. 13) 
It is claimed that the totalizing power of Western thought is such that any 
critical response is always already anticipated: every revolution merely serves to 
further entrench, validate and justify its logic. The discourses which may permit 
Africans to take stock of their position, and try to open up a new space in which to 
operate, originate within and re-assert the power of Western culture: 
C’est que situés dans l’espace critique d’un champ épistémologique, même 
apparemment érigés en contre-discours … ils sont sous le signe d’une 
totalité, d’un ordre de discours qu’ils reflètent et débordent à la fois. (p. 45) 
Hence the need for an ‘écart’, but all the while guarding against the possibility 
that the paths of African revolution may already be inscribed within the Western 
canon, and that an apparent autonomy can in fact constitute a veritable return to 
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the Father’s fold. The conditions of possibility which permit and facilitate our 
discourse also recur within it: thus Africans who are educated by the West, or 
who make use of Western critical materials, may find themselves duplicating 
Western thought. Diawara writes that: 
Because Western man has been creating and re-creating his positivity 
through discourse, a problem concerning traps and reversibilities arises 
whenever an African theorist uses the dominant canon to represent African 
realities. Paradoxically, then, African theorists who assume a violence 
towards the West run the risk of unwittingly reasserting the superiority of 
the Western notion of rationality if they lose themselves in a discourse 
derived from Western ethnocentric canons. (Dangerous Liaisons, p. 457) 
Before we move on to examine this final problem in the next chapter, let us take 
stock of the situation, and in particular look at how we have addressed those key 
notions outlined at the beginning of this chapter, and what may be said about the 
relation between the concepts of universality and authenticity. 
5.6 Conclusion 
It was stated at the beginning of this chapter that any adequate treatment of this 
subject should deal with, and ideally provide some way of understanding, three 
main areas: the notion of authenticity, with reference to African philosophy, such 
that it can be determined who speaks authentically and who does not; the 
corresponding, contrasting notion of Eurocentricity: who is being Eurocentric and 
how; the enduring problems of colonialism and neo-colonialism. 
We shall now consider how each of these areas has been addressed, and what 
conclusions may be drawn, however tentatively. 
5.6.1 Authenticity & Eurocentricity 
From what has gone before it appears that authenticity is as much a ghostly ideal 
as the odeur is an intangible bugbear. Through our readings and appositions of the 
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various texts considered, both of these themes appear to function in a multitude of 
senses and with a minimum of objectivity. Nevertheless, they are genuine 
reflections of people’s experience and, as such, command our attention and a 
serious attempt to account for them. 
Authenticity is a valuable concept; it enables us to utilize a therapeutic approach 
to the various forms of alienation which abound in African academic practice in 
general and African philosophy in particular (the latter involving an especially 
antagonistic relation between, on the one hand, the ideals and mandates of reason 
and, on the other, a continent which has been repeatedly and unforgettably 
theorized as purest un-reason). But authenticity is only valuable as something like 
a ‘regulatory’ concept, for as soon as we take it to be a real property, that may be 
absent from or present in a text and can somehow inhere in a discourse, then it 
becomes possible to criticize and stigmatize others simply because they are not in 
line with one’s own criteria for authenticity. This is not to say that we should not 
criticize others by our own criteria (whose else would we use?), but that, in the 
case of this particular term, to do so is to commit a very dangerous error. For there 
is never any point in one’s analysis at which it is correct to say that we have truly 
reached the source of the problem. There is no end point in the quest for 
(in)authenticity: even when we think we have found it, there is much to say about 
the fact that we think we have found it, and so on. 
This is why authenticity must be conceived as belonging to a totally different 
order. If textual content can be seen as (in)authentic then we burden ourselves 
with something like a Senghorian essentialism; if it is the form of a discourse 
which is susceptible to be (in)authentic then we accept the elitist overtones of a 
Hountondji. I suggest that in order to operate with a thorough understanding and 
 195
proper use of the concept of authenticity we are required to take it as a something 
akin to a moral concept — something which stimulates and guides our act of 
writing; an end (τελοσ), but not an end point which submits to intellectual 
analysis. So authenticity consists neither in form nor content, but it is still an 
operative concept, for, as a regulatory ideal, it guides the practices which 
themselves construct form and content. 
Without this approach, any use of the concept of authenticity entails problems 
of reversibilities which are far more than sleight of hand, and result in an 
interminable and fruitless game of opposites. It is a reflection of the real situation 
in Africa today where, following decolonization, it is no longer obvious who or 
what is the neo-colonizing force (if there be such a thing); it is no longer possible 
to state without equivocation and with confidence which ideologies support (neo-
)colonial influences and which are forces for African emancipation. Indeed, we 
might even go so far as to say that, henceforth, there is no question of occupying a 
position that one terms postcolonial while also ruling out the possibility that this 
one’s position does not derive from, or could not migrate to, the neocolonial. The 
situation is such that any position or discourse can be subverted. Not to recognize 
this betrays a lack of awareness of the realities of the post-colonial environment, 
but it is also a remnant of a very European mythology — that a discourse (e.g. the 
‘rational’ discourse) can be truly, totally free. This seems to be the direction in 
which Mudimbé’s thought takes us. 
Thus, in a strange recovery of the term’s etymology, authenticity comes to 
represent the condition and the sign of one’s liberation. Mudimbé’s ‘retour 
constant sur ce que nous sommes’ is not a guarantee of fidelity, truth or 
authenticity in themselves, but rather a commitment to transparency, an openness 
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to critique and discussion, and an awareness of the conditions of possibility which 
to a greater or lesser extent determine one’s discourse, thus constituting an 
attempt to orient oneself along the trajectories of these ideals (i.e. fidelity, truth 
and authenticity). 
5.6.2 (Neo)colonialism 
Paradoxically, we cannot treat the odeur as a substantial object at the level of 
ideas, for this leads us to all the problems we have outlined; yet, on the other 
hand, it is the real objective facts of colonial situations that perpetuate the 
colonialist discourse whatever we may say.204 
If the colonial period is posited as a period of inauthenticity or unreality then 
post-colonial Africans, in order to realize their authentic character, cannot express 
themselves in relation to colonialism, rather they must refer to pre-colonial 
Africanity in their search for history. But this history is one divorced from the 
present African ‘psychisme’ and can, in principle, serve as nothing but a mode of 
mystification and nostalgia.205 
On the other hand, locating colonial presence is not really a matter of pinning 
down any thing, and critiques which try to identify particular instances are only 
obsessed with particular symptoms; it is a matter of a history. In fact, contrary to 
our preliminary assumptions, the odeur does not consist in a presence, insofar as 
the notion of a presence implies some kind of object (albeit an immaterial one). 
If the odeur were truly a singular presence then it would be possible to 
demarcate its existence within African societies; it would then be possible to say 
what is truly African and what non-African (or, in this case, Western). But this 
too clearly involves a recurrence of the familiar theme of African/Western 
essences, a tangled web we tried so hard to think our way out of. 
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It is possible to reconceive this chapter and Mudimbé’s work by asking in what 
ways African depends on the West, what consequences issue from these modes of 
dependence, and how Africans may act in face of, and ultimately against, this 
network of dependence. The final analytical chapter will address these questions. 
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Chapter 6: Langages en folie, L’Ecart, and The Invention of 
Africa 
6.1 Introduction 
This final analytical chapter will continue the work of the previous one, by 
deepening and refining our study of Mudimbé’s texts, of which the most 
important element is the theme of the écart. Mudimbé hopes that Africans will 
detach their scientific theory and practice from the Western scientific heritage, in 
order to regain their independence and create an authentic context within which 
they will be able to redescribe their experience and reformulate their sciences in 
‘their own terms’. By explaining in greater detail Mudimbé’s idea of the écart, we 
will also clarify his prescriptions for the future direction(s) of African humanities 
and social sciences, so it is to this end that the present chapter is oriented. 
First of all, the following section deals with some of the elements that are 
conventionally associated with philosophy itself and we discuss whether these 
ideas yield a workable concept of the discipline.  
Next, we look at the idea of modernity and its intrinsic Eurocentricity; we 
distinguish three senses of the term and ask whether any of these senses may be of 
use. An example of the term in use is taken from Kwame Anthony Appiah’s In 
My Father’s House, and the subsequent critique demonstrates its complex and 
problematic nature. The conclusion reached in this sub-section, that the term 
‘modern’ as it stands may not be useful for African theorists, is then applied to 
Hountondji’s claim that African philosophy should be conceived as a form of 
(universal) philosophy under the management of Africans. The argument unfolds 
by looking specifically at the stipulation of literacy as a criterion for philosophy. 
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The fourth section deals with Mudimbé’s radical diagnosis for Africa. With 
him, we ask what framework could support authentic African activity. Using a 
second reading of the notion of ‘langages en folie’ we examine Mudimbé’s 
treatment of the subject of creativity. 
In conclusion, the final section looks to the possible futures that may await 
African philosophy, and considers these latter in the light of the overall progress 
of this thesis. 
6.2 Philosophy, Neutrality & Truth 
In this section we shall take a further look at how the term ‘philosophy’ is used in 
general and specifically by the authors who address the issue of postcolonial 
African philosophy. In particular, we shall focus on themes such as neutrality, 
partiality, universality, and philosophical foundations. 
6.2.1 Foundations 
Philosophy, by its nature, is supposed to address that which is common across 
individuals and cultures, that which is universal to human existence. Hence, there 
are discourses like metaphysics to determine the basic units of existence, 
epistemology to understand what knowledge is and how we acquire it, ethics to 
separate right from wrong, logic to analyse the essence of argumentation … the 
list continues. Of course, when attempting to address human questions in a way 
that is universally valid it will probably occur to us that in fact we speak from a 
singular socio-historical perspective and that our discourse is, as it were, both 
particular and ‘encultured’ (cf. L’Odeur du Père, p. 22). Furthermore, as finite, 
imperfect beings, we are prone to error, bias, and the vagaries of the phenomenal 
world. 
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One sort of response to this anxiety, exemplified by foundationalist 
epistemologies such as we find in the Cartesian Médiations, is to abstract from all 
contingent factors, to bracket off the mundane and thus to raise one’s thinking 
above the merely regional. Having done this, we can be confident that our 
knowledge is sure: a product of pure ratiocination starting from self-evident 
axioms and proceeding by strict logical argument.206 
In the quest for ideal objectivity, a further important distinction may be made 
between the faculty of reason and the passions. In this case it is again a matter of 
sifting the particular from the universal, as Senghor remarks: 
Si Descartes écarte les passions, plus précisément s’il les veut vaincre ou 
diriger par ‘des jugements fermes et déterminés touchant la connaissance du 
bien et du mal’, c’est-à-dire par la raison, c’est qu’au fond, il les tient pour 
moins essentielles à la nature humaine. […] Car, tandis que les passions sont 
diverses chez les différents hommes, la raison est partout identique à elle-
même. (Liberté 1, p. 41)207 
In order to criticize a philosophical argument originating within a system like 
this, one may attack the logic, arguing that it is flawed, or does not accurately 
represent the full argument; or attack the premises, arguing that they are false, or 
unsuitable for/irrelevant to the argument; and one may also disagree about the 
equivalence of terms, perhaps suggesting that the author slides from one sense or 
definition to another. 
There is another way to attack this style of argumentation, which is to take issue 
with the ‘intuitive reasoning’, the ‘givens’, or the ‘self-evident’ propositions upon 
which it is based. Such is the Nietzschean reply to Descartes’ cogito when the 
former says ‘notions such as “unmediated certainty”, “absolute knowledge” or 
“thing in itself” contain a contradictio in adjecto’.208 But if Nietzsche is right, and 
every proposition already includes a judgement, and a non-necessary judgement 
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at that, then how is it possible to start to philosophize in a way that is itself 
philosophical (i.e. independent of subjective judgement)?209 
Let us approach the matter from a different angle. What is at issue is how to 
define the boundaries of philosophical problems in a philosophically justifiable 
way, and what we are faced with is the familiar problem of vicious regress. As the 
archetypal totalizing discourse, philosophy requires that our every step be 
philosophical: once sceptical arguments bring into doubt the value and security of 
our knowledge, everything becomes subject to questioning (especially our own 
questioning). But since we always bring into philosophical discourse pre-
philosophical elements — intuitions, customs, prejudices, opinions, tastes, etc. — 
how can we ensure its purity? And how can we distinguish between an a priori 
foundation, which would guarantee at least one basic truth and provide a starting 
point, and a mere pre-philosophical prejudice?210 
The classical response (if ever there was such a question in classical philosophy) 
is that philosophy is part of our nature, and it is usually positioned in 
counterbalance to some non-rational, sensuous, animal side. Therefore the rational 
discourse is an expression of something we all carry inside — an essence, a soul, 
or suchlike. Not only is reason a part of us, according to classical thought, it is 
also the best part of us: the element which escapes contingency and causation, the 
expression not only of our nature but of the divine nature, of truth itself.211 
Yet the idea of philosophy to which we have become accustomed today is very 
different from the classical formulation; today it is considered to be a discipline or 
a discourse, something that people do or create. Ever since the doctrine of the 
substantial self was brought into terminal disrepute, it is no longer appropriate to 
conceive of philosophy as the exercise of a genuine universal faculty.212 
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Philosophy consists of a series of culturally and politically situated texts, and 
philosophers are obliged to come to terms with the fact that the former distinction 
between the necessary truths of reason and the philosophically articulated realm 
of empirical (contingent) truths is no longer easily defensible.213 Thus the pre-
theoretical foundation of philosophy are also inevitably pre-philosophical, and 
this is essentially problematic for the validity of philosophical discourse in the 
light of the methodological constraints it imposes upon itself. 
Let us take the example of ethical dilemmas. Using a single philosophical 
method we may come to different conclusions depending on which facts we see 
(or choose to see?) as pertinent. Then the question arises as to how it is possible to 
decide which facts are pertinent. The discipline demands that we include or 
exclude them according to philosophical criteria and argument, but in order to 
argue for the value of a particular fact, in the absence of a self-evident 
proposition, it will of course be necessary to introduce other, supporting facts. At 
this point the vicious regress initiates as it becomes apparent that these new facts 
must be supported, in order to guarantee their pertinence. The problems multiply 
exponentially if we take into account that there may be more than one 
philosophical method that may be used to control these debates. Hence the 
repeated attempts to find rational (a priori or ‘intuitively’ self-evident) 
foundations. 
Consider the case of lying. Deontological systems of ethics, such as Kant’s, 
ascribe objective moral values to acts (or rather, in the Kantian system, to the 
agent’s ‘will’ or motive), irrespective of circumstances. So according to Kant, the 
decision to lie is immoral regardless of what else might be going on around the 
moral agent. This particular system establishes a realism about moral virtues (i.e. 
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some things are just good and some just bad) and then, to construct moral 
directives, brackets off all irrelevant factors, like consequences.214 
The typical contrast to deontological ethics is consequentialist ethics, of which 
the standard example is utilitarianism, and here we are granted the possibility of 
trade-offs, for in the utilitarian vista acts are morally good only insofar as they 
maximize some end which is good in itself, e.g. happiness. Thus the act of lying, 
per se, is neither good nor bad, for an act’s morality depends on its consequences. 
Since moral value accrues only by convergence with the ultimate end, the 
description of an isolated act, including the motives for the act, does not allow us 
to arrive at a moral judgement: the relevant facts are those which pertain to the 
act’s consequences.215 
How may we arbitrate between these two competing theories, which both seem 
to respond to certain common moral convictions? Kant’s system is inspired by 
Christian ethics; in a rather spiritual bent, it is the good will which is paramount, 
thus capturing an important factor of our moral thinking. Excuses like ‘he meant 
well’, ‘it’s the thought that counts’, ‘I didn’t mean to do it’, and so on, indicate 
just this sort of concern: that morality essentially devolves upon the motivations 
and intentions of the agent. There is a difference between premeditated and 
instantaneous actions, as there is a difference between intentional and 
unintentional actions. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, shows more secular, 
juridical concerns. Here the consequences of our actions are crucial, for 
sometimes at least ethics is about praxis, and getting the best result is the ultimate 
aim. 
So the geneses of the two forms of thought are fundamentally different, and they 
each enshrine different, but co-existent, principles of our moral history and 
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conventions. More importantly, what are we to think when, faced with the 
inconclusivity of purely logical analysis, the only way of deciding between these 
different systems comes down to something like the extent to which the 
conclusions tally with our conventional thoughts about morality?216 For it simply 
is not true that philosophical ethics is based solely on rational arbitration, or 
through consideration of features such as systemic consistency. When a 
philosopher starts from fairly uncontroversial premises, uses logical argument and 
arrives at outlandish and generally repugnant conclusions, the fact is that we do 
think that the philosopher still has some work to do in order to justify her/his 
position, and this will usually be done by some appeal to another of our deeply 
grounded moral convictions. Indeed, philosophical ethics seems to be largely 
inconsequential except insofar as it asserts conclusions that find ready sympathy 
within our current moral climate.217 
There is also an equal and opposite problem: how do we justify our reactions 
before ethical commentaries which attempt to explain, describe and rationalize 
our everyday morality (i.e. the majority of philosophical ethical commentaries), as 
opposed to those which are revolutionary in scope and aim to change everything 
(e.g. Nietzschean ‘super-ethics’)? If convention usually forms our arbitrative base, 
then when it is brought into question there seems to be little left that should 
incline us to either a yea or a nay. 
As we move further away from the conception of philosophy as an activity 
which originates in something in our nature or the nature around us (i.e. as we 
take leave of the notion of there being real, eternal and immutable philosophical 
foundations) it becomes more incumbent on us to accept that the historical 
circumstances which surround our discourse are unquestionably influential, 
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perhaps to a thoroughly irrational and philosophically indefensible degree. The 
pre-philosophical elements of our thinking justify, ratify and correct the ways we 
do philosophy, especially in branches like ethics, but the only way these elements 
could themselves be philosophically justifiable would be if they were somehow 
expressions of rationality itself, rather than mere historical contingencies (such as 
interests and desires) and arbitrary conventions (like morals and taboos). 
As we saw in the previous chapter, for Mudimbé, this confrontation with 
historical contingency is ultimately a fruitful and necessary part of one’s 
discourse. In the words of Tsenay Serequeberhan: 
the locus of philosophic reflection and activity is the concrete actuality and 
the phenomenal historicity of lived existence. (The Hermeneutics of African 
Philosophy, p. 6) 
But the other side of the coin is not so bright. For once it is admitted that 
philosophy is not, and cannot be, self-supporting, we may begin to notice that the 
foundations of the discourse often lie in grounds that are far from neutral, 
disinterested objectivity. Thus, Michel Foucault writes: 
si le discours vrai n’est plus, en effet, depuis les Grecs, celui qui répond au 
désir ou celui qui exerce le pouvoir, dans la volonté de vérité, dans la 
volonté de le dire, ce discours vrai, qu’est-ce donc qui est en jeu, sinon le 
désir et le pouvoir?218 
So the upshot of all this is that it is hard to see how philosophical discourse in 
general could have a genuine philosophical genesis, which should make us 
question the reality of another of the elements conventionally associated with 
philosophy: neutrality. 
6.2.2 Neutrality 
Political ‘neutrality’ in philosophy, as in most other things, is at best a 
‘harmless’ naiveté, and at worst a pernicious subterfuge for hidden agendas. 
(The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy, p. 4) 
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The above citation shows the polemical orientation of this subsection and the one 
that follows. What I want to argue is that philosophical discourses derive a large 
part of their credibility from a still-propagated, though discredited, image of 
neutrality. For example, Marcien Towa claims that it is philosophers’ intellectual 
independence which enables them to approach the truth without ceding to the pull 
of opinion, prejudice or dogma because 
la philosophie est avant tout refus du principe d’autorité dans quelque 
domaine que ce soit et exigence de rationalité (L’Idée d’une philosophie 
négro-africaine, p. 11) 
Towa’s remark points to two finalities conventionally attributed to philosophy’s 
thoroughgoing neutrality: freedom and truth. On this view, philosophy is a 
discipline or a methodical enquiry whose principal concern starts and ends with 
the search for an unmediated universal truth. This apocalyptic role has often led 
philosophy into opposition with religion, tradition and other ‘non-rational’ 
discourses, whose authority it does not recognize, and whose central tenets it 
brings into question. Neutrality thus appears as the criterion which secures 
philosophy’s status as a free and true discourse: free, because it is not subject to 
opinion, training, or authority; true, because it is innocent of bias and its 
conclusions are eminently scientific.219 
One of the first remarks we can make about this claim to neutrality, absence of 
bias and irrational influence, is that it is itself a political stance. Modern 
philosophy defines itself positively as an objective, truth-producing (or maybe 
truth-revealing) discourse; but negatively, it is defined by contrast with these 
‘non-rational’ discourses. The negative definition is effectively a badge of 
authority: philosophy approaches the truth by virtue of its neutral, disinterested 
approach and the fact that an approach is truly philosophical is, to an extent, a 
 207
guarantee of its good faith. Moreover, the philosophical method has always been 
taken to be a more efficacious way of deducing the truth; Plato argued: 
For true opinions also, so long as they abide by us, are valuable goods: but 
they are not disposed to abide with us a long time; for they soon slip away 
out of our souls, and become fugitives. Hence they are of small value to a 
man, until he has fastened and bound them down, by deducing them 
rationally from their cause.220 
Of course, Platonic rationality requires a focus on essentials, an abstraction from 
the haze of multiplicity which blurs one’s perspective. Yet, as is in evidence from 
the arguments of the previous section, there is no zero point from which to start, 
and if neutrality entails complete abstraction from inessential conditions and 
contexts, we are stuck with the seemingly insoluble problem of (philosophically) 
separating the essential from the inessential (a problem usually avoided by 
reducing essence to a mere common denominator). If it is indeed true that 
‘reflection [i.e., philosophy] is the courage to make the truth of our own 
presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that move deserve 
to be called in question’, then the fact of the influence of our own cultural and 
personal specificities should not go unchallenged.221 
But there is a further problem in the notion of neutrality, again tightly linked to 
the mechanism of abstracting from particular details. It is assumed that in order to 
be neutral, and hence to produce a fair and true discourse, it suffices to write 
descriptively and without value-judgements. Contrary to this prejudice, it is often 
through the apparent omission of judgement that one’s influences and allegiances 
are most telling. What follows departs from the discussion of philosophy, but is 
intended to show how what appears to be entirely neutral, descriptive language 
can, through suppression or ignorance of a critical voice, disguise a highly 
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political basis, even unbeknownst to the author. An article in El País, May 2002, 
comments on Paul O’Neill’s fact-finding visit to Africa: 
In September, O’Neill will publish his criteria for governing the so-called 
Millenium Fund, recently set up by Washington in order to allocate funds to 
those poor countries having a suitable administration.222 
Even on a first reading, the neo-colonial trajectory of the Fund’s policy is 
unmistakeable: it is not the first time that Western governments take more than a 
passing interest in the ‘suitability’ of Third World governments.223 Mr. O’Neill 
describes the Millenium Fund project as ‘an historic mission’ and the 
commentator adds that it has purpose of ‘saving Africa from the abyss’.224 The 
abyss in question may be material ruin, widespread poverty and sickness, and 
social collapse — the author is not clear about this. Yet we may fairly assume that 
it is only those countries with a suitable administration which will deserve to be 
rescued from the abysmal catastrophe of post-colonial ‘independence’. 
But it is not these issues, themselves more than worthy of critique, to which I 
wish to draw attention, for the assumptions and prejudices at work at this level of 
the text are rather obvious. Instead, I wish to focus on a less conspicuous phrase 
towards the beginning of the article, where the author describes Africa as ‘the 
poorest continent’.225 Now this phrase is hardly controversial: for decades 
Western Europe has been inundated with images of sickness and starvation in 
Africa. There have been many high-profile popular events and charities which 
have highlighted the plight of African peoples: Band Aid, Live Aid, Red Nose 
Day, Oxfam, to name but a few. (Indeed, the images used, over-used and abused, 
were so powerful that in common language ‘Ethiopia’ and its cognates can now 
be used to make an instantly recognizable allusion to starvation, or as hyperbole 
for thinness.) More recently we have started to talk of the waves of epidemics, in 
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particular AIDS, which sweep the continent, and there has been growing unease 
throughout the wealthier European countries about the hordes of illegal African 
refugees which supposedly inundate Europe daily. So to say that Africa is the 
poorest continent does not seem to say very much, and certainly does not seem to 
constitute a bold and objectionable statement, indeed, it is hardly noticeable. 
Confronted with the generosity of this massive understatement, the question I 
want to ask is simply this: if Africa is poor, in what terms is it poor? The abject 
material poverty of many Africans cannot be denied, the political corruption and 
atrocious human rights records of many African countries are denounced by a 
growing number of people, Africans and non-Africans alike, but is it these things 
that make this continent the poorest?  
Let us approach from the opposite direction — what was it that ever made 
Africa, the poorest continent, worth colonizing? How is it that even today 
multinational companies like Shell find it worth their while to invest in the 
exploitation of this, the poorest continent? And as soon as the question is framed 
in these terms, it is immediately recalled that, contrary to appearances, Africa has 
great natural wealth (including gold, oil, diamonds, etc.) and great agricultural 
capacities (e.g. for growing coffee, tea, cotton, maize, etc.). Europe’s natural 
landscapes having been decimated by the implacable onslaught of the Industrial 
Revolution, Western environmentalists now fear for the future of the vast 
expanses of tropical rainforest which adorn the ‘Third World’, yet which are 
increasingly considered to be global resources (how else could Westerners have 
the right to demand their preservation?) and under threat by the need of ‘Third 
World’ countries to industrialize. Then there is the substantial material and 
scientific wealth in terms of the quantity and variety of plant and animal life 
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which survives in Africa, the still considerable (though ever diminishing) ethnic, 
cultural and linguistic diversity of African peoples, the largely untapped resources 
of traditional medecine, and the unique archeological worth inherent in the 
continent that was the cradle of humankind. 
Now, it may be countered that such a diatribe is hardly to the point: all the 
author of the article implies is that Africans are generally very poor. Granted. My 
contention is not that this is not true (though I am not sure it is), nor that it is 
evidence of anything like a ‘colonizing mentality’ on the part of El País’s writer. 
Instead, my argument is that there is something underhand going on here, on two 
levels, firstly through a sort of selective amnesia, and secondly in the way of a 
mythical cultural construction. The first, destructive, phase allows us to overwrite 
the hardly distant history of colonial exploitation, and so elide the very historical, 
economic, and human reasons for African poverty. Instead, the latter is portrayed 
as something normal, and Africa is reduced to a metaphor for destitution, 
corruption, sickness, and famine. Then comes the second, constructive phase: 
once the argument has been sterilized of traces of (Western) culpability, the image 
of the West may safely be allowed to enter, this time as the rational benefactor 
who will disinterestedly diagnose the causes of, and try his very best to alleviate, 
the terrible suffering of his unfortunate neighbour. 
The irony is not, I think, misplaced, and it does not imply that Africans have no 
responsibility for the state of their countries and peoples, but emphasizes that to 
maintain silence with respect to Western involvement is to renounce intellectual 
honesty and political transparency. On challenging the qualifier ‘poorest’ as a 
given, and returning it to its genuine, interpretative role, we are effectively 
reminding ourselves that Africa is in fact a part of the world that is rich in 
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resources. When we remember this, yet are still faced with images and 
testimonies of famine, pestilence and generally widespread poverty, the question 
naturally arises: why are Africans still so poor? And from this point we are led to 
question our own historical involvement with the continent. 
So there are two elements to be retained from this part of the discussion, the first 
of which is summarized by Hountondji when he writes: 
Le tiers monde n’est sous-développé qu’en proportion de son intégration au 
système capitaliste mondial, système où il demeure condamné à une 
situation de dépendance.226 
And the second, related point is that this economical ‘under-development’ is 
reflected in theory, leading to a ‘réplique scientifique de l’extraversion de nos 
économies dominées’.227 The overarching theme is that neutrality, as a principle 
of justice, cannot consist in the abstraction from (and hence silencing of) the 
particularities of context (i.e. difference). For this reason we shall move on to look 
at the contrary idea of partiality. 
6.2.3 Partiality 
In this sub-section it will be suggested how the concept of neutrality might be 
reconstrued or possibly replaced. For while the concept, or the common usage of 
the concept, may be objectionable, there are reasons for recuperating it. 
We have already discussed some of the problems that arise from equating 
neutrality, and hence fairness, with abstraction from specificities. It is also 
instructive to consider that this rendering of neutrality is itself a culturally specific 
device. An alternative type of neutrality may be seen in Senghor’s biography, 
which shows that, in accordance with his cultural heritage, the first president of 
Senegal continually emphasized the importance of compromise, negotiation and 
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inclusion, as opposed to a majority rule tending to the exclusion of minorities (a 
claim supported by the assimilationist tendencies of Senghor’s own texts, if 
sometimes belied by the actual history of his political career).228 
Kwasi Wiredu also contrasts the Western tendency to abstract from marginal 
perspectives, a practice demonstrating the peculiar belief that the majority is 
somehow representative, or that a middle ground will satisfy all, with a traditional 
African politics, which is said to privilege the inclusion of all views.229 Wiredu 
points to a certain unity of approach among traditional African governments 
which ‘consisted in the insistence on consensus as the basis of political decision-
making’ (p. 143). The interests of individual clans are represented by 
spokespeople who participate in councils where ‘the representative status of a 
member is rendered vacuous in any decision in which s/he does not have an 
impact or involvement’. It follows from this that to marginalize a representative 
by eliminating her/his importance through majority vote is to nullify the claims of 
the represented groups, which, Wiredu argues, is effectively a violation of their 
rights as human beings. Whether or not this is the case, here we are given a fresh 
concept of political neutrality that presents an image of the just society which is 
substantially different from that enshrined in most Western countries. 
Furthermore, these examples show the direction of the argument to follow — 
the idea of the complete inclusion of particulars. For neutrality as the elision of 
difference can be a pure fudge: in a world where difference breeds inequality, not 
to represent this difference becomes in itself a partiality because it represents a 
refusal to theorize inequality (especially insofar as silence is assent). So again, the 
problem lies not in neutrality itself, but in a false neutrality. 
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Now, it may be argued that this construal is nothing more than the view ‘in 
which justice turns out to reside, unexcitingly, in the institutionalization of 
pluralism’.230 Indeed, not only is such a conclusion unexciting, it is also untenable 
since it resurrects the old dilemma of how inclusive liberalism should deal with 
proponents of exclusion: whether to include them and thus legitimate a discourse 
which promotes intolerance and exclusion, or to exclude them and thus, though 
remaining faithful to its political aims, prove that truly universal inclusion is an 
impossible ideal. 
But this is not the point of my argument, which is in fact analogous to Nancy 
Hartsock’s critique of Richard Rorty. The latter dismisses the Enlightenment 
tradition that aims at producing a comprehensive and coherent account of truth 
and reality, instead recharacterizing philosophy as a discontinuous conversational 
practice of hermeneutics. Hartsock rejects Rorty’s position because, in order not 
to reconstruct institutionalized prejudices (‘Renaissance’ concepts such as the 
omniscient trascendental subject, an idealized reason, etc.) he recommends a form 
of discourse which is discontinuous and marginal, a series of conversations rather 
than claims to truth. But this, she argues, inevitably ignores the fact of existent 
material inequalities. To the extent that Rorty’s project disrupts the centrality of 
dominant discourses it can be viewed as subversive and progressive, but with 
respect to subjects who already occupy marginal positions, whose voices are 
already brought into systematic doubt, it becomes a new form of exclusion.231 
6.3 Philosophy and Modernity 
Basically this section applies some of the conclusions of the preceding pages. It 
discusses the usage of the term ‘modern’ and the implications of this usage. 
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6.3.1 A Neutral Definition of Modernity? 
The term ‘modern’ appears to have at least three meanings which, for all their 
distinctness, overlap in their usage: the first, an imperfect synonym of 
‘contemporary’; the second, a reference to those things which characterize the 
modern period; the third, a reference to a phase of development. 
In the first sense, which attempts no more than a chronological reference, a 
country is described as ‘modern’ simply because it is part of the modern world, so 
the term is synonymous with ‘modern-day’. The argument is something like: if 
‘modern’ means ‘contemporary’, then the whole world is modern right now, since 
‘contemporary’ means no more than how something is right now. 
The second sense is apparently innocuous, referring only to the particular 
developments of a historical period. Of course, if it is used to mean the period 
from the end of the Middle Ages to the present day, it is wholly Eurocentric, 
referring explicitly to a division of European history, which may or may not be 
applicable to, or meaningful for, histories outside Europe. Thus, to speak of a 
‘modern’ Africa may be to make a category mistake, deriving from an assumption 
that a particular history has universal relevance (like looking for a Greek 
Renaissance, for example). But this objection will not arise so long as the term is 
not stretched beyond its true extension. 
The third sense is often used to make a socio-cultural distinction, either 
synchronically, between different co-existing cultures, or diachronically, with 
respect to a single culture over time. So it is possible to talk of ‘traditional’ or 
‘feudal’ Europe as opposed to ‘modern’ Europe (diachronic use). On the other 
hand, it is not uncommon to find a distinction made between the modern world 
and the developing world, i.e. the Third World (synchronic use). In fact this third 
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sense is no more than an extrapolation of the second, the content of the latter 
being extended by some ethnocentric assumptions about single and universal 
paths of ‘development’. 
Bearing in mind these different uses of the term ‘modern’, let us turn to a 
passage from Kwame Anthony Appiah’s In My Father’s House, where he appears 
to address the central problem that occupies Mudimbé, namely, what strategy 
Africans are to adopt for the future of their societies. He writes the following: 
For the African intellectual, of course, the problem is whether — and, if so, 
how — our cultures are to become modern. What is for the West a fait 
accompli — indeed we might define modernity as the characteristic 
intellectual and social formation of the industrialised world — offers most 
Africans at best vistas of hope, at worst prospects to fear. (In My Father’s 
House, p. 172)232 
Now, I do not wish to attack Appiah over his use of the term ‘modern’: the point 
is not to show that he is inauthentic, Westernized, Eurocentric, or otherwise 
unfaithful to Africa. But it will be useful to consider how the term is used, in this 
instance and in general, and what might be the consequences of that use. 
First, I want to consider which sense of ‘modern’ Appiah is using here. 
Evidently it is not the first sense, synonymous with ‘contemporary’, for he draws 
a distinction between Africa and the West: the West is modern, Africa is not (but 
may become) modern. As was observed, if any country is modern (sense 1) then 
every country is modern (sense 1) for we are talking about global 
contemporaneity. What we are left with are two uses which, I contend, are 
actually a single sense in two different contexts: one historical and the other 
ideological. The former use, more ingenuous, indicates a meaningful division 
within European history; the latter suggests something like a universal historical 
essence. This is the idea that there is a single, linear course of historical 
development and that each country’s position can be plotted along the course, so 
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that we may distinguish modern simpliciter from, for example, traditional 
simpliciter. In other words, there are certain artefacts, practices, ideas, and so 
forth, which are essentially modern or essentially traditional. This sort of idea will 
be familiar from the ethnological texts to which we have already referred (see 
section 3.3). 
Appiah has good reasons for using ‘modernity’ and its cognates thus: he wants 
to denote real structural differences between distinct societies, and he wants to 
discuss whether it is desirable, and if so how it is possible, to shift one sort of 
society (Africa) in the direction of the other (the modern world). So it is not that 
Appiah is using the term in contrast with any notion of backwardwardness, or that 
he is making a moral judgement; certainly it cannot be said that he neglects to 
consider his own conditions de possibilité, or that he is unaware of the perils of 
colonial influence (see In My Father’s House, pp. 135-220). 
Nevertheless, his use of the term ‘modern’ leads to some unfortunate 
consequences, which he may not be willing to accept. The least of these problems 
is the rich ambiguity of the word itself, which connotes so many things, yet 
denotes few with any clarity. Also fairly minor is the worry that in using the 
concept of modernity we inevitably, and possibly unwittingly, set up an ideal 
which discourages reflection upon facts, but instead constructs reality through 
pure theory. The (tendencious) proposition that the West is the epitome of 
modernity becomes axiomatic and analytic: forgetting that the concept must have 
a content which represents the empirical world, we stop questioning whether 
Western countries really do incarnate all the prestigious characteristics of 
modernity. The Eurocentric alignment of this position cannot be mistaken. 
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But the principal objection to this terminology is that it is based on wholly 
specious logic. To begin this critique, let us raise the ghost of a suspicion: why 
should we even start to talk about a thing which is intended from the very 
beginning as some quintessence of Westernism? Even the germ of such a proposal 
can only be a remnant of cultural imperialism. If the concept of modernity is 
something that perfectly characterizes the West alone, then perhaps it is too 
parochial and too narrow a concept to be applied to cultures across the whole 
world, even in terms of ‘possible development’ (L’Odeur du Père, p. 43). In fact, 
we are not looking at modernity simpliciter at all (which would be a universal), 
but the modern age of a particular culture or group of cultures. 
It is also important to bear in mind the disparity between philosophical language 
and concepts, and everyday language and concepts. Philosophy, by its nature, 
attempts to function with a rarified, abstract language in order to do justice to the 
precision of its argumentation. But how might it be possible to arrive at a non-
historical, neutral understanding of a ‘loaded’ concept like that of modernity? By 
its nature it refers to historical development (both as the development of history 
and in history). Appiah says, ‘indeed we might define modernity as the 
characteristic intellectual and social formation of the industrialised world (p. 172), 
yet he fails to remark upon the fact (although he must surely be aware of it) that 
this ‘intellectual and social formation’ already presents Africa’s inferiority, both 
in its concepts and in tangible relations. As we have seen, many of the elements 
which reflect or construct the modern Western psyche (rationalism, civilization, 
social and political freedom, high economic and technological development, etc.) 
depend upon the existence of a savage other, who is maintained in (the image of) 
savagery precisely to protect (the image of) Western civilization.  
 218
And this is not only a matter of representation: Western social formations also 
depend historically on the subjugation and exploitation of other nations. The most 
obvious, and yet most often ignored, example of this is the Americas, particularly 
North America — the continent which is now home to the most powerful nation 
on earth, whose entire history of ‘discovery’ and colonization is inextricably 
linked to the destruction of indigenous cultures, and whose rapid industrial and 
technological development was dependent on the savage violence of slavery. As 
Ngugi Wa Thiong’o argues, ‘slavery, colonialism, and the whole web of neo-
colonial relationships […] were as much a part of the emergence of the modern 
West as they were of modern Africa’.233 
But this is also true in terms of the more ‘civilized’ materialism that governs the 
world today: economic relations which maintain Third World countries in an 
unnatural, yet strangely normalized, poverty, while simultaneously propelling the 
industrialized countries into a frenetic over-development which seems doomed to 
autophagy. 
As with the extract from El Pais in the section on neutrality above, once we 
have overcome the amnesia that allows us to think quite comfortably that African 
under-development is the result of something particular in the African essence, 
rather than global history, it is clear that the culture which is seen as the 
quintessence of modernity is fundamentally (both materially and ideologically) 
dependent on its antithesis.  
Despite all this, let us, for the sake of argument, suppose that the West really is 
the epitome of this modern age. But then we must ask: what of the links, often 
fundamental, that the West maintains with the non-Western world? For we cannot 
avoid the fact that the two are linked in very basic ways: economically 
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(international loans), agriculturally (the production of cash crops for export), 
industrially (the exploitation of mineral resources, arms sales), socio-politically 
(charitable aid). Add to this list what are perceived as global interests in the Third 
World — the manufacture and/or use of nuclear power and/or weaponry, the 
preservation of rainforests, and so on — as well as the West’s history of political 
intervention in Africa, even since independence, and it seems that African and 
Western identities are closely intertwined. It is not just that they are linked 
through trade relations, but that they are actually constructed through each other, 
both materially and ideologically. As Serequeberhan says, ‘interior to the essential 
constitution of European modernity is the relation with its Other — the colonized 
non-European world (The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy, pp. 56-7). So if all 
of these elements are constitutive of the identity of Western countries, to deny or 
reject their importance could mark a re-emergence of the famous preoccupation 
with cultural essences, that is to say, we abstract from the ‘fringe’ or 
‘unrepresentative’ aspects of our lives in order to distil an essence of what the 
West is ‘really’. But protests about exploitation of sugar/coffee/tea growers, the 
relatively low price of Western luxury goods, demonstrations about Shell 
involvement in Nigeria, growing dissatisfaction with capitalism and 
commercialism, and so on, are true and important aspects of our culture. They 
partly define who we are, who we think we are, and what role we believe 
ourselves to play in the world. 
On the other hand, if these elements are really not the sort of thing we mean 
when we say ‘modernity’ then the West cannot, after all, be the epitome of 
modernity. To continue to claim that it is so is to fix the argument in advance, to 
beg the question. This objection may be summarized in the following way: the 
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West is fundamentally and inextricably linked to the non-West, such that any 
precise division is ultimately artificial and even unreal; now, to assign precise 
properties to unreal objects, to pretend that they exist in a way that they do not 
and cannot, is intellectually dishonest. 
It seems that the decision to characterize the West as pre-eminently modern 
stems from a desire to talk about the West en soi, to consider its essence. Without 
even considering all the problems associated with cultural essentialism, we may 
dismiss this move as an attempt to fix the outcome. If the West is the epitome of 
modernity then the links which connect it to the non-Western world must also be 
seen as part of modernity, and those parts of the world must be taken into account 
when we talk of modernity. (Could it be that we do not, after all, know quite what 
modernity is?)  
Therefore, either the West is no more modern than its counterpart, or they are 
both as modern as each other. Again, this is the view held by Ngugi: ‘The cultures 
of Africa, Asia and South America, as much as those of Europe, are an integral 
part of the modern world’ (p. 10). So the West is not the embodiment of the spirit 
of modernity, and so we must question the nature of this modernity itself. 
6.3.2 And Philosophy … ? 
The same may be said for philosophy: why should Africans play this game at all? 
Why should they be concerned about whether traditional African discourses are 
philosophical in the conventional, ‘strict’ or ‘universal’ sense of the term? 
Essentially, these questions presuppose another, more pointed: why should 
African philosophy be predicated on, or develop in accordance with Western 
standards? If it is replied that what is at issue is the continuation of a philosophy 
which abstracts from cultural particulars and is thus truly universal, then we are 
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still free to ask whether it is not a universalization of a particular strain of abstract 
thinking made from a singular perspective, and from what perspective the 
abstraction has been made, i.e. in whose eyes it is neutral. As we have seen, 
silencing voices which represent difference and inequality does not lead 
unfailingly to neutrality, and even the expression of the supposedly a priori basis 
of one’s reasoning may well bear the inflections of context, as well as the deeper 
marks of one’s interests and desires. 
To deal with a specific instance, we may take Hountondji’s contention that 
philosophy can in principle develop only in literate cultures and that, since pre-
colonial Africa was not literate, there could not have existed a pre-colonial 
African philosophy, in the strict sense. The conclusions he wishes to draw include 
the outright repudiation of all efforts to ‘reconstruct’ traditional African 
philosophical systems (because it is impossible to reconstruct that which never 
existed) and that the only path for the future development of African philosophy 
is the path of … universal philosophy.234 
The premises are based on Hountondji’s particular conception of philosophy as 
a continually developing system of thought, such that ‘l’absence de transcription 
n’enlève certes rien à la valeur intrinsèque d’un discours philosophique, […] elle 
l’empêche cependant de s’intégrer à une tradition théorique collective’ (Sur la 
philosophie africaine, p. 135). Philosophy is supposed to be a critical discourse 
which is able to recuperate its past, constantly to re-evaluate what has gone 
before, and it does this by striving to achieve the universal truth that Hountondji 
posits as the ideal, but always inachievable end (τελοσ) of philosophical 
discourse.235 Consequently, even instances of traditional ‘sage’ philosophy are not 
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really philosophy because they claim to enounce eternal and unquestionable 
truths.236  
Universal philosophy, on the other hand, is not just a composite of propositional 
conclusions, but consists also in the dialectical route that is followed to reach 
those conclusions, all the more so because the latter must be available for repeated 
verification and reinterpretation. These processes require literacy because 
la tradition orale aurait plutôt tendance à favoriser la consolidation du savoir 
en un système dogmatique et intangible, tandis que la transmission par voie 
d’archive rendrait davantage possible, d’un individu à l’autre, d’une 
génération à l’autre, la critique du savoir. (p. 131) 
Oral traditions are based on recital, for fear of losing the precious knowledge 
that has been gained. By contrast, the practice of writing liberates thinkers from 
the need to recall and allows them to devote themselves to interpretation and 
critique. Since traditional (pre-colonial) African culture is illiterate it cannot have 
produced philosophy, though it may have produced philosophers who had 
philosophical thoughts.237 But to produce philosophical ideas is not to engage in a 
philosophical tradition, for that discourse inheres in a history and not a collection 
of ideas: it is a dialectical process of inquiry and not a blank repetition of 
traditional dogma. 
That, at least, is Hountondji’s argument. So what can be said in response? 
Mudimbé remarks: 
il me semble important de noter que la ‘leçon d’écriture’ que l’on invoque 
de plus en plus fréquemment pour différencier les traditions africaines et 
européennes est un critère, pour le moins, contestable. (L’Odeur du Père, p. 
193) 
First, let us ask with Mudimbé what exactly writing is: what makes a society 
(il)literate? Ancient Greece, for example, must have been fairly widely literate 
since there were instances of writing in public, which were obviously meant to be 
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read by the public (e.g. inscriptions on gravestones, posted laws, etc.), but this is 
generally limited to a quite basic level of language use. Were the majority of 
Greeks able to engage with written philosophical texts, or was philosophy, as 
seems to be indicated by the presence of people like the Sophists, still very much 
a spoken art? 
It is also worth noting that the literacy criterion can function as a kind of 
replacement for the more overt notions of savagery that were formerly in use in 
ethnology. This is related to the notion of having a history, of being a historical 
subject, able to recall the past and to orient oneself in the present in order to 
determine the future. Thus, Claude Lévi-Strauss writes:  
Après avoir éliminé tous les critères proposés pour distinguer la barbarie de 
la civilisation, on aimerait au moins retenir celui-là: peuples avec ou sans 
écriture, les uns capables de cumuler les acquisitions anciennes et 
progressant de plus en plus vite vers le but qu’ils se sont assigné, tandis que 
les autres, impuissants à retenir le passé au-delà de cette frange que la 
mémoire individuelle suffit à fixer, resteraient prisonniers d’une histoire 
fluctuante à laquelle manquerait toujours une origine et la conscience 
durable du projet. (Tristes Tropiques, p. 353) 
Yet the flaws of this conception are many, as Lévi-Strauss goes on to admit: 
some of the most important developments in human history, including the 
invention of agriculture and the domestication of animals, took place long before 
the advent of scriptural recording and representation; the architectural 
achievements of the unlettered Incas and Mayas are fully the equal of the literate 
Egyptians and Sumerians.238 Indeed, it is even questionable to what extent writing 
has actually favoured the progress upon which the Western world prides itself, for 
‘depuis l’invention de l’écriture jusqu’à la naissance de la science moderne, le 
monde occidental a vécu quelques cinq mille années pendant lesquelles ses 
connaissances ont fluctué plus qu’elles ne se sont accrues’ (Ibid., p. 353). 
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On the other hand, the coercive potential bestowed on authorities by a banalized 
literacy is unmistakable. Lévi-Strauss identifies city and empire building as the 
only phenomenon which has, throughout world history, consistently accompanied 
the initiation of generalized scriptural competency. Thus, writing seems to 
‘favoriser l’exploitation des hommes avant leur illumination’ (p. 354).239 
Other criticisms that might be raised include the fact that it seems plainly 
bizarre to say that societies can produce philosophical thoughts and even 
philosophers who have those thoughts, and that in this sense it can be said that 
they are ‘doing’ philosophy, but that, at the same time, that culture does not have 
a philosophy until those thoughts are written down. As far as this particular 
objection goes, I do not have an argument to back it up, but must simply submit 
that something seems very wrong here: perhaps it is just a question of Hountondji 
refusing to commit himself to either of the alternatives which follow from his 
position, i.e. that the existence of philosophical thought and philosophers is also 
dependent on writing, or that philosophy is possible without writing. However, 
there is no evidence in the text to suggest that Hountondji would countenance 
either of these alternatives. 
We may also object that Hountondji overemphasizes the diachronic aspect of 
philosophy, to the detriment of the synchronic aspect. At any one time, people can 
discuss matters philosophically, and what they produce is then unwritten 
philosophy: this is what the students in philosophy classes do every day, so it is 
surely something that could be done by ‘sages’. (I think in response Hountondji 
would argue that it is the diachronic philosophical heritage, in the form of formal 
texts, which enables students to philosophize at any single point in time, and that 
this heritage is lacking with respect to sages.) Perhaps we would not be able to 
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talk about Kantian ideas if there were no texts from or about Kant, but it is worth 
bearing in mind that as much as texts allow us to transmit knowledge and to 
submit it for continual and unlimited examination and interpretation, it is just as 
true that they lock us into particular ways of thinking about the world from which 
it is often very difficult to escape.240 
Furthermore, by his own standards, Hountondji appears to be construing 
philosophy as an autonomous history of ideas, and yet he cites at great length 
Marx and Engel’s German Ideology in order to spell out that ‘ce n’est pas la 
conscience qui détermine la vie, mais la vie qui détermine la conscience’, and that 
the history of philosophy ‘ne tire pas d’elle-même la loi de son propre 
développement’.241 But in this case we might wonder why writing is of such 
crucial importance, if it is the material, productive conditions of life which 
determine the length and breadth of our ideas.242 
But the profoundest critique must be that Hountondji is quite clearly attempting 
to manoeuvre us into his final (conclusive) position. In effect, we only have to 
face his conclusion if we (1) accept his definition of philosophy, (2) concede that 
literacy (in the sense that he understands the term) is a necessary condition for the 
existence of such a discipline, and (3) grant that Africa was non-literate in this 
sense. Since we are free to take issue with any or all of these claims, and having 
seen some of the reasons for doing so, we may wonder whether Hountondji’s 
position is not once again more of a polemical stance than a serious and thorough 
argument. 
In a similar moment of rhetoric, Marcien Towa asks: ‘toutes les cultures 
connaissent-elles un développement de la pensée philosophique?’ (L’Idée d’une 
philosophie négro-africaine, p. 19). Again, the answer is in the negative, this time 
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because of the fact that many cultures are not open to dissension and debate, 
which are the mainstay of philosophical activity. So not all cultures have (though 
all are capable of having) philosophy.  
But once more this is a loaded question: Towa has already defined philosophy 
as a discipline originating in a Western tradition, then he asks whether everyone 
shares this tradition.243 The answer is a foregone conclusion. In order to ‘unload’ 
the question, we would have to define philosophy without reference (explicit or 
implicit) to Western culture. Whether or not (we believe) we can do this depends 
on whether or not (we believe) the essential elements of philosophy are truly 
context-independent: the arguments of the last section brought this thesis into 
doubt. 
Furthermore, Towa mixes two different ideas of universality, mistaking the 
universality of practice (everyone doing philosophy) for the universality of reason 
(philosophy producing results which, if at all valid, are universally valid). 
Obviously the latter is an important mainstay for the conventional concept of 
philosophy, though the former is not. 
Towa (who concurs with Hountondji’s literacy criterion) also makes the 
following statement: 
on peut admettre aisément que l’Afrique moderne n’atteindra pas vraiment 
sa maturité culturelle aussi longtemps qu’elle ne s’élèvera pas résolument à 
la pensée profonde de ses problèmes essentiels, c’est-à-dire, à la réflexion 
philosophique. (‘Conditions d’une affirmation d’une pensée philosophique 
africaine moderne’, p. 341) 
Apart from the lurking shadow of a singular, linear theory of development (what 
model of ‘cultural maturity’ is assumed — a Western one?), it is pertinent to ask 
whether Africa’s ‘essential problems’ are really going to be solved by 
philosophical analysis.244 And we might wonder if there is not a certain slippage 
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between the uses of ‘philosophy’ deployed by the two ‘professional 
philosophers’. For while it seems plausible that a highly technical philosophical 
text of the ilk of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus could not be elaborated without an 
equally technical language and a sufficiently precise, durable form of 
representation, i.e. writing, it is far from obvious that the latter would also be 
requisite in order to deal with existential problems of the kind that face Africa 
today. If we are using ‘philosophy’ in this sense, why should one think that 
African peoples, or any of the peoples of the world, have ever been lacking in this 
respect? 
6.4 Strategies En Folie 
In this section we return to a closer reading of Mudimbé’s texts, in particular to 
the concept of the ruse (see 5.5.4). We shall deal with some of Mudimbé’s plans 
for dealing with the ruse and examines his radical diagnosis for Africa, asking 
what sort of framework could support authentic African activity. 
6.4.1 Le Cadre 
Aimé Césaire, in his Discours sur le colonialisme, gives an example of how one’s 
thinking may become trapped in futile and sterile oppositions. He cites Gourou, 
who remarks: ‘les pays chauds typiques se trouvent devant le dilemme suivant: 
stagnation économique et sauvegarde des indigènes ou développement 
économique provisoire et régression des indigènes’ (Discours sur le colonialisme, 
p. 35). Again, what is being asserted is some inherent and essential difference 
between ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ countries, such that for the former to 
undergo any kind of ‘development’ or ‘modernization’ is for them to lose their 
soul.245 Césaire’s critique is not long in coming: ‘Gourou choisit […] d’omettre 
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de préciser que, si le dilemme existe, il n’existe que dans le cadre du régime 
existant’ (p. 35). It is only within the given framework of international economic 
and political relations (and specifically, for Césaire, international capitalism) that 
the dilemma is operative. 
Mudimbé makes a similar point about the general split existing within the 
African humanities and social sciences, a split which has developed as a result of 
colonial discourse, and which leads to two types of scientific practice: ‘celle 
produite par la société coloniale et celle qui serait de la responsabilité de la 
nouvelle société décolonisée’ (L’Autre Face du Royaume, p. 102). Although the 
first continues and is openly complicit with Western discourse, while the second 
strives to negate it, in effect they are both subordinate practices since they both 
assume the primary, grounding reality of the colonial culture.246 
To illustrate this situation, the condition of the African humanities and social 
sciences is symbolized with a metaphor that represents the African scientist as a 
being perpetually enclosed in a lift, whose movement and function are controlled 
by the Westerners who use it. Intermittently, the doors open and close, people 
enter and exit the lift, and the eternal inhabitant snatches glimpses of the world 
beyond. For want of genuine personal experience, it is in relation to the 
information given by those coming from outside that the African must construct 
her/his theories, and decide whether to accept or reject the given model, or even to 
resort to ‘une parole narcissique tournant et retournant ses rêves pour les intégrer 
au monde clos et dérisoire de sa cabine’ (p. 103). Without a way of taking a 
perspective on her/his position, s/he cannot understand the full significance of the 
symbols s/he manipulates. Thus, ‘ces vues réfléchies par le regard d’autrui 
deviennent pour lui “savoir”’, and, naturally, the ‘prisonnier’ shows a preference 
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for those theories which allow her/him to construct her/himself positively, as a 
thinking, intelligent and free individual. 
The greatest irony is that the African is in no way constrained to stay within this 
limited and suffocating context: 
En principe, il lui suffirait d’un geste pour arrêter la machine, en sortir et 
occuper, selon une convention de louage ou de cession acceptée, un 
appartement ou une chambre; bref vivre et voir son monde à même la réalité. 
Mais visiblement il ne parvient pas à comprendre que l’initiative lui 
appartienne. (L’Autre Face du Royaume, p. 102) 
Ultimately, what is represented through this metaphor is a lack of consciousness 
about the origins, the conditions of possibility of one’s discourse, together with a 
general refusal to consider the inter-penetration of ideological and scientific 
practice (Cf. L’Odeur du Père, p. 102). Through this failure of self-reflection, the 
African subject resigns her/himself to the hegemony of the prevailing discourse, 
and this ultimately leads to a state of alienation, since Western discourse is unable 
adequately to represent African realities: 
L’ordre du discours occidental, espace parfaitement délimité, fonction d’une 
structure socio-économique et d’une archéologie culturelle, ne rend et ne 
pourrait rendre compte d’autres cultures ou d’autres systèmes que par 
référence à lui-même et point, me semble-t-il, dans la spécificité d’une 
experience qui lui serait irréductible. (L´Odeur du Père, pp. 44-5) 
In this sense, Africa has not escaped (neo-)colonization, for in a discourse where 
the West is set up as the norm, as the standard from which all measurements are 
to be made, the only space available to Africa, insofar as it differs from this 
standard, is a role of deviance. In such an environment, data which do not fit in 
with the dominant theory are either restructured to fit within alien categories (e.g. 
Senghor’s treatment of African art) or effectively become incomprehensible 
within that context. Hence the problem of radical difference, as opposed to mere 
exoticism, where a genuine Other who is not reducible to a handful of 
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ethnocentric propositions demands a real opportunity for dialogue. Mudimbé’s 
question is within what framework this engagement may take place: ‘la réponse 
africaine doit-elle partir de l’intérieur des catégories proposées par ces cadres ou 
surgir d’ailleurs?’ (L’Odeur du Père, p. 86). 
This leads us to the discussions of difference and theory convergence which we 
find in L’Odeur du Père (part II, chapter 4 and part III, chapter 7, respectively). 
Mudimbé criticizes a text which attempts to compare and contrast African and 
European traditions through a distinction between existence and essence, and 
asks: 
Pourquoi, en effet, pour définir l’Afrique et la situer face ou contre Europe, 
faut-il partir de la pertinence des catégories aussi ‘chargées’, à ce point 
intimement liées à la tradition occidentale […] depuis l’antiquité grecque la 
plus ancienne […]? (pp. 183-4)247 
If we work from the concepts of existence and essence and idealize African and 
European traditions as sets of characteristics, then if there is any cultural 
crossover at all (surely no-one would deny there is), there are two broad 
possibilities: either African tradition is ‘contained’ in the European, all the 
elements of the former realizing the essence of the latter, or there is an 
intersection, where some elements of the former are present in the latter, while 
others are not. (In other words, either Africa is only another, less developed, 
version of Europe, or there are particular African characteristics which cannot be 
reduced to European tropes.) If the latter is the case and there are norms and 
values which appear in one realm but not the other then ‘il faut bien relever les 
propriétés de non commutativité et de non associativité et tirer les conclusions qui 
s’imposent’ (p. 184). Which is to say, it must be taken into account that there exist 
elements in one tradition that cannot be understood in the terms of the other (and 
vice versa). If this is not done, then given the fact of the ‘dépendance qui [relie 
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l’Afrique] aux anciens colonisateurs’, fresh problems of neo-colonialism arise: for 
neo-colonialism is nothing but the old violence of colonialism (which essentially 
submits the colonized to an alien ordering, both materially and ideologically) 
perpetuated through the supposedly post-colonial mechanisms of contemporary 
existence. Consequently: 
Des idéologies de développement [enchaînent l’Afrique] à des modèles 
étrangers dont l’application se fait selon des grilles qui ne tiennent compte ni 
de ses contradictions propres ni de ses problèmes réels. (p. 118) 
Once again, Mudimbé takes up the twin examples of Christianity and science, in 
order to sketch his notion of a creative écart. To this end he considers a text by M. 
Hegba, who writes in hope of a new approach to the issue of africanizing 
Christianity, one which would reduce neither to a panning for ‘common 
denominators’ (i.e. between Christianity and indigenous animist religions) nor to 
a purely humanist endeavour (i.e. charity and good works — the ‘spirit’ of 
Christianity).248 Hegba’s desire to separate Christianity, which he sees as ‘une 
religion orientale, accaparée par l’Occident’, from its impregnation and unfolding 
within Western histories does not, for Mudimbé, seem to indicate a ‘refus des 
données révélées’, but a ‘désir de les intégrer dans une relation nouvelle de 
l’homme africain à son monde et à sa culture’ (p. 119). 
But, taking this even further, what would it take to effect a repositioning, or 
rather a reconciliation, between Christianity and local African religions? For the 
conception of the former as something radically different from and hostile to the 
latter is itself a legacy of the violence of Western imperialism which set itself the 
task of bringing the rest of the world to the light of reason and true faith. On the 
other hand, some of the most central acts and symbols characterizing Western 
Christianity were derived from the pagan rites of pre-Christian Europe.249 Indeed, 
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when the genesis and evolution of the Christian religion is replaced in its proper 
context, we cannot help but realize that ‘l’occidentalisation du christianisme est 
une des mesures de son harmonie visible et invisible avec, notamment, les 
animismes locaux d’autrefois’ (p. 120). 
However, what must be avoided in the attempt at rapprochement is simply 
ending up with a kind of syncretic ‘jam’ of the various religious beliefs. Instead, it 
is to be hoped that each individual religion retain its specificity and originality. 
The intrinsic irreducibility of each element is, therefore, a basic principle of this 
way of thinking. But how, then, is a reconciliation possible: surely any belief in 
the truth of Christianity necessarily relegates all other religions, actual or possible, 
to the realm of myth? 
In order to approach the problem from another angle, Mudimbé looks at the 
analogy of the convergence of the wave and corpuscular theories of matter at the 
turn of the twentieth century. It was discovered that, depending on which initial 
postulates are adopted (i.e. to describe in terms of the ‘observable’ or in terms of 
the ‘inter-observable’) one arrived at totally different and conflicting conceptions 
of the fundamental nature of matter: that it is either corpuscular or undulatory. To 
resolve the apparent antinomy of simultaneously assigning two contrary 
properties to the same stuff it was necessary to come to the understanding that, in 
absolute terms, matter is in fact neither one nor the other, and moreover we truly 
cannot say what matter is ‘absolutely’. Any knowledge that we have is inevitably 
drawn from a perspective (or series of perspectives) and is thus intimately bound 
up with our own positioning. All we are able to do is to construct a ‘language’ 
that best captures the truth of this perspective, while not ruling out that there may 
be others which require radically different ‘languages’. Consequently: 
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l’inconciliabilité ne réside donc pas dans les choses qui demeurent telles 
qu’en elles-mêmes, mais dans la représentation que l’on a et dans les 
langages du corpusculaire et de l’ondulatoire. (p. 121) 
To try to make a compromise, as such, would be to lose the power of at least 
one of the theories, so in order to make consistent sense of this paradoxical 
situation it is necessary to take a step back from both theories and elaborate a 
language which is capable of dealing equally with the two, without distortion. 
For Mudimbé, this procedure is just as pertinent to the question of religion. All 
religions try to convey a deep understanding of the infinite and the absolute, yet 
none are capable of doing so, precisely because the languages they use are finite 
and limited: 
N’est-ce pas par un jeu […] de dérèglements (réductions, analogies, 
transpositions) que la Mystique opère pour parler de Dieu dans un langage 
fini alors qu’Il est l’infini? Sur quel type d’énonciation et de système 
objectif de transcription des corrélations entre le fini et l’infini se fonde-t-
elle pour dire une réalité (essence et existence) qui est hors du langage, hors 
de l’espace, hors du temps? (p. 185) 
As in the case of science, it is possible to conceive of different religions as 
different expressions of a single search (for a single object). No finite, 
perspective-based language can actually capture the infinity and universality of 
truth. No language is final and absolute, but each is a way of looking for finality 
through a particular context. In reply to Hegba’s conviction that ‘nous voulons 
Jésus-Christ comme référence suprême unique’, Mudimbé emphasizes that 
indigenous religion is for many Africans ‘un mode d’être fondamental, un savoir 
et une histoire, à partir desquels des positivités s’organisent, se modifient, 
s’harmonisent’ (p. 120). 
So once again, the only way to accommodate both of these different ‘theories’ 
on a rational basis is to perceive them as discrete and non-commensurate (and 
therefore non-competitive) bodies of knowledge of the same thing (i.e. God). The 
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‘recul’ that is required here is not a step back from truth (or God) but from our 
own expression of truth, it is a form of modesty. For the different ‘languages’ try 
to convey the Absolute, but they are not the Absolute; they try to express the 
inexpressible. There is no neutral position from which to arbitrate between them, 
yet the true division exists not between the enunciations themselves but between 
the postulates which give them sense, and these postulates, created by people, are 
not irreconcilable. 
There is, however, an obvious disanalogy with the scientific example. For we 
may say that the same scientists must have believed enough in both the 
corpuscular and undulatory theories of matter to try to effect a reconciliation. 
Indeed, one of the most profound problems with religion through history has been 
that when people of different creeds encounter each other, peaceful reconciliation 
is often the furthest thing from their minds and hearts. 
The reply I believe Mudimbé would make to this objection is that such people, 
who (unfortunately) probably make up a large proportion of the world’s believers, 
have mistaken their religion for their faith: that is, they have mistaken the 
language they use to convey (imperfectly) their own sense of the divine for the 
divine itself (cf. L’Odeur du Père, pp. 120-122). Nevertheless, one cannot help 
but suspect that this argument would get short shrift from a great number of 
‘believers’. Would this be a sign that religious antagonisms are really, as 
Mudimbé says, ‘entre des genres de pouvoir culturel et spirituel en concurrence 
[…]’ (p. 122)? In any case, Mudimbé’s argument is a lot more localized than it 
may appear: he is not trying to advocate or predict any kind of global syncretism, 
but is rather leading up to the conclusion that: 
Le problème de l’africanisation du christianisme et le problème de 
l’intégration des religions africaines à la modernité sont isomorphes. (p. 122) 
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It is basically a question of those people who have something ‘at stake’ in both 
Christianity and indigenous religions. In effect it is a suggestion for a way 
individuals (e.g. ‘Westernized’ Africans) might come to terms with what appear 
to be two contradictory ways of life, by showing that there cannot be a 
contradiction because the two ways start from different bases; at the same time 
this indicates the essential unity behind religious thought. 
Introducing this kind of perspective also enables Mudimbé to disrupt the sort of 
oppositional thought which sets up Christianity as the ultimate form and 
expression of the truth, and relegates all other religions to the status of 
mystification and barbarity. Yet he does so without attempting to negate or 
challenge Christianity on its own terms, thereby avoiding the ruse (see section 
5.5). In doing this, he also disrupts any conceptual alignment that might exist 
between the notions of Christianity, civilization and modernity (with paganism, 
savagery and primitiveness on the other side) by displacing the religious element 
from its privileged status.250 
From this discussion we can see the general trajectory of the Mudimbean assault 
on the humanities and social sciences, which is not so much concerned with the 
truth or logical validity of Western discourses (though this is also a part of his 
critique). Mudimbé comments that: 
le problème de la vérité au sens strict paraît secondaire face aux impératifs 
de la validité des systèmes à construire d’après les règles. (L’Autre Face du 
Royaume, p. 90) 
His main concern is how Western discourses are constructed with respect to 
other possible discourses:  
La question est, en effet, dans la signification des objectivations des 
chercheurs qui, — niant, ignorant ou taisant prudemment — l’irréductibilité 
de l’autre, proposeraient les résultats d’investigations comme lectures totales 
et définitives de l’autre et de son milieu. (p. 98) 
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6.4.2 L’Ecart 
So it might seem as if Mudimbé is saying that all that Africans have to do is to 
affirm the reality of their experience and the value of their positioning, in order to 
bring about a new order, converging Africa with the West in the manner we have 
outlined above. Unfortunately, it is not so simple. For would such an affirmation 
amount to much more than the basic position of Négritude? Would Hountondji 
admit to any other motivation for his own texts? Yet we have objected to these 
positions on the grounds that, in various ways, they permit the continuation of 
certain aspects of colonial discourse. 
The problem, the essence of which was touched upon in the preceding chapter 
under the heading of the ruse (5.5.4), may be schematized as follows. What is at 
risk is that, in claiming a new discursive space in which to elaborate their ‘own’ 
sciences, Africans inadvertently take up the ready-made framework of yet another 
strain of Western discourse. The consequences of this are twofold: first, the 
framework may support unpalatable contents (e.g. speculation about ‘the African 
soul’, or assumptions about the neutrality of abstract philosophy); secondly, the 
framework is given, which makes it inherently subordinate (Négritude was an 
antithetical moment), subject to recuperation and once again answerable to 
Western control. The former element has already been discussed sufficiently; the 
latter leads in two directions: the first, another subject that has already been 
treated, is that for Africans to accept a new ‘liberating’ evolution of Western 
discourse amounts to a vindication of the latter, because in continuing a particular 
strain of history it provides a continuation ‘peut-être infidèle’ of that discursive 
history, which includes colonialism. The second and more insidious consequence 
is that the new form of speech is literally given to the colonized, irrespective of 
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whether it actually addresses their problems. Within such a context, the 
appearance of post-colonial autonomy can only be illusory. 
Let us take a landmark to fix our bearings. In L’Autre Face du Royaume, 
Mudimbé remarks upon Lévi-Strauss’s astonishment that non-Western theorists 
should criticize the cultural relativist phase of ethnology as a further attempt to 
establish the inferiority of non-Westerners. In reply he argues that: 
ce qui serait anormal c’est que les chercheurs non Occidentaux ne 
s’inquiètent pas du triomphe de la ‘manière de dogmatisme’ que le 
structuralisme actualise et qui, à partir de leurs sociétés et de leurs mythes, 
plonge l’agent social qu’est l’homme dans le silence, l’y oubliant presque 
avec bonheur, ou mette très haut un métalangage au désavantage des 
rapports et de la vie des hommes. (p. 99)251 
Among other objections we may note that: first, there is no break in the social 
histories which yield this conceptual evolution; it is continuous with the same 
structures that created and supported the problems.252 Secondly, it is a 
continuation of the denial, or ignorance, that there are elements of Africa which 
cannot be understood through the European experience. Thirdly, it represents a 
refusal to wait and hear what others have to say about the problems of ‘dogmatic’ 
science, instead trying simply to give the answer (which is itself a sign of 
dogmatism). Fourthly, it is a continuing preoccupation with truth and validity 
rather than position and history.253 
In order to correct the excesses of colonial science, new rules are brought into 
play about what counts as a good discourse, but once more these are posited on 
Western terms. Cultural relativism is proposed as an answer, before the other has 
even been ‘allowed’ to consider the form and content of the question. What is 
given is another account of ‘the’ problem and another definition of ‘the’ solution, 
when what is needed is the space within which the formerly colonized may start 
(and continue indefinitely) to redefine themselves.254 
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The most important element of Mudimbé’s prognosis for African science is that 
Africans themselves must move to regain their parole, and this must be a true 
activity. It is not simply a question of their occupying different epistemic 
positions, and therefore having different perspectives on reality, from Westerners, 
but it is also a matter of coming to terms with colonial alienation, i.e. the negation 
of the colonized individual’s subjectivity. True independence cannot be given, in 
the same way that a sufferer of mental illness cannot just be given her/his sanity, 
but it must be taken up for oneself through an assertion of one’s subjectivity.255 
To make sense of this, we are given a passage from Sartre:  
Le chemin qui mène à l’indépendance (faire face à ses fantasmes, faire face 
aux hommes) ne peut passer par la dépendance absolue: transfert et 
frustration, promesse au moins tacite — je vous guérirai (je vous libérerai; 
vous serez maître d’un savoir…) — attente d’une permission.256 
And Mudimbé concludes that ‘c’est que la relation doit éclater’ (p. 192). True 
emancipation, true recovery requires autonomous activity, which in principle 
cannot be given. Thus, the freedom offered by new forms of Western theory in 
fact represents a continuation of colonizing discourse insofar as it sets up new 
norms and rules which are exterior to the colonized subject: once again it is the 
‘attente d’une permission’. 
J.-C. Willame comments thus: 
c’est donc parce qu’il est un dit d’autrui  —  le critère de la scientificité ici 
importe peu  —  que ce nouveau discours ne peut être retenu. Langage 
‘fou’? L’auteur le reconnaît volontiers. Mais cette prise de position, ce 
témoignage lui apparaît indispensable pour mettre terme à l’aliénation 
coloniale et néo-coloniale. (‘L’Autre face du royaume ou le meurtre du 
père’, p. 93) 
What I believe Mudimbé is getting at is that any theory that Africans can 
currently articulate is necessarily ‘colonized’ in advance, since it will invariably 
be a continuation of colonial history. Thus even the most careful and open-
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minded perspective can be accused of complicity with the colonizer. As 
Christopher Miller says: ‘Within this system, the specter of legitimation, elitism, 
and dominance is naturally omnipresent, and all positions are ambiguous’ (The 
Surreptitious Speech, p. 433). True Africanity quite simply is not something that 
can be known from the current perspective, but will only be knowable in the post-
revolutionary era, when the African psyche has been restructured. This is how I 
interpret the following extract: 
la réadaptation de notre psychisme après les violences subies [… est] le 
problème majeur [….]  C’est de cette entreprise que dépend aujourd’hui et 
dépendra demain la pertinence des attitudes que nous pouvons développer 
face aux endémies qui nous viennent d’ailleurs ou que nous créons nous-
mêmes, qu’elles soient de nature économique, politique ou idéologique. (p. 
13) 
The pertinence of one’s stance against undue Western influence depends upon a 
‘psychic reorganization’. A text by Herbert Marcuse provides enlightenment at 
this point:  
The wants of liberated men and the enjoyment of their satisfaction will have 
a different form from wants and satisfaction in a state of unfreedom, even if 
they are physiologically the same. (‘On Hedonism’, p. 182) 
And this is because 
these wants and interests themselves, and not merely their gratification, 
already contain the stunted growth, the repression, and the untruth with 
which men grow up in class society. (Ibid., p. 168) 
We may explain this by returning to the arguments of section 4.3.3. In order to 
know the true interests which bind us to solidary action, it is necessary first to 
divest oneself of one’s interests, needs and desires as they have been constructed 
through the present forms of social existence. Freedom is not just a matter of 
being able to have what one wants, but primarily of being able to see clearly what 
it is that one wants. Or rather, it is existing in a space where one’s wants develop 
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in harmony with one’s true interests (but there is no guarantee that the latter are 
perceptible from one’s current perspective). 
Here is the reason why Mudimbé emphasizes ‘cette norme importante: l’arrêt 
sur nous-mêmes, ou plus précisément, un retour constant sur ce que nous sommes 
avec une ferveur et une attention particulières, accordées à notre milieu 
archéologique …’ (p. 14). 
6.4.3 Folie 
Might the folie of Mudimbé’s text, as the Sophoclean epigraph suggests, be no 
more than a futile form of vengeance?257 In fact, Mudimbé’s proposal to effect an 
excommunication majeure from Western scientific culture may not be so ‘fou’ as 
it appears at first sight. The folie supposedly resides in the decision to reject, or at 
least to extricate oneself from, a discourse of a certain origin, when this discourse 
is eminently scientific and truth-loving. 
As with the discussion of convergence above, there is no question of a 
relativism about truth here; the debate is not about whether truth is single or 
multiple, but whether the production of truth-statements is or is not a deeply 
political enterprise. It is a confrontation with, on the one hand, the difference 
between the form and content of a discourse (i.e. the methodology, theoretical 
framework and the actual enunciation), and, on the other hand, the meta-theory 
which interprets that discourse and the context which nourishes it. For example, it 
is perfectly possible to approach philosophical problems from a realist perspective 
without having fixed the status of one’s discourse. That is to say, from the fact 
that one adopts a realist stance with regard to the existence of truth, we are not 
committed to believe that we are emitting the discourse, telling the truth in the 
only way it can be told. All we are committed to is the objective reality of truth, 
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that the way the world is ‘ne dépend aucunement de mon caprice’.258 It is still 
assumed that there is a single truth to be apprehended, the difference lies in the 
way that we believe we are related to it. Thus one can be philosophical realist, as I 
believe Mudimbé is, yet still contend that 
l’universalité ne peut exister qu’à partir d’une expérience critique et 
permanente d’une authenticité singulière … (L’Autre Face du Royaume, 
p.136) 
But an authentic African discourse must involve a ‘bracketing’ of what is 
Western, even if it is ‘right’, and a reprisal (re-taking) of original speech.259 Such 
a strategy appears folly because, while the space for such a manoeuvre does not 
exist, it appears as if Mudimbé simply wants to reject the truth that Western 
science offers, without having anything to put in its place. In response to this 
concern, I cite Marcuse:  
insofar as unfreedom is already present in wants and not just in their 
gratification, they must be the first to be liberated — not through an act of 
education or of the moral renewal of man but through an economic and 
political process encompassing the disposal over the means of production by 
the community. (Negations, p. 193) 
It is not just that Africans must replace colonial discourse with their own, 
authentic discourse, but that they must cause a rupture which will close the 
colonial discourse and prevent a neo-colonial recuperation of their efforts.260 In 
the present context, where relations have been structured and maintained through 
(neo-)colonial domination, even the most seemingly nationalist of endeavours can 
betray a sense of the noxious odeur. Effectively, then, Mudimbé projects ‘une 
utopie se réduisant à une prise de parole’ (p. 86): freedom and authenticity are not 
defined but are projected into a void, a new space within which they can be 
reconceived without fear that one is merely picking crumbs from the colonial 
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platter. Having said that, we are given a clear idea of how Africans are to navigate 
towards this emptiness: 
en commençant par cerner, d’abord et rigoureusement, ceux qui sont, en 
vérité, les tendances réelles de nos sociétés et les expressions les plus 
concrètes de nos contradictions d’hommes situés en un temps et un espace 
donnés. (Ibid.) 
Another aspect of the ‘folie’ consists in the discursive doubling that Mudimbé 
must use in order to situate himself with respect to the ‘utopia’ he posits. 
Essentially, this is a recapitulation of the theme of the final section of chapter 4, 
regarding ‘racial’ violence: the need to simultaneously utilize and disavow certain 
categories which are found to be ideologically suspect and scientifically 
inaccurate, but which are also politically meaningful.  
If it is accepted that terms like ‘the West’ do not accurately (or neutrally) 
describe the real state of the world and simply to use them brings into play some 
dangerous ideas, then the fact that Mudimbé makes use of this category appears to 
trap him within the very coils of the ruse he hopes to escape. On the other hand, 
such terms are in common use: if ‘the West’ does not exist in the world in quite 
the same way as it is talked about, nevertheless we may say that it also has an 
‘ideal’, or perhaps ‘ideological’ reality. Since the categories are active within our 
minds, we may be sure that they also have some political reality. In order to be 
able to theorize this aspect of reality, it is therefore important to be able to handle 
these concepts, inadequate as they may be. The African theorist must still theorize 
‘Western discourse’ as such, in order to be free of it, for though it does not exist 
as such, it still ensnares him; paradoxically, to give up the ability to do so is itself 
a snare of Western discourse.261 
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6.5 Conclusion: The Invention of Africa 
Much of this chapter was oriented around the argument that neutrality cannot 
consist in the total text which says everything from every perspective, any more 
than it could consist in perfect abstraction from all perspectives. Indeed, the 
conclusion I am leading up to is that neutrality cannot consist in texts at all, but 
must be something about the general way in which we orient our reading and 
writing practices. Neutrality consists in our openness before the possibility of an 
other text which might compete with and displace our own, or more radically, 
which just could not be calibrated against our own. 
This vision must be strongly linked to a particular idea about truth. For if we 
believe that truths are, in some sense, already out there just waiting to be 
apprehended, and also that the only tool needed for their apprehension is the 
universal, abstract reason which acts as some sort of ‘truth-detector’, then there is 
no point in being open to another’s point of view, except insofar as s/he might be 
a better logician.262 But if we accept that when we discourse we are doing 
something really creative, and that the position from which we speak substantially 
influences what we say and how we say it, and if we also accept that even in 
relation to a single, indivisible truth there may be better perspectives from which 
to apprehend it (and, furthermore, that there is no safe, neutral position from 
which to discern which is the best perspective) then it becomes imperative that we 
are open to other discourses: it is a matter of our rational survival. 
It should be remarked that this position is a long way, indeed as far as possible, 
from naïve relativism about truth, because if there were not some fact of the 
matter (i.e. objective truth), rather than just many different and arbitrarily 
different accounts, then there could be nothing that we could genuinely miss out 
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on by ignoring other perspectives (except the spice of variety). If there is 
something genuinely at stake then the imperative to listen is really a co-operative 
attempt to get to this something. Hence the importance of ‘le maintien et 
l’épanouissement par l’adaptation […] d’expériences socio-historiques 
singulières’ (L’Odeur du Père, p. 11). 
This conclusion is in line with Mudimbé’s argument about the convergence of 
irreconcilable scientific or religious positions. Convergence is only conceivable 
because it is held that there is a single truth, but that this truth can be only 
imperfectly comprehended in a limited, partial way; without this attitude, not only 
would we have no reason to seek to reconcile competing theories, but we would 
also have no way of contending with false ones. 
But there is also a danger of asserting a binary opposition which leads us to a 
doctrine of unexamined partiality versus unexamined neutrality.263 Mudimbé 
wants an open, reflective partiality which, because it is non-totalizing, leaves the 
way open for a multiple neutrality, for it is obvious that true neutrality cannot be 
represented unilaterally. 
Another focus point of this chapter was the use of terms like ‘modern’ and the 
difficulties that are engendered when one is not careful about the baggage they 
carry with them. For although we may attempt to use the concept of ‘modernity’ 
in a neutral way, it is already loaded with dangerous ideology. Either it 
presupposes contraries like ‘traditional’, ‘developing’, underdeveloped’, etc., 
thereby continuing a Eurocentric view of development, or it is so vague and 
diffuse a concept that it distinguishes nothing and says nothing much about 
anything. In the end we may fairly ask: why bother with the concept at all? Why 
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should we constrain ourselves to a defense of African modernity, any more than 
an acceptance of African primitiveness? 
But it is probably counter-productive for the African theorist to give up the term 
(whose use will certainly continue elsewhere), since it describes a reality, a real 
system of inequalities and constraints, that is, of both quantitative and qualitative 
differences between the ‘developed world’ and the ‘developing world’. The use of 
the term ‘modern’ is ideological not because it connotes profound difference (for 
the difference exists, though not in so clear cut a way), but because it suggests 
that the difference is normal, natural or essential. The term may indicate its 
historical context but only in an impoverished way, as it points to a single linear 
path of development and substitutes the very particular for the universal. If we are 
to use ‘modern’ in the historical sense of the term (rather than just meaning 
‘contemporary’) then Africa can never become modern, any more than America 
can be part of the Roman Empire. Africa can only be modernized — a 
simulacrum of modernity. If we use ‘modern’ in the third sense, to make a socio-
cultural distinction, then we are obviously presupposing some sort of Eurocentric 
view of development.264 
Next, we examined the literacy criterion stipulated by Hountondji in his 
discussion of what African philosophy should be. It was argued that Hountondji’s 
concepts of literacy and philosophy seem rather narrow, that it is not obvious that 
literacy is a necessary condition for science, as he claims, and that his analysis of 
the type of social organization which develops through literacy is too simplistic. 
The last section continued with a discussion of the social and theoretical 
frameworks which enclose African discourses and considered a way in which 
apparently competing languages may be reconceived as different expressions of 
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the same truth. This approach preserves the fundamental irreducibility of different 
ways of life, while also enabling those whose existence spans the cultural divide 
to preserve the essential elements of both cultures, without compromising either. 
From there we went on to develop the theme of the écart, a subject which was 
broached in the preceding chapter. We discussed the argument that in order for 
Africans to arrive at a truly authentic African discourse the most important 
condition is that they bring about a kind of rupture between the Western 
discursive space and their own. By opening up a sort of negative space, a utopian 
‘prise de parole’, Africans will be able to redefine (indefinitely) the problems that 
they face and to begin to look for solutions that are primarily relevant to their 
environments. 
One of the paradoxes of this position is that Mudimbé must thereby recognize 
that he is himself speaking from a position of compromise; he is speaking from a 
wholly transitional state. Hence, I believe, his refusal to give positive content to 
terms like ‘authenticity’ and the ‘odeur’; instead he accepts ‘ “le complexe de 
Tirésias”: cette capacité de pouvoir assumer, dans la virginité de la parole et la 
folie d’un espoir, l’activité et la force de la subjectivité face à l’histoire’ (pp. 201-
2).265 
It seems appropriate to close this final analytical chapter with these words from 
Chinua Achebe: 
You have all heard of the African personality, of African democracy, of the 
African way to socialism, of negritude, and so on. They are all props we 
have fashioned at different times to help us get on our feet again. Once we 
are up, we shan’t need any of them any more. But for the moment it is in the 
nature of things that we may need to counter racism with what Jean-Paul 
Sartre has called an antiracist racism, to announce not just that we are as 
good as the next man but that we are much better. (Morning Yet on Creation 
Day, pp. 71-2) 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 La Philosophie Africaine? 
It was in the search for an answer to the question Qu’est-ce que la philosophie 
africaine? that we started by looking at two apparently contradictory approaches. 
The first type we considered, exemplified by the evocative writings of Léopold 
Senghor, whittles the question down to the issue of racial essence. African 
philosophy is the philosophy which permeates African culture and can therefore 
only be created by Africans. The term ‘African’ is taken to mean something 
stronger than merely being a national of an African state: it is more like being an 
‘ethnic African’, or, as Senghor put it, a négro-africain. 
Paulin Hountondji, the author of the second approach, argues that African 
philosophy need not be intrinsically African, indeed he doubts whether anything 
at all can be intrinsically African, if that is to imply having a racial essence. The 
Africanness of a text is nothing more than the Africanness of the author, and does 
not determine philosophical content: it follows from this that any sort of text can 
be African, provided its author is. Furthermore, this Africanness is not taken to be 
an essence, nor does it consist in a particular culture, it is the mere fact of whether 
someone is or is not an African national, or rather a citizen of an African state. 
These two approaches rely on two very different ideas of philosophy. The first 
represents philosophy as something of a collective nature which inheres in our 
cultures, that is, in our day-to-day activities, arts and literature, rituals, proverbs 
and general outlook on life. We may be philosophical without realizing because 
the philosophical structures are always already imbedded in our languages and 
ways of life. Thus it is possible to find out about a people’s philosophy by 
examining their social interactions, folktales, customs, sayings, the structure of 
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their language, and so on. Since one’s essence determines one’s basic 
philosophical beliefs, which in turn determine one’s culture, the ‘authentic’ 
philosophy of a people will expose the metaphysical roots which give that people 
their essence, and thus their identity. 
Hountondji’s account holds that this concept of philosophy is both mistaken and 
wildly misleading, being founded in part on a confusion of the different senses of 
the word ‘philosophy’. What has been described above, it is argued, is not 
philosophy in any strong sense, but a hypertrophic culturalism which preys on a 
select range of philosophical terminology. To construe philosophy as a substratum 
of culture is to render the concept diffuse: if philosophy could exist in the 
unconscious workings of the mind, then even animals might be credited with 
philosophical wisdom. 
Hountondji objects that it is not an unconscious, collective phenomenon which 
constitutes the discipline of philosophy as it is practised in universities across the 
world. On the contrary, the strict use of the term refers to the never-ending, but 
teleologically guided, construction of rigorous critical texts. These are texts which 
discuss issues such as freedom, the self, the problem of good and evil, the forms 
of logic, and so on. Academic philosophers tend to be keenly and meticulously 
critical both of themselves and of their fellows. The texts they produce, therefore, 
rely to a great extent on individual, conscious reflection. Understood in this way, 
philosophy is a universal discipline, identical in all countries and in essence 
incapable of being split into African and European varieties. Unconscious 
collective philosophies can only be impossible figments of the Africanists’ 
imaginations: they cannot exist because any philosophy requires the conscious 
production of critical texts by individual thinkers. 
 249
7.2 African Identity and Colonial Influence 
We have also shown how the two writers respond to the issue of the revaluation 
of African identities. Senghor attempts an ecstatic celebration of the culture 
négro-africaine, which is impressive but fatally flawed. His critics generally agree 
that Négritude played a valuable role as the first high-profile movement directed 
by Africans which intended to reassess the role of the African in the modern 
world. But there was no profound questioning of the colonial categories of 
thought which justified European invasion and exploitation of Africa on 
‘universalist’, humanist grounds. Concepts of racial difference were not brought 
into question, but were re-evaluated, their order turned upside-down. Hence, 
Négritude was not quite the discourse of African emancipation that was hoped 
for; the only difference between Négritude’s tenets and those of colonialism is 
that the former ostensibly represent colonizer and colonized as equal (though still 
opposite) parties. Admittedly, this has the virtue of clearing the way for dialogue 
between the two sides, since it is henceforth assumed that the colonized people 
has something to say. But another consequence is that African reason is supposed 
a priori to be of a different type from that of the colonizer: the price of equal 
status seems to be an inevitable mutual incomprehension. 
Hountondji is not interested in the mythologization of the African proposed by 
Senghor, and it appears that he does not choose to fight Western dominance 
through ideology but through the abstractions of academic philosophy. However, 
the oppositional structure of this reading of the two writers is deeply flawed, and 
in chapter 4 we paused to consider whether the debate is really so dualistic and 
clear-cut as we have made out. It was said in defence of Senghor’s position that 
the stress he placed on the existence and role of the putative African essence was 
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not merely gratuitous, but, on the contrary, was intended to address the needs of 
Africans during what was experienced as a time of crisis for African identities. 
Négritude was an attempt to redress the perception of Africans as backward, non-
rational, or otherwise inferior to white Europeans.  
Having said this, the criticisms that Hountondji makes of Négritude, Africanists 
and ethnologists are largely fair and accurate. In launching his critique, and in 
offering his own ideas, Hountondji is himself responding to a perceived historical 
imperative: namely, that African philosophers do not need to be told what they are 
and must be in essence, they do not require the systematic a priori determination 
of their discipline; rather, they need the political and conceptual space in which to 
formulate their own questions and manners of response in ways analogous, but 
not identical, to those of Western philosophical circles. What Hountondji tries to 
bring to the debate is the sort of systematic rigour that he believes should 
characterize philosophy everywhere, despite having been practiced chiefly in the 
West. 
The terms of the comparison of Senghor and Hountondji were partly set by the 
particular focus of our own interests in the subject, but this same focus 
unavoidably distorts the relationship between the protagonists. Rather than 
opposition, the concept of supercession represents with greater accuracy their 
position relative to each other. For not only does Hountondji react critically 
against the Négritude movement, but he also takes for granted ways of thinking 
that may only have become open as a direct consequence of the historical 
developments of which Négritude was a key expression. For example, Hountondji 
does not believe it necessary to argue that Africans are capable of philosophy, nor 
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even that African philosophy exists (‘la philosophie africaine […] existe, c’est 
indiscutable’, Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, p. 12). 
7.3 The Ruse 
7.3.1 Violence 
One of the conclusions drawn in chapter 2 was that Senghor’s texts are in some 
way quite desperately politically naïve: he appears to refuse to face the facts of 
conflict and radical inequalities based on racial concepts. He also appears to 
renounce all serious attempts to criticize colonialism (‘la France n’a pas à justifier 
ses conquêtes coloniales. […] Elle doit seulement concilier ses intérêts et ceux 
des autochthones’, Liberté 1, p. 40). 
 Similarly, Hountondji’s position is also in danger of being too quiet on issues 
of inequality. His conviction that there exists only one sort of reason and only one 
sort of philosophy leaves out of the picture the history of exclusion of non-whites 
from the realm of reason. 
However, when we looked at theories which try to carry out a critique of the 
violence that characterizes colonialism it seemed as if, by doing so, they 
necessitate the use of categories such as ‘the West’ and ‘the dominant culture’. 
Recycling such terms maintains the sort of binary opposition (e.g. West/other) 
which we are struggling to undo. Without seriously bringing into question the 
cogency of all categorical identities it is impossible to go further than Négritude, 
i.e. a re-ordering of values which is essentially limited to a ‘Narcissistic’ phase of 
reaction. Yet by abandoning a strong reading of terms such as ‘the West’ (i.e. a 
reading that allows us to say how the West dominates Africa), it seems that we 
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give up the possibility of articulating a coherent critique of neo-colonial 
domination. 
This is exactly what Mudimbé means when he refers to the ruse: a discursive 
trap, such that even when trying to criticize the West we end up by unwittingly re-
asserting its importance. In some way our discourse is already ‘colonized’ in 
advance, and it either undermines itself or finds itself powerless. This problem 
was also expressed in the section on racial violence, where it was argued that to 
continue to use the terms of racial difference was to continue to realize one of the 
preconditions for racial violence of all kinds. Only by reaching a point where 
racial violence becomes literally unthinkable, where the objective absurdity of the 
category permeates our subjectivity, will the violence ever truly end. 
Yet at the same time it is unreasonable to expect that we can directly give up the 
language of racial categorization, for it enables us to describe those aspects of 
reality which are still experienced through such categories. Practical experience, 
shaped by concepts which are ratified by society, undermines the rigour of theory 
and forces us to continue talking in terms of racial classification which have no 
objective claim on our speech. 
7.3.2 Folie 
When Mudimbé advocates an African excommunication from Western social 
discourses, to the extent that African discourse might henceforth be truly 
authentic (i.e. an activity grounded in one’s autonomy, springing from local 
‘conditions de possibilité’, and regardless of the truth or falsity of Western 
discourse), he tries to reconcile theory and praxis, re-inscribing value into how 
something is said, who says it, and from where. 
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But the folie also runs deeper, for he persists in talking about entities, such as 
‘the West’, whose existence has already been brought into question. In effect, the 
African theorist must in some sense project his discourse into a void, or limbo-
like space: s/he must treat ‘the West’ as if it were simultaneously present and 
absent. It is absent because we know that it does not exist in the singular way we 
are often drawn to think and speak of it; but it is present precisely because it is 
thought and spoken of in this way. The concept is politically active, even if it 
refers to no specific objective reality. The void-like quality of this discursive 
space consists in the irresolvable tension that this strategy generates — neither 
from our current position, still squeezed within the coils of neo-colonialism, nor 
from the projected perspective of an accomplished revolution does it entirely 
make sense — hence it is something of a psychosis, a pathology to be undergone. 
The allusion to the ‘complexe de Tirésias’ suggests that we undergo this 
linguistic splitting because what we are really trying to achieve is an 
understanding of reality not as it actually appears to us but as it might, if we could 
effect a re-ordering of society which would allow ‘la réadaptation de notre 
psychisme’. In the meantime, we must use the categories we possess to describe 
the world as we currently experience it, while bearing in mind that our 
conclusions are to be continually brought into question.266 
7.4 Possible Further Development of the Thesis 
One of the conclusions that appears to have developed by the end of this thesis is 
that the idea of there somehow being two ‘sides’ to colonialism, the idea that we 
can neatly and with a good conscience designate the oppressors and the victims, 
the agents and the patients, is quite wrong and painfully misleading. Such a clear-
cut division, if ever it was feasible, could only have been applicable to the state of 
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affairs at the very beginning of colonialism, when factors such as inter-cultural 
influence and marriage, and global trade networks and corporations (which 
transcend, and perhaps dissolve, national boundaries) were less significant. By 
comparison, the state of the world today is a complete flux, and it seems 
increasingly difficult to designate social groups that can meaningfully and 
accurately be described as ‘dominant’. 
In fact, even this conclusion is to a considerable extent shaped by the limits of 
space and time which have been imposed on this thesis. If I had been able to 
justify, and do justice to, a more substantial digression then my answer would 
have been that there were never two sides, that such a categorization of historical 
agents and such an analysis of historical events are in all cases too simplistic and 
disregard the important details of the matter. This response, which I suspect to be 
true but cannot yet substantiate, would have been backed up and contextualized 
with extended research which has not been possible for the present work. On the 
other hand, it is not difficult to suggest an initial direction that such research could 
take, and this is the subject of the final few sections below. 
7.4.1 Complicity 
First, I would like to determine whether it is true that some Africans, perhaps 
whole societies or social groups, were complicit in the selling of other Africans to 
European slave traders (and to what extent, if any, slavery was already practised 
among Africans). Clearly this issue is of some importance, as it brings into 
question the assumption of African solidarity, which is the assumption that, as 
victims of European brutality, all Africans suffered from a common cause and 
were constrained to a single destiny. 
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An associated question is to what extent there existed inter-ethnic conflicts in 
Africa before the advent of slavery and colonization. Once more, it is a matter of 
doubting the assumption that the pre-colonial era was some kind of golden age for 
Africa, and that the wave of colonial violence and terror crashed upon and 
submerged what had previously been a land of peace and harmony. It seems quite 
likely that inter-ethnic conflicts and rivalries may have been invisible to the 
foreign eyes of Europeans who often perceived only an undifferentiated mass of 
savagery. 
The reason such questions are important is that they enable us to begin to 
disencumber ourselves from the sort of ‘charity’ which portrays all Africans as 
victims of single fate which was imposed on them from outside and over which 
they had no control. The concomitant idea, arriving silently beside its partner but 
all the more powerful for its silence, is that pre-colonial Africans were not social 
agents, that, along with colonialism, history burst upon the continent and washed 
the inhabitants into the modern era.267 
As an equal and opposite inquiry, I would want to investigate the actual states of 
affairs within so-called colonial societies, as they were before, during, and after 
colonialism. For I imagine that there must also have been dissension, and 
indifference, within these societies with respect to the motives, projects, and ends 
of colonialism. Was there ever a single Enlightenment voice, or is this itself an 
Enlightenment myth that has been taken up by critics of Western discourse? How 
can we talk of the Western, humanist tradition, in the singular? 
7.4.2 Complacency 
Colonialism has become an established fact, by which I mean that everyone 
seems to know what happened with more or less precision, and everyone seems 
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sure of exactly how and why it is wrong. Yet such confidence and such certainty 
are themselves reasons for careful inquiry. Colonialism is a social system and 
social systems only work (in the sense that a machine ‘works’) if everyone does 
what s/he is expected to do. Since people inevitably do not always do as they are 
told, as they are taught, or as they are compelled, the social machine never even 
comes close to perfect functioning, and insofar as theories of social movement are 
elegant and rational, to the same extent they are ideal abstractions from society as 
it is, or could be. 
As we move further into an era which is ostensibly post-colonial, to assume that 
modalities of oppression can be unambiguously theorized under rubrics of race, or 
even social groupings like ‘Africa’, ‘the West’, and so on, is to help oneself to 
quite a substantial presupposition. When modern institutions of power 
automatically wear egalitarian colours in office, how may we unequivocally 
assume that when a person is oppressed or dispossessed, the violence is 
committed upon her/him qua a minority subject, and how may we unequivocally 
unmask the holder of power?268  
7.4.3 Colonialism/Imperialism 
It is assumed that we know what colonialism is, and therefore that we know what 
are we criticizing when we condemn it. Similarly, we assume that we know that 
colonialism is over. But I wonder, what exactly is over? What is, or was, 
colonialism? For instance, was the former system of apartheid also colonialism, or 
was it a crisis internal to the South African state? 
Sometimes it is thought just to say that although colonialism — i.e. physical 
occupation of land — is over, imperialism remains. Indeed, it is a valid point and 
a useful direction for inquiry: as both Mudimbé and Hountondji argue, the modes 
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of Western dominance are hard to perceive, self-propagating, and grow 
abundantly within African social space. But if colonization is the occupation and 
control of another’s space, then perhaps looking into the concept of space will 
allow us a more fecund critique of the relations between Africa and the rest of the 
world. 
On the other hand, in what sense may we say that Western societies are, or 
were, imperial societies? How can we make such blanket statements? For 
although we may admit, Socratically, that if one suffers to remain in her/his native 
land then s/he tacitly accepts to abide by its rules and be judged according to its 
laws,269 it is quite clear that there never was (and probably never will be) the sort 
of wholesale consensus that would constitute a bona fide social contract. 
Analogously, it may be said that every member of a colonial society is complicit 
with that society’s enterprises, especially insofar as s/he, knowingly or 
unknowingly, enjoys the material and psychical advantages that it confers; 
nevertheless, this complicity is not necessarily either conscious or active (as the 
colonized individual’s responses are actively complicit, as defined by Fanon and 
Memmi). So we may wish to criticize the modern Westerner’s integration within 
a network of social forces which maintains Western power, wealth, and 
‘development’, while simultaneously marginalizing, impoverishing, and retarding 
countries of the ‘Third World’. But at the same time, it is unrealistic, and 
ultimately pointless, to posit the average white, middle-class, male, office worker 
in the West as the dominant opposite of poor black African farmer. Indeed, we 
might suspect that the problem in such cases is really not one of domination, 
active or passive (whatever the latter could mean), but a problem of estrangement: 
a powerlessness on both sides, which, although establishing vast differences in 
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standard of living, is ultimately sad because it precludes common understanding 
of the factors which structure our selves and direct our lives, and hence human 
solidarity. 
7.4.4 Language 
Fanon says that in speaking a language one takes on the whole weight of the 
civilization behind it. By contrast, Marcien Towa argues that language is an 
empty receptacle. Is Towa writing from a very Western (e.g. Lockean) 
perspective, reflecting a culture which has not had to fight through linguistically 
constructed barriers of oppression and misrepresentation? 
Likewise, Donald Davidson says, in rebutting the notion of alternative 
conceptual schemes, that if we could not assign credible explanation to a 
creature’s utterances than we could not ascribe to that creature linguistic ability 
(and hence intelligence). But, in history, things have worked the other way 
around. Through denying a priori the intelligence or humanity of certain classes 
of human beings, dominant groups have managed to ignore or silence the 
rationality of their speech. 
Kwasi Wiredu also comments that ‘the very conceptual frameworks of our 
lucubrations are in many ways those that are embedded in the foreign languages 
in which we have been trained. Who and what, then, are we?’ (Cultural 
Universals and Particulars, p.147). Other theorists take this point even further: 
Every time we speak or write in English, French, German, or another 
dominant European language, we pay homage to Western intellectual and 
political hegemony.270 
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But why should this be so? Like cultures, languages are also heterogeneous — 
with different accents, dialects, grammar, semantics, syntax, registers, and so 
forth. 
7.5 Conclusion 
It is immensely important to enagage with the problems that are raised within the 
area of African philosophy. One of the first concerns of this area is the 
fundamental question of the nature of philosophy, a question which, due to the 
specificities of Africa’s history, forces the discipline to take account of socio-
historical context. On the one hand, philosophy must come to terms with the role 
it has played in the justification of colonial exploitation and the fact that many of 
the greatest exponents of what was supposed to be a neutral, universal discourse 
have actually been highly partial and ethnocentric. On the other hand, the growing 
interest in traditional forms of thought and the possibility of different types of 
reason necessitates a re-examination of the discipline’s boundaries, and could 
even lead to a complete revolution in what we take to be ‘philosophy’. 
Whether or not this will be the case, an immediate effect of African involvement 
within international philosophical circles is to bring the discipline into a closer 
rapport with the political environment, for ‘le sort de la philosophie est liée à celui 
de la liberté’.271 In a continent that has undergone and continues to undergo 
dramatic, and often extremely violent political upheavals, it is increasingly 
important to put into practice those skills which can promote clear thinking and 
clear speaking, the primary basis for effective communication and mutual 
comprehension. When the structures of African societies frequently change, for 
better or for worse, what other discipline is capable of addressing simultaneously 
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the legal, economic, political, and ethical demands of many and diverse social 
groups? 
And if a fair number of the problems that have occupied African philosophers 
so far seem to take the form of irresolvable conundrums that go round and round 
in circles, this fact only fairly reflects the current state of our (global) societies. 
The profound (and, I think, irresolvable) difficulty in deciding, and then proving, 
exactly what is colonial or neo-colonial influence is only one aspect of a world 
that seems unable to come to terms with its ultimate unity, particularly in the face 
of moral and political issues whose deep complexity is finally revealed as we start 
to bring into doubt old, comfortable cultural essentialisms and ethnocentric 
reduction. Other aspects might include: the moral status of international military 
intervention, concerns about globalization, the distinction between armed struggle 
for freedom and terrorism, problems of immigration, and modern questions of 
national identity. 
At the same time, it is obvious that there is a reason to engage with these issues 
only so long as we believe that we can actually come closer to resolving them. Or 
perhaps resolution is too difficult a goal, or of the wrong order. For indeed, what 
Mudimbé offers us is not so much a solution or a resolution, as a suggestion for a 
path to take, which might lead us to find a fresh perspective. It is ‘“l’aventure” 
contre “la science”, l’incertitude contre la sécurité intellectuelle’; and for Africans 
it is also: 
une promesse, celle de pouvoir produire ‘une science du dedans’, celle de 
s’intégrer dans la complexité véritable des formations sociales africaines et 
de les assumer, non plus comme des calques de l’histoire occidentale mais 
en leur specificité culturelle et historique; c’est concevoir l’Afrique comme 
pouvant être autre chose qu’une marge de l’Occident et donc comme 
pouvant prétendre à un autre avenir que celui de zone sous-développée, 
garante du développement de l’Occident; c’est enfin, et surtout, vouloir que 
les sciences sociales ne soient pas seulement des collectrices d’informations 
dites objectives mais qu’elles soient, de manière réelle, revélatrices de 
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mouvance sociale et lieux d’une prise permanente de conscience et de 
parole. (L’Odeur du Père, p. 57) 
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 See Senghor’s Pierre Teilhard de Chardin et la politique africaine and Teilhard de Chardin’s 
Sauvons l’humanité (same volume). 
82
 The Bantus are generally taken to inhabit southern, eastern and central Africa. This is not, then, 
a single society, but the languages of the Bantu are supposed to derive from the same linguistic 
family: hence one of the justifications for this categorisation. 
83
 Alexis Kagame, La Philosophie bantu-rwandaise de l’être (Brussels: [n. pub.], 1956); Kwame 
Nkrumah, Consciencism (London: Heinemann, 1964); Alioune Diop ‘Niam M’Paya ou de la fin 
que dévorent les moyens’, preface to La Philosophie bantoue. Hountondji credits Nkrumah as the 
originator of the term ‘ethnophilosophy’. See ‘From the Ethnosciences to Ethnophilosophy: 
Kwame Nkrumah’s Thesis Project’ in Research in African Literatures 28.4 (1997), pp. 112-120. 
84
 Hountondji supplies what he calls ‘une bibliographie minimale’ of African philosophy on p. 12, 
note 1. On p. 53, note 1, he refers us to Alphonse Smet’s Bibliographie de la pensée africaine, in 
Cahiers philosophiques africains, 2 (July-December, 1972), Lubumbashi. 
85
 Towa adds: ‘Mais on peut dire autant des autres ethnophilosophes. D’une façon générale, la liste 
des ethnophilosophes et celle des théologiens africains coïncident à peu de choses près.’ in 
‘Conditions d’une affirmation …’, p. 343. 
86
 E.g.: ‘Celui qui prétend que les primitifs ne possèdent point de système de pensée, les rejette 
d’office de la classe des hommes’, in La Philosophie bantoue, p. 15. 
87
 Cf. La Philosophie bantoue, p. 123. 
88
 This is because the sources are supposed to be implicitly philosophical; see Sur la ‘philosophie 
africaine’, pp. 32-3. For a discussion of why Hountondji rejects this claim, see the next section, on 
Hountondji’s own concept of philosophy. For a defence of ethnophilosophical methodology, see 
Oyenka Owomoyela, ‘Africa and the Imperative of Philosophy: A Skeptical Consideration’, in 
African Philosophy: The Essential Readings, pp. 156-186. 
89
 Hence Tempels: ‘Si les Bantous possèdent une philosophie définie, une sagesse profonde et un 
comportement fondé, nous pourrons peut-être y trouver une base valide sur laquelle il sera 
possible aux Bantous de construire leur civilisation’, La Philosophie bantoue, p. 113. Clearly, with 
such a narrow focus, there is little room for a critical appropriation of Bantu philosophy, for it is 
regarded as an object. 
90
 Fabien Eboussi-Boulaga, referring to Molière’s caricatural bourgeois, who is delighted and 
amazed to learn that all his life he has spoken prose, without realizing. Quoted in Sur la 
‘philosophie africaine’, p. 54.  
91
 Mudimbé deals with such an argument; see L’Odeur du Père, pp. 135-6. See also Aimé Césaire, 
Discours sur le colonialisme, pp. 15, 37-41; and John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Representative 
Government, the Subjection of Women, sections 197-9 and 382. 
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92
 For a more detailed discussion of the links between ethnology and domination, see L’Odeur du 
Père: ‘l’ethnologie ne prend ses dimensions propres que dans la souveraineté historique — 
toujours retenue mais toujours actuelle — de la pensée européenne …’ p. 23; also pp. 44-5, and 
52. 
93
 Compare the following: ‘What one might call the “imputation of community” is one of the 
favoured ways of advancing racist discourse: it is by assigning a “singular plural” — the Jew, the 
Arab, the Bambara, the homosexual — and thus by the negation of individuality that all forms of 
rejection are practiced, Jean-Loup Amselle, ‘Anthropology and Historicity’, trans. by Marjolijn De 
Jager, in African Studies Review, vol. 28, nos 2/3 (1985), 12-31 (p. 27). 
94
 See Marcel Griaule, Griaule, Dieu d’eau: Entretiens avec Ogotemmêli (Paris: Editions du 
Chêne, 1948). Hountondji’s criticisms of Griaule may be found on pp. 91-4, and 101 of Sur la 
‘philosophie africaine’. 
95
 So they are described in the Collins English Dictionary (1998). 
96
 Compare Oyenka Owomoyela: ‘A true African philosophy would aim at reconciling Africans to 
Africaness [sic], not at advocating dissolution in a European cultural mélange’, in African 
Philosophy: The Essential Readings, p. 178. 
97
 In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey, vol. 5, African Philosophy, ed by Guttorm Floistad 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) p. 34. 
98
 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed by Harold Jenkins (London: Methuen, 1982), II, 2, 249-50. 
99
 Arguably, the objection raised through this particular example comes down to another 
terminological confusion, ‘natural philosopher’ simply being synonymous with ‘natural scientist’; 
still it is a matter of fact that the status and role of Western philosophy has greatly changed since 
its ancient hellenic inception, for this reason, if for no other, Keita’s argument merits 
consideration. 
100
 L’Idée d’une philosophie negro-africaine, pp. 24-44. 
101
 Christopher Miller comments that ‘within this system, the specter of legitimation, elitism, and 
dominance is naturally omnipresent, and all positions are ambiguous’, in ‘Alioune Diop and the 
Unfinished Temple of Knowledge’, in The Surreptitious Speech,  pp. 427-434 (p. 433). 
102
 Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, p. 48 (emphasis added). For reservations about Hountondji’s 
commitment to this ‘geographical criterion’, see section 3.4.1, above. 
103
 Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, p. 49. Hountondji discusses this at length in ‘Recapturing’, in 
The Surreptitious Speech, pp. 238-48. 
104
 See also Recherche théorique africaine et contrat de solidarité (Geneva: Institut national 
d’études sociales, 1978). 
105
 Owomoyela in African Philosophy: The Essential Readings, p. 171. 
106
 Cf. bell hooks: ‘The force that allows white authors to make no reference to racial identity in 
their books about “women” that are in actuality about white women is the same one that would 
compel any author writing exclusively on black women to refer explicitly to their racial identity. 
[…] It is the dominant race that reserves itself the luxury of dismissing racial identity while the 
oppressed race is made daily aware of her racial identity.’ In Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and 
Feminism (Boston: South End Press, 1982), p. 138. 
107
 Cf. Oyenka Owomoyela: ‘the mentality that sees superstition and fetish priests in Africa while 
it sees religion and thinkers in Europe, that sees mythology and systems of thought in Africa while 
it sees philosophy in Europe, is kin to that which sees natives, savages and tribes in Africa while it 
sees citizens, civilized peoples and nations in Europe.’, ‘Africa and the Imperative of Philosophy: 
A Skeptical Consideration’, in African Philosophy: The Essential Readings, p. 179. 
108
 Eleni Coundouriotis, Contesting Authenticity: Colonialism, Ethnography and the Novel (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 95. 
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109
 For further discussion on the use of the ‘singular plural’, i.e. natural racial kinds see Albert 
Memmi, Portrait du colonisé, p. 106; see also Sur la ‘philosophie africaine’, pp. 226-8 for 
Hountondji’s discussion of the ‘singulier trompeur’, la civilisation africaine. 
110
 Once again, it is Senghor’s penchant for etymology that leads him to rely on the term 
‘sympathetic’; a more natural English translation might be ‘empathic understanding’. See section 
2.2. 
111
 Cf. ‘L’Esthétique négro-africaine’, Liberté 1, pp. 202-17. See also the second chapter of the 
present work for a discussion of the issues recapitulated above. 
112
 Léopold Senghor, ‘Négritude and African Socialism’, in St. Anthony’s Papers (repr.), The 
African Philosophy Reader, pp. 438-48 (p. 439). 
113
 Serequeberhan, summarizing these views, labels them ‘Senghor’s internalized and ontologized 
racism’, in The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizon and Discourse, p. 46. See also pp. 
49-52 for Serequeberhan’s convincing argument that, for Senghor, ‘it is Indo-European humanity 
which, properly speaking, is the embodiment of “true” humanity as such. […] Africanité — on its 
own terms — describes the humanity of the human in Negro-African existence as primitive 
savagery’, pp. 50-52. 
114
 According to Towa, the very question about whether there exists a black reason relies on the 
racist context which makes it possible; v. ‘L’Idée d’une philosophie negro-africaine’. 
115
 See Myth, Literature and the African World, pp. 127-9; see also chapter 2, section 4. 3, of this 
thesis. 
116
 ‘In Praise of Alienation’ in The Surreptitious Speech, pp. 201-224 (p. 205). 
117
 Coundouriotis comments that ‘Senghor addressed the future and not the past in his humanistic 
ideal, seeking to assert what Fabian calls the “coevalness” of African and European experience 
from the present moment onward’, Claiming History, p. 82. 
118
 Cf. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin et la politique africaine, throughout. 
119
 I am thinking principally of Senghor’s discussion of this subject in ‘Ce que l’homme noir 
apporte’, in Liberté 1, pp. 22-38. 
120
 The principal texts we have used in our reading of Senghor were first published between 1939 
(‘Ce que l’homme noir apporte’) and 1966 (‘Negritude’ in Optima). Compare Césaire’s less 
moderate critique of the colonial culture, in Discours sur le colonialisme, p. 41. 
121
 See section 2.3 of this thesis, and Liberté 1, p. 259. 
122
 Cf. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin et la Politique Africaine. 
123
 Hountondji ascribes a methodology which is not supposed to be relevant to any particular 
school, movement, style, or generation of philosophy. See section 3.4. 
124
 Compare Senghor, who says ‘le Négro-Africain nous a, toujours et partout, présenté une 
conception du monde à l’opposé de la philosophie classique’, Liberté 3, p. 72. 
125
 For details, see chapter 2 of this thesis. 
126
 ‘Beauvoir and the Problem of Race’, in Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, ed by Julie K. 
Ward and Tommy L. Lott, pp. 260-284 (p. 282). See also M. P. More, ‘Outlawing Racism in 
Philosophy: On Race and Philosophy’, in The African Philosophy Reader, pp. 364-373 (especially 
pp. 370-372). 
127
 Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, trans. by John T. 
Goldthwait (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 113. 
128
 In making use of the following extracts from minority discourse texts I am certainly not 
assuming that these are the only or the best examples. Rather, it is a matter of looking at a style of 
discourse which theorizes the problems of marginalizing violence, since it is precisely this element 
that was said to be lacking in the responses of Senghor and Hountondji. 
129
 Nancy Hartsock, ‘Rethinking Modernism: Minority vs. Majority Theories’, in The Nature and 
Context of Minority Discourse , pp. 17-36. 
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130
 Such is the tone of ‘Vues sur l’Afrique Noire ou assimiler, non être assimilés’ in Liberté 1, pp. 
39-69. He even goes so far as to say that the French language, due to its clarity, orderliness and 
harmony, is the perfect vehicle for African development (p. 65). Since this essay, like the others, 
was written for a French audience we may infer that Senghor’s extreme tact was at least in part for 
the sake of diplomacy. 
131
 I use the equivocation ‘minority or marginalized’ because groups such as women are, of 
course, numerically in the majority. In general I shall treat the two terms as synonymous. 
132
 Simone de Beauvoir, Le Deuxième sexe (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), p. 131. See also The 
Hermeneutics of African Philosophy, pp. 62-3. 
133
 Cf. La Philosophie bantoue, p. 17; The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy, pp. 60-2. 
134
 Cf. Césaire, Discours sur le colonialisme, throughout; and The Hermeneutics of African 
Philosophy, pp. 55-85. 
135
 Nancy Hartsock, The Nature and Context of Minority Discourse, p. 21, note 3. 
136
 I am not claiming that Hartsock would accept these points of view, only that the over-
simplicity of her analysis entails them. 
137
 Cf. Peau noire, masques blancs; Le Portrait du colonisé. 
138
 There are other marginalized groups, whose concerns are not taken to be solidary with minority 
discourse. Extreme right-wing organisations — ‘white-power’ groups, and so on — are also 
marginal. 
139
 Kobena Mercer, Welcome to the Jungle: New Positions in Black Cultural Studies (New York: 
Routledge, 1994), p. 194. 
140
 Kobena Mercer, Welcome to the Jungle: New Positions in Black Cultural Studies (New York: 
Routledge, 1994), p. 194. 
141
 This is not such a strange idea as it may sound: both Fanon and Memmi discuss colonized 
subjects who internalize their oppression and are, in effect, their own worst enemy. See Peau 
noire, masques blancs, and Le Portrait du colonisé. 
142
 There are traditionally at least two broad senses to the term ‘violence’: the more obvious being 
the use of (excessive or undue) force against other people or objects. The second, perhaps 
derivative, and less common sense is ‘to distort or twist the sense or intention of’. See Collins 
English Dictionary (1998). 
143
 It is possible to hold that there are differences between ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’ without wishing to 
assign any moral value to those differences. 
144
 Obviously in some way it is what is called for, since without an understanding of the racist’s 
subjectivity there is no rational way of proceeding to counter, undermine, or simply treat it. 
145
 This is analogous to Mudimbé’s description of ‘l’ethnologie qui peut, au gré des idéologies 
ambiantes en Occident, privilégier tour à tour ou simultanément la thèse du relativisme culturel ou 
son contraire’, in L’Odeur du Père, p. 99. 
146
 Cf. ‘On Government’, in Three Essays by John Stuart Mill. 
147
 The Nature and Context of Minority Discourse, p. 71. For a more contextualized discussion of 
these issues, see M. P. More’s ‘Outlawing Racism in Philosophy: On Race and Philosophy’, in 
The African Philosophy Reader, pp. 364-373; Anthony Appiah’s ‘ The Uncompleted Argument: 
Du Bois and the Illusion of Race’, in‘Race’, Writing, and Difference, ed by H. L. Gates, Jnr. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 21-37; and Lucius Outlaw’s On Race and 
Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1996). 
148
 According to Hountondji, the strict sense of the word ‘philosophy’ is an ‘ensemble de texts et 
de discours explicites, [une] littérature d’intention philosophique.’ See Sur la ‘philosophie 
africaine’, p. 33, n. 20, and also chapter 3 of this thesis. 
149
 E.g., Towa ‘Conditions d’une affirmation d’une pensée philosophique africaine moderne’; 
Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (London: 
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Methuen, 1992), pp. 135-171; Serequeberhan, The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy, pp. 13-
30. 
150
 ‘The perceptions and arguments of the professional philosophers inevitably show the 
consequences of what Mudimbe … describes as “silently depending on a Western episteme,” and 
share the weaknesses of inauthenticity that are often associated with Négritude …’ Oyenka 
Owomoyela in African Philosophy: The Essential Readings, p. 181.  
151
 As Margaret A. Simmons comments: ‘if racial differences are not cast in stone, they are 
nonetheless salient features of individual lives in a racist society’, in Philosophers on Race: 
Critical Essays,  
ed. by Julie K. Ward and Tommy L. Lott (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), pp. 260-285 (p. 
282). 
152
 Manthia Diawara, in Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation & Postcolonial Perspectives, ed. by 
Anne McClintock et al (Minnesota: University Of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 456-467 (p. 457). 
153
 Jean-Claude Willame ‘L’Autre face du royaume ou le meurtre du père’, in Génève-Afrique 
(1976), 1, 89-95 (p. 90). Willame continues: ‘Cette minorité a été formée par des maîtres 
admirables, certes, mais qui appartient [au] royaume européen.’ 
154
 The preceding citation is the subtitle to L´Odeur du Père. Mudimbé describes his collection of 
essays as ‘écrits de circonstance. Différents et même, apparemment, contradictoires, ils sont 
davantage expressions d’une interrogation attentive à la vie et au milieu vital que recherches 
systématiques selon les normes scolaires’. In L’Odeur du Père: essai sur des limites de la science 
et de la vie en Afrique noire (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1982), p. 14.  All further citations of 
Mudimbé, unless indicated otherwise, will refer to this text. 
155
 I leave the last three items of this list in their original French forms since it seems to me that a 
concise translation would lack precision, and a precise one would lack concision. 
156
 Note the naval image invoked by the term arrimer — ‘to lash, or stow’ — Africa would 
therefore be constrained both in terms of position and direction, both subordinate to the West at 
present and fated to follow the same line of progress. Mudimbé develops these elements later on, 
as shall we. 
157
 Tibor Mende, quoted by Mudimbé, p. 12. We might also add to this list of economic problems 
faced by Africa, the enormous burden of financial debt owed to various national and international 
banks, and the obligation to produce so-called ‘cash crops’ (which are largely destined to 
constitute luxury goods for Eur-American consumption) and thus neglect the public food supply, a 
policy whose disastrous consequences have been seen in the chronic famine suffered by the poor 
of several African countries during the recent decades. Serequeberhan also remarks: ‘in the name 
and in the guise of technological and scientific “assistance” Europe imposes on us its hegemonic 
political and cultural control’, ref.  p. 21 
158
 According to Hountondji this is the case with ethnophilosophy, which thereby becomes a 
‘réplique scientifique de l’extraversion de nos économies dominées’, in ‘Occidentalisme, élitisme: 
réponse à deux critiques’, in Recherche, Pédagogie et Culture 9, 56, 58-67 (p. 63). 
159
 See Mudimbé, The Invention of Africa, pp. 86-90, and Sartre’s ‘Orphée Noir, in the Anthologie 
de la nouvelle poésie nègre, pp. ix-xliv. 
160
 This citation is reminiscent of Fanon: ‘la philosophie n’a jamais sauvé personne … 
l’intelligence non plus n’a jamais sauvé personne … si c’est au nom de l’intelligence et de la 
philosophie que l’on proclame l’égalité des hommes, c’est en leur nom aussi qu’on décide leur 
extermination’, in Peau noire, masques blancs, p. 22. We explore this link further in what follows. 
161
 There is a further rapport between these two terms: étreindre, here implying ‘to embrace’, may 
also mean ‘to grip tightly’; the noun étreinte may also be translated ‘stranglehold’, hence the 
danger of étouffement (suffocation, smothering). 
162
 Compare JanMohammed and Lloyd: ‘Such pluralism tolerates the existence of salsa, it even 
enjoys Mexican restaurants, but it bans Spanish as a medium of instruction in American schools’, 
p. 8 in The Nature and Context of Minority Discourse. 
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163
 Mudimbé with B. Jewsiewicki, ‘African’s Memories and Contemporary History of Africa’, in 
History & Theory (1993) 32. 4, 1-11 (p. 3). 
164
 Also note the voluntary renunciation of the claim to objectivity; Mudimbé: ‘il se peut que cet 
ensemble de traits soit purement accidentel ou n’ait d’autre sens que de signifier moi-même’ (p. 
14). Fanon writes: ‘je n’ai pas voulu être objectif. D’ailleurs c’est faux: il ne m’a pas été possible 
d’être objectif’, in Peau noire, masques blancs, p. 70. 
165
 Lettre à Maurice Thorez (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1956), p. 15. Hountondji also cites this 
passage (see below). 
166
 Mudimbé, L’Autre face du royaume, une introduction à la critique des langages en folie 
(Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1974), p. 136. Cf. David Armstrong’s theory of ‘immanent 
universals’, Universals and Scientific Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
See also Memmi, Portrait du colonisé, p. 12. 
167
 Mudimbé is here making explicit reference to Michel Foucault’s L’Ordre du discours (Paris: 
Éditions Gallimard, 1971). 
168
 See also Mudimbé’s ‘African Gnosis’, where he writes: ‘epistemological contexts … make 
[discourses] possible and … account for them in an essential way’, in African Studies Review 
(1985) vol. 28, nos 2/3, 149-233 (p. 149). Towa also makes a similar case: ‘Conditions d’une 
affirmation…’, p. 348. 
169
 L’Odeur du Père, part I, section 3. 
170
 This is, of course, a common reproach made to post-modernists like Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard 
and Rorty. For a criticism of these writers along such lines, see Nancy Hartsock in The Nature and 
Context of Minority Discourse, pp. 17-36. 
171
 Of course, there is no obligation to give an English translation; I am working on the assumption 
that if we can give an adequate translation then we understand and can make use of the phrase. In 
what follows, a periphrastic translation of the term is also the beginning of an exegesis. 
172
 Cf. the title of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s book, In My Father’s House. 
173
 ‘Space’ in the literal sense of the word and also in the senses which imply ‘les attitudes d’être, 
[…] l’exercice de la pensée, les pratiques de connaissance et les manières de vivre’, L’Odeur du 
Père, p. 11. 
174
 Compare vision, which Locke calls ‘the most comprehensive of all our Senses’, An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), Book 
II, Chapter IX, §9. See also M. Foucault, Les Mots et les choses (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1966), 
pp. 144-5. 
175
 Notably ‘L’Esthétique négro-africaine’, in Liberté 1: Négritude et Humanisme (1964), pp. 202-
217 — see chapter 2 of this thesis. 
176
 And see Eleni Coundouriotis, Claiming History: Colonialism, Ethnography and the Novel 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 73-96, where she discusses Paul Hazoumé’s 
ethnographical rewriting of Western interpretations of African art and symbolism. 
177
 La Pensée africaine: recherches sur les fondements de la pensée négro-africaine (Dakar: Les 
Nouvelles Éditions Africaines, 1983), pp. 58-60. 
178
 Indeed, unless we take the particle ‘de’ in the phrase ‘l’odeur du Père’ to indicate a causal link, 
it does not even mean that he ever existed.. 
179
 Mythologies (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1957), p. 128. 
180
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1928), §293. 
181
 Is the last item in the list really ‘aid’, or something which ‘[sert] remarquablement bien à la 
recolonisation’? L’Odeur du Père, p. 12. 
182
 Surely this is precisely what Owomoyela has in mind when he claims that the ‘professional 
philosophers’ ‘silently depend on a Western episteme’ and goes on to argue that ‘in order to 
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rehabilitate our professional philosophers, African universities might need to absorb the discipline 
of philosophy into their institutes of African Studies. The philosophers would then have strong 
inducements to shed their present disdain for African Studies’. See Owomoyela in African 
Philosophy: The Essential Readings, pp. 181-2. 
183
 Robert Graves notes that ‘official English literature of the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries 
cannot … properly be understood except in the light of Greek mythology …’, in The Greek Myths 
(Middlesex: Penguin, 1960), p. 11. 
184
 Cited in L’Odeur du Père, p. 9. Senghor also goes further, arguing that Africans must discover 
their blackness and a style to express it through the study of French letters: see Liberté 1, pp. 39-
69. 
185
 Of course it is important to discern the nuances of these positions. The object of Hountondji’s 
dissatisfaction is a discourse that is focussed on Africans while tending to elide them as speaking 
subjects, or, when they are permitted to speak, forcing representations/interpretations of African 
realities into rigid conceptual schemes that are proper to the West. There is no equivalent of this 
with respect to Europe and the Greeks, as the latter were exhumed, so to speak, not assimilated as 
contemporary masters. 
186
 See Eleni Coundouriotis who remarks on ‘a tendency to equate anticolonialism with an anti-
Western attitude’, Claiming History, p. 95. 
187
 Achebe goes on to say :‘I have indicated somewhat offhandedly that the national literature of 
Nigeria and of many other countries of Africa is, or will be, written in English. This may sound 
like a controversial statement, but it isn’t. All I have done has been to look at the reality of 
present-day Africa. This “reality” may change as a result of deliberate, e.g., political, action’, and 
also: 
‘There are not many countries in Africa today where you could abolish the language of the 
erstwhile colonial powers and still retain the faculty for mutual communication […] The only 
reason why we can even talk about African unity is that when we get together we can have a 
manageable number of languages to talk in — English, French, Arabic.’ pp. 94-5. 
188
 Cf. Mudimbé: ‘les critiques […] élident par trop facilement une question majeure, celle du sens 
de l’écart à prendre à l’égard de l’Occident et ce qu’il coûte vraiment d’assumer cet écart’, 
L’Odeur du Père, p. 44. This line of thought is developed below. 
189
 Cf. La Mentalité primitive. 
190
 L’Odeur du Père, p. 45 and Jean Baudrillard, Le Miroir de la production (Paris: Éditions 
Galilée, 1985), p. 97. 
191
 Compare what Carlos A. Forment writes of post-colonial writing: ‘Postcolonial narratives do 
not aspire to provide a definitive account of the encounter between ex-colonials and ex-imperialist 
masters, rather they provide normative and literary resources for both groups to undergo a 
transformation that takes them beyond their previous experiences of each other. Postcolonial 
narratives, in contrast to Enlightenment stories, do not hold out the promise of complete mastery 
and transparent understanding. Instead, what they offer its practitioners is an acknowledgement of 
differences and a tolerance for the mobile, nonfixed, fluid nature of sociopolitical meaning …’. 
Carlos A. Forment, ‘Culture, Identity, Democracy’, in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the 
Boundaries  of the Political, ed by Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996), p. 320. 
192
 L’Odeur du Père, p. 100. See also Benoît Verhargen’s essay ‘The African University: 
Evaluation and Perspectives’, in The Surreptitious Speech, pp. 333-343. 
193
 B. Verhaegen, quoted in L’Odeur du Père, p. 101. 
194
 L’Odeur du Père, part II chapter 3 and part III chapter 5. See also chapter 5 of Appiah’s In my 
Father’s House for a discussion of these criteria. 
195
 It is worth noting the resonance between Senghor’s confident phrase and the critical 
introduction to L’Odeur du Père, where it is stated that ‘l’occidentalisation de l’Afrique […] est à 
présent une action et un mouvement qui […] président à l’aménagement de la vie et même de la 
pensée’, p. 11. 
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196
 See Towa ‘Conditions d’une affirmation …’, p. 341; Wiredu, Philosophy and an African 
Culture, p. 61; and Bodunrin in African Philosophy: An Introduction, 3rd edn, ed by Richard A. 
Wright (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984), p. 7. 
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